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ABSTRACT 
Process plants are complex socio-technical systems that degrade gradually and 
change with advancing technology. This research deals with exploring and answering 
questions related to the uncertainties involved in the process systems, and their complexity. 
It aims to systematically integrate resilience in process design and operations through three 
different phases of prediction, survival, and recovery using a novel framework called 
Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF). The analysis relies on simulation, data-
driven models and optimization approach employing the resilience metrics developed in 
this research. In particular, an integrated method incorporating aspects of process 
operations, equipment maintenance, and process safety is developed for the following three 
phases: 
 Prediction: to find the feasible operating region under changing conditions
using Bayesian approach, global sensitivity analysis, and robust simulation
methods,
 Survival: to determine optimal operations and maintenance strategies using
simulation, Bayesian regression analysis, and optimization, and
 Recovery: to develop a strategy for emergency barriers in abnormal situations using
dynamic simulation, Bayesian analysis, and optimization.
Examples of a batch reactor, and cooling tower operations process unit are used to
illustrate the application of PRAF. The results demonstrate that PRAF is successful in 
capturing the interactions between the process operability characteristics, maintenance, and 
safety policy. The prediction phase analysis leads to good dynamic response and stability 
iii 
of operations. The survival phase helps in the reduction of unplanned shutdown and 
downtime. The recovery phase results in in reduced severity of consequences, and response 
time and overall enhanced recovery. Overall, PRAF achieves flexibility, 
controllability and reliability of the system, supports more informed decision-making and 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION, CHALLENGES AND NEED FOR ADVANCED 
RISK AND RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT* 
Risk management challenges and continuous increase of global public aversion to 
hazards and risks associated with the process industry have been observed in the recent 
years. In order to manage process industry risk, several studies and methods have been 
developed and are currently used. Two types of interacting factors: 1) technical (equipment 
malfunction, process parameter variation), and 2) social (regulations/policy, human and 
organizational factors) are important in assessment of risk for a process system. However, 
current methods are based on an analysis of either technical factors, often quantitatively, or 
social factors, usually qualitatively. Apart from failure to establish all critical scenarios due 
to either factors, their combined and interactive effects are seldom considered. This 
research need calls for the development of a holistic and integrated systems framework for 
effective risk management, although full coverage of possible mishaps will be utopian.  
The application of the resilience engineering perspective is gradually being 
explored as an approach for considering the dynamics of socio-technical aspects based 
on systems theory to provide a safety net. This research presents a novel framework - 
Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF) for incorporating both technical and 
*Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Pasman, H. J., Waldram, S. P., Rogers, W. J., & Mannan, 
M. S., "Did we learn about risk control since Seveso? Yes, we surely did, but is it enough? An historical brief 
and problem analysis," JLPPI, Vol 49, Part A, Pages 5-17. Copyright 2017 Elsevier Ltd.
Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Reese, A. M., Chaudhari, D., Mentzer, R. A., & Mannan, 
M. S., "Regulatory approaches-Safety case vs US approach: Is there a best solution today?", JLPPI, Vol 46, 
Pages 154-162. Copyright 2017 Elsevier Ltd.
1 
2 
social factors in an integrated approach. This is based on four aspects: Early Detection 
(ED), Error Tolerant Design (ETD), Plasticity (P) and Recoverability (R). The resilience 
methodology emphasizes dynamics, unforeseen and even unknown types of threats, 
uncertainty, systems degradation and complex interactions. With resilience metrics a 
combined framework for predictability, survivability and recoverability, all via dynamic 
analysis, is introduced. PRAF primarily focuses on early detection of unsafe domains of 
operation, assessment of aggregate risks and prioritization of safety barriers during process 
upset situations and reduction in response time resulting in a reduced frequency of loss of 
containment events LoC, reduced consequences and enhanced recovery.  
1.1. Motivation and Challenges 
Statistics for incidents and LoC events show that they have continued to happen 
globally and have occurred across a wide variety of industrial sectors. Also, there are 
limitations in existing risk management methods. For this research, a systems-based 
resilience approach is proposed to address the gaps identified from literature and to answer 
the following questions:  
 How to predict or find frequency of occurrence of LoC events with developing
technology, complexities and stringent regulations?
 How to assess risk with existing safety barriers?
 How to prioritize emergency barriers, and signals from them, in order to reduce
response time?
In the next sub-sections, the limitations of risk assessment methods, incident 
statistics, and failure of complex systems are briefly described. 
3 
1.1.1. Limitations of risk assessment and management 
There are different types of risk assessment methods: Deterministic and 
Probabilistic, or Qualitative and Quantitative1. Some of the major risk identification, 
estimation and evaluation methods used currently for risk assessment and management 
are2: 
 Risk identification: Hazard and operability study (HAZOP), What-if analysis.
 Risk estimation: Fault Tree Analysis FTA, Failure mode and effect analysis
(FMEA), Human reliability analysis HRA, Event tree analysis (ETA), Cost
benefit and risk benefit analysis (CBA/RBA), Sensibility analysis (SA), Expert
systems, and databases.
 Risk evaluation: Monte-Carlo simulation, Hertz-type simulation.
The following are two main observations: 
 In general risk assessments are based on a mechanistic approach for problem
solving. In such cases, the emergent properties arising from the whole system
are not recognized.
 Thus far, social factors related to regulations, humans and organizations are not
considered in an integrated way during the risk assessment.
The general methods ignore specificities of the studied scenario and complexities 
of scenarios are generally simplified. The knowledge background of the people, who are 
participating in the risk analysis, is critical (e.g., as with the main hazard identification 
technique of HAZOP), and is susceptible to bias and ignorance. Additionally, in HAZOP 
studies, analysts may miss half of the significant scenarios, resulting from a variety of 
causes, such as failure to anticipate human errors and often miss the interconnections 
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between various system elements1; not discovering design errors3, 4; and weaknesses of the 
method itself and team competency5. Furthermore, there is a great disconnection between 
risk analysis methodologies and social factors (human and organization). The most 
comprehensive method is quantitative risk analysis, however, analysts have a tendency, to 
model only equipment failures that appear in databases whereas failure modes may differ 
widely and historical data may be orders of magnitude different from actual values for a 
case at hand. Apart from that there are many assumptions made on the nature and follow-
up of unintentional hazardous material releases and consequence effects that leads to 
uncertainty. Often, uncertainty boundaries are vaguely defined. Also, in practice, a 
thorough review of risk assessment studies is rare. 
1.1.2. Incidents over the years 
Developments and advancements in areas of process safety and risk management 
have arisen and been implemented over the years in the industry. However, a retrospective 
look at the major incidents in the process industry as shown in Figures I.1 and I.2 reveal 
that incidents continue to happen globally6. It is evident from Figure I.1 that the incidents 
are global in nature with the maximum percentage of incidents reported in the United 
States. Figure I.2 illustrates the property damage for 100 largest losses in the last two 
decades in various business sectors. It can be seen that losses as high as 12,488 US million 
dollars have occurred in the upstream business unit. This data is supporting the fact that 
there is an increasing trend of incidents, complexity and degradation of the process 
systems. 
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Figure I.1 Percentage of global incidents (developed using data from Marsh report6) 


























































1.1.3. Complex systems failure 
Evaluating and managing risk for complex systems such as infrastructure – power, 
transport; the aerospace industry; the nuclear and energy sector; process industries; 
medical units; financial and business divisions, etc., is critical for the survival and growth 
of the nation and its people. However, in the modern world one of the major challenges in 
the risk management of these is the relative lack of knowledge and expertise to deal with 
the uncertainties. Hence, looking at the risk problem from a systemic viewpoint will be 
conducive in effective risk management and thus avoid the conventional notions of risk 
independence. It is evident that it is the relationships between various components and 
parts of the systems and their structure that lead to many failures7. Examples of such 
failures of complex systems are summarized in Table I.1.  
The research questions that need to be answered are - how do we address the 
systemic issues and elevate them to the attention of higher management levels, and more 
importantly do these complex systems require new approaches and models. For example, 
degradation of both process systems (due to ageing assets) and safety culture do not occur 
overnight. It is a slow process, which may not be perceived by many who are involved. 
However, can we make such organizational drifts visible with process system indicators 
and resilience metrics that are subject to temporal fluctuations? Therefore, what is needed 
is a new approach i.e., the systems approach of resilience and hence recognition of process 
upset events as potential precursors of catastrophic incidents. This is all about early 
detection of weak signals and hence providing maximum time for a considered response. 
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Table I.1: Complex system failures 












 Over 40 tons of 
(MIC) was released 
into the atmosphere 
and the toxic vapors 
spread into the 
nearby neighboring 
community 
 Management failure towards
accountability and corporate
commitment to safety
 No management of change
system for evaluation of  safe
shutdown
 Failure of safeguards on
demand due to poor equipment
integrity and operating
procedures
 Safety equipment such as






















thousand people die 
every year from 
medical errors  
10.Communication
system broke down
and Josie was given a
fatal dose of
methadone
 Lack of communication
between the different
healthcare providers involved.
















Financial firms much 
more susceptible to 
systemic risk due to 
high interconnections 
with one another 
Due to the collapse of 
the company, Bear 
Stearns was finally 
sold to J P Morgan 
 Weak supervision resulted in
undue risk and a failure to
maintain sufficient capital
Company 
was sold to 
JP Morgan 
Chase for $10 
















The space shuttle 
Challenger exploded 
73 seconds after 
launch 
 Failure of one of the O-rings
on one of the solid rocket
boosters.
Significant pressure on the
NASA managers.
 Policy related issues, e.g.,
from policy, ‘fully operational’
meant that it could be used for
routine operations (not test
flights) and ‘cost effective’
was interpreted to mean that it
could be launched on schedule
without delays
Loss of crew 
(7 fatalities), 






1.2. Need for Advanced Risk and Resilience Assessment 
Since the Seveso disaster 40 years ago, not only risk management methods, but also 
challenges to the process industry, have increased along with change in the public’s risk 
perception globally. The Seveso incident brought to attention some critical issues, such as 
lack of knowledge on runaway reaction scenarios, hazards of formation of dioxins, lack of 
regulatory requirements, poor communication and coordination, and no emergency 
response or evacuation plans. Regulations related to process safety and risk management 
have evolved with time as compared to earlier when there were no specific regulations for 
controls of such major hazards as became evident during the Seveso incident. Some 
existing gaps are lack of learning from previous incidents, scale-up issues, limitations of 
experiments related to real scenarios (e.g., vapor cloud explosion), uncertainties involved 
in complex systems and their gradual degradation. This necessitates developing and using 
advanced methods and a holistic approach such as resilience and advanced mathematic-
statistical methods to resolve these issues.  
1.2.1. Regulations 
Regulations give a great impulse to improvement of environmental protection, and 
also of occupational and process safety, both in the United States (US) and in Europe. 
Regulatory regimes – safety case and US Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations 
are analyzed with regard to their effectiveness in preventing process safety events.  In 
order to compare industry’s safety performance within the different regulatory regimes and 
rationale behind the statements/claims made globally, a comparative assessment of the 
process safety performance of four countries was carried out: Australia, Norway, United 
Kingdom (UK) and US for two major sectors: offshore upstream and refining. Also, a brief 
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comparison based on data from an operator with global facilities has been included. As 
will be further addressed, the regulatory approach is only one of several factors impacting 
safety performance, and robust evaluation of such regulatory regimes should also consider 
operator and regulator roles and competency, age of facilities and inherent hazards. 
The various country regulations evolved over time, with Norway the first to use a 
safety case approach in the 1980’s, followed by the UK after the Piper Alpha incident and 
Lord Cullen report, and then Australia.  US regulations themselves have evolved over 
time, with a combination of prescriptive regulations and the performance based PSM 
approach in 1992.  Table I.2 presents the comparison between the safety case regulations 
and a more hybrid approach of US PSM regulations13.  
Figure I.3 summarizes the differences between the two regulatory approaches by 
highlighting the various elements13. The Safety case approach covers more elements as 
compared to the US-based regulations. 
Figure I.3: Differences between the two process safety regulations 
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Table I.2: Summary: comparison of regulatory regimes 
Safety Case US PSM regulations 
A risk – or – hazard management framework 
- Identifying controls to deal with identified
hazards and measures taken to ensure
continual working of the controls function.
Analogous to requirement of PHA by PSM 
standard 
- 1910.119 states PHA ‘should be
appropriate to the complexity of the
process and shall identify, evaluate, and
control the hazards involved in the
process.’
A requirement to make the case to the 
regulator 
- Company demonstrates process of hazard
analysis, and why certain controls are chosen
over other. Safety case acceptance provides
license to operate.
- Regulator can impose higher standard on
operators to respond to hazards.
- US regulators do not evaluate and pass
judgment of hazard management plans
before allowing an operation to
commence.
- Misconception that safety case regulation
is abandonment of prescription.
A competent and independent regulator 
- Safety case jurisdiction cannot be enacted.
High level of expertise is necessary to
accept/reject safety case.
- Safety case changes what auditors do on the
site visits. Rather than ensuring updated
documents/working hardware, they need to
ensure if specified control is functioning as
indented.
- Comments of US offshore safety
regulator, James Watson, suggests that the
agency does not intend to engage
companies in the way that is necessary to
impose safety case.
Workforce involvement 
- Employee participation is necessary for
development of the case to the regulator.
- PSM also requires employee participation.
SEMS II, which became active in 2013
also requires employee consulting. OSHA
requires inspectors to consult employee
representatives on site, but no such
regulation for offshore.
A general duty of care imposed on the 
operator to reduce risk to ‘as low as 
reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) 
- Provides leverage for regulators.
o This is why fire protection
standards on rigs in UK waters are
higher than those in Gulf of
Mexico.
- Duty of operator to do whatever practicable
to identify and control all hazards.
o Operator cannot claim to be in
compliance just because it has gone
through hazard identification
process.
- If there is no directly applicable rule,
operators still have a duty to manage risk.
o They should maintain some
reasonable level of risk awareness
that goes beyond mere compliance.
- Blind compliance mentality characterized
by Minerals Management Service (MMS)
regime.
- US OSH Act. Section 5(a)(1) of the Act
specifies that employers must provide a
workplace that is ‘‘free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm.”
o Impose a duty on employers only
when the hazard is actually
causing or likely to cause harm.




1.2.2. Country-specific regulations 
The country specifics are summarized below. 
Australia 
The Australian regulatory system is performance-based, but with prescriptive 
elements. There are different regulations on safety critical equipment and safety outcomes 
for exploration and production operations for various states in Australia. These include 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Western Australia); Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Victoria); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1981 
(Northern Territory); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (South Australia); 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1982 (Tasmania); Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 
1982 (Queensland); Petroleum (Offshore) Act 1982 (New South Wales); Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety) Regulations 2009. 
Norway 
Norway’s regulatory system dates back to 1972 when the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD) and Statoil were created. The NPD has most of the responsibility as 
government’s technical advisor and ensures companies comply with the obligations of the 
Norwegian regulations. Norwegian Maritime Authority, Norwegian coastal administration, 
and civil aviation administration eventually came on board as supervisory bodies for 
exploration and drilling, helidecks and so on. The regulatory system advocates a 
performance-based system with the major concern being minimizing the risk posed by 
various operations. The regulations provide flexibility with regard to the use of technology 
by encouraging use of standards to comply with the regulatory requirements. The 
Alexander L Kielland accommodation facility incident in 198014  led to organizational 
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change, with NPD more involved in a coordinating role and other supervisory bodies 
acquired the role of providing technical assistance in their area of specialty to NPD. 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), after splitting from NPD, came into effect in 2004 to 
administer safety and working environment15.     
United Kingdom 
The recommendations of the Lord Cullen report after the Piper Alpha disaster in 
1988 were reinforced by implementing a new regulation, Safety Case Regulation. This is a 
goal-setting approach where the operator prepares a detailed safety case assessment of the 
hazards and actions to mitigate risk to an acceptable level, while the regulator is to provide 
an independent assessment that hazards and risks are being appropriately identified and 
managed.  In 2005, UK HSE revised the Safety Case Regulations and included more 
details on significance of Quantitative Risk Assessment. The purpose of Offshore 
Installations (Safety Case) Regulations (2005) is to help in the reduction and mitigation of 
risks and hazards associated with the offshore installations and related activities.  For 
onshore facilities, UK follows a similar regulation called Control of Major Accident 
Hazards (COMAH).  
United States 
As previously noted, the US approach to regulation has both prescriptive and 
performance-based aspects. The regulations provide minimum criteria of design, 
maintenance, and reporting to be achieved by each facility. A number of requirements or 
best practices included in voluntary standards and guidelines like API and ASME have 
been incorporated into the CFR.  OSHA PSM applies to onshore facilities like refineries. It 
is considered a performance-based approach, requiring the operator to perform various 
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activities such as Process Hazard Analysis and Management of Change but the approach 
taken to meet those objectives is left to the operator. 
The Minerals Management Service (MMS) was created in 1982 to manage oil, gas 
and mineral resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). It assumed responsibility to 
administer execution of activities in the OCS.  The Macondo incident in 2010 led to major 
organizational reforms and discussions. Suggestions were made to adopt a performance-
based regulatory system. MMS, which was renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), was reorganized into two separate 
agencies – the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). The BOEM was given authority to manage 
environmental and economic development of offshore resources while the BSEE 
undertook the role of ensuring safety of offshore operations, permitting conditions, 
inspections, and the regulatory program.   In 2010 an updated API recommended practice 
in the form of the Safety & Environmental Management System (SEMS) was put forth by 
BSEE to regulate offshore operations, with a performance-based format similar to OSHA 
PSM.  SEMS contains the elements of PSM (e.g., hazard analysis, mechanical integrity, 
emergency response) with additional third party facility audit requirements and 
inspections. 
1.2.3. Results: Data analysis 
Financial loss 
Figures I.4, I.5, I.6, and I.7 give the non-normalized data for cumulative value of 
damage in million dollars for total, petrochemical, refinery and upstream losses, 
respectively. These charts are based on the “100 Largest Losses” report by Marsh 6. It is 
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evident from Figures I.4, I.5, I.6, and I.7 that there was progress made in safety in the US, 
Australia and UK since the installation of PSM and safety case regulations. However, the 
lack of a common and consistent normalization factor makes it very difficult to interpret 
the data appropriately. The number of major incidents has remained low in Norway over 
time, but all incidents in the database have occurred since the installation of the safety case 
regulation. US safety has generally improved since PSM has been implemented.  The data 
also indicates UK’s safety performance has improved since safety case was instituted. 
There is no clear distinction between performances among countries. There is 
improvement, but no country is a clear leader. 
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Figure I.5: Petrochemical losses 
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Figure I.7: Upstream losses 
Process Safety consequences by country (offshore upstream) 
This study presents an analysis based on the best available data. However, it should 
not be ignored that process safety performance data reporting and collection lacks a 
globally accepted criteria. There is a need of a universal system of process safety 
performance measurement, reporting and data collection. Process Safety performance of 
different countries is compared based on fatalities, major injuries, major fires and oil spills 
data from IRF and Oslo & Paris Conventions Commission16. 
Table I.3 provides the number of events that are represented within the normalized 
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Table I.3: Process safety events (non-normalized data) 
Countries US UK Norway Australia 
No. of fatalities 
2007 4 1 1 0 
2008 11 0 0 1 
2009 4 0 1 0 
2010 12 0 0 0 
2011 3 2 1 0 
2012 4 0 0 2 
No. of major injuries 
2007 50 36 34 7 
2008 70 38 31 13 
2009 59 42 31 11 
2010 78 44 27 9 
2011 38 32 27 8 
2012 49 46 29 5 
No. of major fires 
2007 10 1 0 1 
2008 4 0 0 1 
2009 3 0 0 3 
2010 1 0 0 0 
2011 4 0 0 0 
2012 9 0 0 0 
No. of oil spills 
2005 146 438 147 - 
2006 45 313 122 - 
2007 37 279 167 - 
2008 84 270 173 - 
2009 42 299 146 - 
2010 22 271 140 - 
It can be observed from Figure I.8, that the US had fatal incidents every year and 
had the worst performance in three out of six years (2007, 2009 and 2010). Australia has 
two spikes for years 2008 and 2012, while Norway has a more or less flat trend. Hence, 
there is a varying trend and it is difficult to conclude which performance trends and thus 
which type of regulation is better.   
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Figure I.9 gives the normalized performance of the number of major injuries. The 
definition of the term ‘Major Injury’ has been developed by IRF based on HSE (UK) and 
PSA15 requirements. It is defined as any work-related injury that results in one or more of 
the following: amputation, skeletal injuries, burns, injuries to internal organs only if the 
injured person becomes unconscious, is admitted to the hospital, or requires resuscitation, 
eye injuries, any acute illness, hypothermia, any injury resulting in unconsciousness, 
resuscitation, or admittance to the hospital. It can be concluded from Figure I.8 that UK 
has the highest number of major injuries for three years - 2009, 2010 & 2012. Australia has 
a peak in year 2008. Norway’s injuries are typically +50% higher than US.  All three 
safety case countries have a higher number of injuries than the US for all the years except 
for 2012.  
Number of major fires per 100 offshore installations has been plotted vs. year as 
shown in Figure I.10. It is clear that there is no trend, although Australia has the worst 
performance for three consecutive years, and none since ‘09. US can be seen to have a 
relatively flat trend. Norway’s performance is best, followed by UK. Figure I.11 covers the 
number of normalized spills for three countries Norway, UK and US. It can be seen that 
the UK has the least number of normalized spills, closely tracked by the US with a 
decreasing trend. Norway’s normalized spills are comparatively high.  As a reminder, the 
OSPAR database does not include Australian spills to water.  
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Figure I.8: Fatalities 
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Figure I.10: Major fires 






















































































Process Safety consequences by country (refining) 
Incidents in refineries across four countries, US, UK, Norway and Australia were 
analyzed. The timeline for incidents was from 1994 to 2012 as per Marsh data. Figure I.12 
shows the number of incidents per country per year. Here, it can be observed that the total 
number of incidents per year in the US is very high compared to UK, Norway and 
Australia. However, when normalized in Figure I.13 a more valid representation of the data 
shows that all countries have similar safety performance.   
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Figure I.13: Incident rate 
The number of refineries in each country is quite different, as is the refinery 
capacity. For example, average capacity of refineries in the US in 2012 was around 17,737 
thousand barrels per day (BPD) and for Australia in the same year a much more modest 
760 thousand BPD.  The Energy Information Administration (EIA) database was used to 
obtain the values of capacity of refineries for all countries from years 1994 to 2012. This 
capacity was used as a normalization factor to calculate the incident rate, defined as below. 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦
                          (1.1) 
Normalized refinery incident rates are shown in Figure I.14. The plot shows that 
there is no clear difference between the performances of countries with respect to safety. In 
some years, UK and Norway show remarkable performance with zero incidents, while in 
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peaks and a varying trend over the years. US performance is fairly uniform compared to 
others.   
To dampen out the annual variation in Figure I.14, average incident rates for the 
four countries were calculated and are shown in Figure I.15. Analyzing the average 
incident rate per country, Australia and Norway data have higher rates than the US and the 
UK.  The UK clearly has the best average performance on this metric. Fatalities were also 
computed based on the Marsh data and normalized using capacities obtained from EIA. 
Fatality rate was calculated by using the following formula: 
𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦
 (1.2) 

































Figure I.15: Fatality rate 
From Figure I.14, it can be seen that from years 1994-2012 Norway’s fatality rate 
has been exceedingly good. The UK fatality rate is more than the US for 2004-2012, and 
markedly less for the prior period.  
Operator data 
Data provided by an anonymous operator allows for a more definitive observation, 
based on API RP 754 Tier 1 & 2 incident data for 2014.  Process safety incidents in the 
company’s refining and chemical operations in Europe and Australia where the safety case 
approach is used, were compared with those in the US, Canada, and other locations where 
the PSM approach is used. The operations are substantial, with over 50 million man-hours 
in aggregate for the included sites.  Man-hours were used to normalize the incidents.  Tier 
1 incidents were 33% greater in the countries using the safety case approach and 16% 
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with data from the prior year. No hypotheses are provided as to why the PSM countries 
had fewer incidents, nor is there justification to make definitive conclusions without data 
from additional operators over a broader time horizon.   
In summary, based on the varying trends in fatality and incident rates one cannot 
conclude which country and which regulatory regime is best.  Furthermore, aside from data 
limitations, Swiss Re, et al. have concluded that regulatory regime is just one of several 
factors influencing a facility’s risk, including mode of operation, turnaround intervals, use 
of contractors, etc.17. Clearly such factors are also impacting safety performance as 
measured by lagging indicators. A more comprehensive and holistic systems approach of 
building process resilience including technical, human and organization factors would be 
useful. Hence, there is a need to explore and develop a Resilience Analysis Framework for 
process design as well as operations. 
1.2.4. Knowledge growth and gaps 
Altogether, knowledge about how to prevent environmental pollution and to 
maintain process safety is strongly developed. The growing knowledge resulted in designs, 
materials, and constructions becoming much more reliable and safe in use; new concepts 
were born such as fail-safe applications and inherent safety. The difference between hazard 
and risk became clear, and risk assessment started its development with consequence 
analysis methods describing the phenomenology of releases of hazardous materials in 
physical and chemical terms.  
1.2.5. Process Hazard and Risk analysis 
Process safety starts with identifying and locating hazards. Hence, HAZOP 
developed in the 1970s at Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the UK became quickly a 
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“must-do” all over the world and found application in other engineering applications. 
HAZOP puts emphasis on operational hazardous situations that may be caused by bad 
design, procedures, human failure, and failure of critical safety measures. At the same 
time, techniques developed elsewhere in the military, aerospace, or nuclear power, such as 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), were adopted for identifying potential 
component failures. Both still form the backbone of hazard identification as well as 
additional techniques, such as checklists and ‘What-if’. However, application of the 
techniques does not guarantee that all hazards are found. Not at all, and for a variety of 
reasons as pointed out recently by Leveson from a system’s point of view and by Baybutt 
from human failure in the HAZOP team18, 5, 19. Heavy computerization as proposed by 
Cameron and coworkers in their Blended Hazid (BLHAZID) approach offers good 
perspective, but still more can be done 20. 
Parallel to the early HAZOP and FMEA developments have been those in 
reliability engineering. Reliability thinking enabled mapping failure causation in complex 
installations, such as fault and event tree analysis. Where fault trees from basic failures 
merge and end in a top-event, which in processes exist as a hazardous release, event trees 
branch out to possible subsequent events such as evaporation, dispersion, and ignition et 
cetera, to final events with major consequences. Hence, with these tools in the 1980s risk 
assessment came off the ground with defining risk metrics, such as the individual and 
societal risk, and the use of risk matrices. Some countries in the EU adopted risk 
assessment methods for land use planning, others kept the basis of a license procedure to 
calculate effect distances based on threshold intensities of toxic concentration, radiant heat, 
and explosion blast21. 
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With respect to physical effects of mishaps since the 1980s, many simplifying 
models have been developed. As computational fluid dynamics (CFD) became faster over 
the years, more sophisticated, and professional, it developed into quite a powerful tool for 
predicting consequences of mishaps, such as cloud dispersion and explosion effects. 
Toxicologists formulated probit relations to assess lethality risk as a function of exposure 
to a toxic cloud, while also probits were obtained for the effect of explosion blast on 
structures and the probability of injury and fatality by radiant heat. A considerable number 
of commercial CFD and Finite Element (FEM) codes have become available. Like the EU 
SMEDIS project in the 1990s, a verification and validation protocol for these codes would 
strengthen confidence in the results. Where effect and damage models are producing in the 
end the magnitude of safe distances, this will be of high importance, both in accidental and 
potential terrorist attack situations.  
In the middle of the 1990s developments in electronics and automation enabled 
introduction of safety instrumented systems, while at the same time CCPS' Layers of 
Protection Analysis (LOPA), started its tour of conquering the world22. Difficult cases, 
however, still depended on Quantitative Risk Analysis, also known as Probabilistic Risk 
Analysis. At the end of the 1990s it became clear that the basis of risk assessment results 
was still far from being sound and solid. This initiated work to improve QRA 
methodology: Bowtie became popular, and ARAMIS brought QRA a step further23. 
Following this is the work of Cozzani and colleagues facilitated developing methods and 
acquiring data to include domino scenarios leading to cascading effects and escalation, and 
risks of natural threats, such as earthquake, flooding, storms, and lightning enabling 
protection requirements24. 
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1.2.6. Safety management 
Already early on, the effect of human actions and organizational factors to 
influence accident occurrence has been recognized, but it took until the middle of the 
1980s before management became aware that they were key in having a good level of both 
occupational and process safety. Safety management gave a boost to understanding the 
management influence on human failure, and the interest of taking adequate organizational 
measures such as regarding roles, training, procedures, incident investigation, audits, and 
emergency planning.  
All of these measures reduced the number of accidents significantly, but not 
sufficiently, and certainly not the major ones. There were no indicators to measure the 
trend other than personal safety indicators, such as lost time incident rate and fatal accident 
rate, i.e. metrics of failure. Meanwhile, there is industry-wide fair agreement on lagging 
process safety performance indicators such as hazardous substance releases above a 
minimum threshold quantity depending on properties. However, with respect to the many 
possible leading indicators, which in the end are more important because their nature is 
predictive, more work must be done.  
Following a system approach, probabilistic predictions to supplement deterministic 
(usually not available) and covariate models reduce the uncertainty of when an event, such 
as an upset, is expected to occur under specified conditions. Therefore, using traditional 
and Bayesian methods, prediction within a socio-technical system is consistent with a 
scientific approach in the same way that the Higgs boson was identified and validated (to 
5.9 sigma,1 in 588 million) by probabilistic methods developed in 20th century science to 
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model uncertainties that were established to be inherent in all reality including engineering 
socio-technical systems. 
1.2.7. System approach, complexity, causality 
Rasmussen’s idea of a system approach and its dynamics (socio-technical system), 
which has been much further expanded and elaborated by Leveson is very helpful in 
battling complexity and obtaining a more comprehensive view on accident causality18, 25, 26. 
Leveson proposes a control loop approach to identify possible causes by deficiencies in the 
four elements of the loop (controlled process, sensor, controller, and actuator) at the 
various levels of the socio-technical system from shop floor via management and board up 
to government authority. In this way any possible cause whether in organization, human 
action / in-action, or in technology, either in design or operation, including software should 
become identified. Causes will include faults by dysfunctional interactions of by 
themselves safe and well-functioning components. This way of thinking is very promising, 
but it still lacks a workable computer tool to handle the masses of data needed to predict 
possible scenarios required for effective risk management. As Kahneman observes, a 
human is too focused by the WYSIATI (What you see is all there is) limitation and a 
human’s availability heuristic to anticipate well unexpected event chains27. For prediction 
of potential mishaps, we shall need a fast and sensitive cause identification system and as 
mentioned before, HAZOP is not sufficient. 
1.2.8. Uncertainty, Fuzzy logic, Bayesian statistics and networks  
Uncertainty is inherent to a possible risk event and is expressed in its likelihood or 
rather probability of occurrence. Predicting a risk quantitatively requires determination of 
the value distributions of consequence and probability, which are both afflicted with 
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uncertainty in their value, because of uncertainty in the data that were used to estimate 
these distributions. In QRA in particular, the uncertainty in estimated probability can be 
easily one or two orders of magnitude. And when it concerns a rare event, which is mostly 
the focus of interest, validation is not possible. This problem has surfaced in EU-projects 
such as ASSURANCE28, and it led to much skepticism about the sense of performing 
QRA. The main problem of scenario definition was already noted. Another problem are the 
failure data. There have been several initiatives to establish equipment failure databases of 
high quality with public access to facilitate QRA. The known ones on data collected in 
offshore operations are those by HSE UK and OREDA29, 30. Reported failure data often do 
not include human operational or maintenance error. Moreover, failure frequency of a 
component is not only because of its individual behavior or operational treatment but also 
due to cascading or escalating effects by failure elsewhere. To apply with confidence a 
decision criterion such as As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), the assessment 
results must include confidence limits. 
During the last decade ‘possibilistic’ and probabilistic techniques such as fuzzy 
logic, Petri nets, and in particular Bayesian statistics and Bayesian networks (BN) have 
become widely applied to enable decision making predictive statements about uncertain 
events involving risks. These methods helped greatly to incorporate expert knowledge, to 
model relationships among random, often dependent variables; the latter even in a dynamic 
sense enabling monitoring of slow and fast changing risk levels. BNs are also well suited 
to map effects of management and human failure on operational performance. Another 
application of Bayesian statistics is to estimate rare event frequency on the basis of 
measured frequencies of various types of more commonly occurring precursors of the 
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event and related events. BNs are also useful for dynamic risk analysis of processes by 
failure enhancement due to degradation, while in combination with HAZOP results BNs 
can help operators locate more quickly the most likely causes of an abnormal situation. 
They then can prioritize actions to reduce risk and lower probability of upset.  
Altogether, there is still much work to do to exploit mathematical-statistical 
methods, reduce value uncertainties and make risk predictions more accurate. An overview 
and summary of process and plant risk control and management over the years and a 
further outlook on methods/approaches has been given by Pasman, 201531. A recent 
perspective article on trends and challenges in process safety is by Mannan et al., 201532. 
1.3. Looking into the future: top-down problem analysis  
Major accident hazards and associated risks are still present. Will we be able to 
provide all needed products by running small decentralized units? Can we avoid large 
quantities of flammables and toxic materials? No, the future with protection of the climate 
and requirements of sustainability will probably demand large industrial agglomerations of 
specialized plants that are dependent on each other for energy, feed stocks, and products. 
As humanity will further grow in numbers, demand quantities will not decrease, and 
although final products may be safe, many unavoidable intermediates will not be safe. In 
addition, the number of new processes applying, e.g., biomaterials, will grow. More 
sustainable fuels such as hydrogen will in large quantities not be without hazards, to say 
the least. Process intensification may limit reactor volumes or even result in mini-reactors, 
and combine unit operations, which will undoubtedly favor safety. But most often the 
trouble is associated with large quantity; manifolds, purification processes, storages, and 
transport will still handle large quantities. Hence, complexity will not reduce but probably 
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grow and lead to failure outcomes with increased frequencies and consequence severities. 
Will economics relax or will competition and therefore pressure on cost further increase? 
Probably the latter will occur. Reputation and reliability will be valued. It will ensure that 
company management cannot afford a major mishap. Anyhow, risk control, risk 
communication, and risk governance with involvement and education of stakeholders with 
shared responsibility for major decisions and risk will remain of utmost importance. With 
this, we arrive at setting the requirements for a High Reliability Organization of which 
resilience is a fundamental prerequisite33. Although used so far in the context of 
organization we intend to expand its meaning to the whole socio-technical system of a 
technical system within its organization. So, what is exactly meant by resilience, what can 
we do to assess it and what is a satisfactory level of it? 
 The requirement that regulators have to drive forward and provide a just
environment within which the taking of short cuts, or adopting strategies
with a high risk, is unacceptable.
 Industry then must sign up, enthusiastically, to working to best available
current standards and practice - the risk taker has to be made an outcast.
 There then is a requirement to produce safety professionals by providing
appropriate education, training, experience and attractive career paths. This
will include training so that those in industry are fully up to date with
techniques, strategies and skills that they will need to understand and
possibly use - e.g. the activities of MKOPSC and others, degrees, short
courses, distance learning, case studies, safety professional qualifications,
safety passport, etc.
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 At the same time researchers also need to develop new concepts, tools,
methodologies, software, etc., so that safety professionals and the field of
process safety continues to advance - e.g. tools of the future - resilience,
blended HAZID, Bayesian network, etc.
An important factor that works against improving safety is the usual absence of a 
comprehensive system approach where all relevant information is analyzed.  Another 
attribute of a system approach is to include the organization and human interface in the 
measurements, modelling, updates, and management together with the technical system 
with a chemical process, for example.  
Another characteristic of the system approach is to identify and model significant 
interdependencies, identified from a risk assessment, rather than unrealistically assuming 
apriori that the individual components behave independently.  The system approach also 
models important time dependencies and the effects of condition ranges on observed data, 
component behavior, frequency of occurrence, and outcome consequences. 
1.4. Research challenges and objectives  
As stated earlier, there exist limitations in existing risk assessment and 
management methods. Primarily, the current methods follow a disintegrated approach. 
There are two aspects to this, first, there is a disconnection between technical and social 
factors and second, lack of data sharing between the process simulation, maintenance, and 
safety. Further, there exists limitations to using data for evaluation and relying on values 
from literature and without gaining any insights about the plant performance. Additionally, 
methods need to be developed and implemented that capture meaningful information from 
weak signals or precursor data and also study impact of uncertainties to major key 
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performance indicators for the process or business at large.  Figure I.16 (original figure by 
Visser; modified by Knegtering and Pasman) shows the progress or evolution of various 
methods/policies/developments that have happened over time34, 35. In spite of these, as seen 
earlier, incidents continue to happen globally. Lack of knowledge can contribute 
significantly to the cause if the accidents were not each investigated, learned from, and 
actions taken beyond immediate causes to causes that always implicate and entangle the 
management, leadership, organizational, and human factors. The next level is to adopt a 
more comprehensive and holistic systems approach of Resilience towards process safety 
and risk management.  
Figure I.16: Evolution in process safety and risk management methods 
In order to address the challenges identified, this research has the following three 
prime objectives: 
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1. Predictability: predict the process upset situations or events and find the maximum
bounds of the feasible operational region while satisfying any process, and safety
constraints.  This would result in stability of process systems under uncertainties
and better flexibility and control of the process system under study.
2. Survivability: to determine the optimal operations and maintenance strategies by
establishing an integrated method to incorporate process, maintenance, and safety
models. The impact is improved reliability and maintainability of the process
system while a reduction in unplanned shutdown or downtime.
3. Recoverability: to establish strategy for emergency response using scenario-based
analysis. This would result in reduced severity of consequences, and response time
and overall enhanced recovery.
Therefore, Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF), is developed that
would help achieve these objectives and hence lead to data-driven, process model-based, 
cost effective more informed decision making for process design and operations. This 
would deliver business continuity as well as add business value. 
1.5. Summary 
In general, it can be concluded that indeed much has been achieved. Many lessons 
have been cast in regulation, standards, codes, and practices, both in design and operation. 
But at the same time our methods to identify possible scenarios, to predict abnormal 
situations arising and with that to prevent mishaps are still far from perfect. However, 
various methodical avenues can be further explored. For risk control, the complexity and 
non-linear behaviour of process plant and supporting systems require a system approach.  
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A detailed research on resilience engineering methods to integrate both technical 
and social factors based on systems approaches would help to understand process 
upset/incident situations better and thus support resilience of such socio-technical process 
systems. Resilience for a system or a leader implies the ability for the system or a leader to 
anticipate, respond, adapt, and learn from unexpected situations, again showing the need 
for socio-technical system modeling, management, and resilient leadership. In a sense 
rather than a new method, the system approach reveals the emphasis that should always 
have been placed on organizational and human factors, which are sensitively engaged in 
and influence the underlying causes, root causes, and the concomitant implications, e.g., 
for acceptable regions of risk rather than acceptable point values of risk. The concept of 
resilience helps us understand the relationship of complexity, uncertainty, organizational 
factors, leadership, and system culture, which understanding can increase our optimism 
about future deliberations to build credibility and confidence in a comprehensive socio-
technical approach for optimum decision making and risk management. 
Catastrophic incidents and failures of complex infrastructure and systems have led 
to an increased significance of a systems approach to risk management36. These complex 
systems can be characterized as a combination of several technical and social sub-systems 
interacting with each other in specific, usually non-linear patterns. One example of such 
complex socio-technical systems is the process industry that includes chemical plants, oil 
and gas platforms, and onshore and offshore installations. The process industry is an 
indispensable part of today’s modern society considering the critical products it provides 
for consumption, for sustenance of its members, and maintenance of the infrastructure. 
However, over decades due to disastrous loss of containment37 incidents, augmented risk 
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and challenges to process safety management of such systems has been acknowledged. 
Social factors like regulations or policy related matters, human, and organizational factors 
have been acknowledged to play a crucial role in process safety and also in maintaining the 
efficiency of technical barriers to prevent high consequence events. Consequently, an 
interest in an integrated systems based approach of resilience engineering has arisen which 
considers both technical and social factors in a single methodology and aims to strike a 
balance between various performance requirements of such systems36.  Increased research 
and application of the resilience engineering concept is evident in various sectors such as 
ecology, the environment, psychology, etc., in past years. However, process systems 
resilience has substantial need for a quantified framework to exhibit standardization and 
development of process resilience aspects and principles38. Typical property of a system is 
that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, which makes it complex. Process safety 
incidents emerge due to inability or failure to understand these complex interactions. A 
resilient process system will be able to survive better when subjected to such unknown and 
unforeseen threats.  
The key contributions of this work are: 
 A standard process system resilience framework called PRAF - ‘Process
Resilience Analysis Framework’ with a unified taxonomy.
 24 process system resilience metrics including both technical and social
aspects have been developed.
 A PRAF survey has been conducted and survey response has been analyzed
to answer the three research questions related to incorporation of the
resilience metrics in the risk and/or resilience assessment – what are the
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most important metrics for each of the three phases of PRAF – avoidance, 
survival, and recovery?, are there any differences in viewpoints of various 
groups of survey respondents?, what are the weights or level of importance 
for each of the metrics? 
 A new resilience-based and integrated systems approach for hazard analysis
called RIPSHA – ‘Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard
Analysis’.
 A predictability assessment methodology to predict process upset situations
and hence have better flexibility and control of process system.
 A Bayesian based method for uncertainty quantification.
 A novel and integrated method of survivability assessment using PRAF. A
novel metric called SSI – ‘System Survivability Index,’ was incorporated as
the system safety threshold to analyze the safety impact costs.
 A summary of concepts of business continuity, sustainability, process
system resilience and their relationship based on an incident case study.
Chapter II presents a literature review of the previous developments on which the 
Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF) concepts and model formulations 
presented are based. The review covers the previous work carried out in system resilience 
and resilience engineering, risk and resilience assessment of process systems, and 
modeling aspects of process system resilience. The foundations of the proposed framework 
PRAF are formally introduced in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, a novel resilience-based 
qualitative method for hazard analysis called Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems 
Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA) has been proposed.  A thorough predictability assessment 
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analysis procedure has been formally proposed in Chapter V, for the identification of the 
process upset situations or events affecting the flexibility and control of the process system 
under study. In Chapter VI, a novel method of survivability assessment using PRAF has 
been presented. The concepts of business continuity, sustainability, process system 
resilience and their relationships are explored and presented in Chapter VII. Finally,  the 
concluding remarks and recommendations for future work are summarized  in Chapter 
VIII.
CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW* 
In this chapter, the literature review is presented, which outlines the concepts and 
previous developments in areas of resilience, resilience engineering, process resilience, and 
resilience modeling. First, the concepts of system resilience and resilience engineering are 
discussed. The fundamentals of resilience are outlined, along with the definitions and 
various research areas where the concept has been applied. Finally, a literature review of 
the modeling aspects and resilience concepts in the area of process risk and resilience 
assessment is provided. This section covers the previous work in the fields of process risk 
analysis and reduction, systems thinking, early fault detection, and dynamic simulation and 
optimization. These fields capture the resilience engineering implementation in the process 
industry.  
2.1. System Resilience and Resilience Engineering 
In recent years, there has been an increase in research literature on the application 
of resilience concepts in enhanced risk assessment and management39, 40. For example, 
book by41 marked the maturation of a new approach to safety management and the chapters 
explored different facets of resilience. The work of42 and 43 demonstrates the simulation 
and optimization modeling of technical processes with respect to flexibility and 
operability. 44 analyzed the Columbia disaster using Resilience Engineering concepts, and 
concluded that resilience perspective will create foresight about the changing patterns of 
*Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Pasman, H. J., Waldram, S., Pistikopoulos, E. N., & 
Mannan, M. S., "Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF): A systems approach for improved risk and 
safety management," JLPPI, Vol 53, Pages 61-73. Copyright 2018 Elsevier Ltd.
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risk before failure and harm occurs. 45 introduced the Resilience Analysis Grid to provide a 
well-defined characterization of a system that can be used to manage the system and 
specifically to develop its potential for resilient performance.  46 proposed six resilience 
aspects for safety in chemical industry. 47 used a survey method to identify deficiencies 
related to Resilience Engineering by measuring seven safety culture indicators and 
managerial factors. Francis et al. proposed a resilience analysis framework incorporating 
absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities40. 48 used the mathematical programming 
approach to identify the most important factors of integrated managerial and organizational 
factors.  
Various researchers have defined ‘resilience’ in different contexts and viewpoints 
as presented in Table II.1. The following are some aspects identified from these selected 
definitions:  
 no common definition of resilience or resilience engineering;
 ‘resilience’ is closely related to ‘Robustness’ in various definitions;
 resilience definitions are applied to numerous categories: safety, critical
infrastructure, business process, supply chain, organization, and
ecological/environmental;
most of the definitions imply post-event analysis. 
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Table II.1 Resilience definitions 
Year Definition Research area Reference 
1973 A measure of the persistence of systems and of their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain 




1999 Disaster resilient community is a community that can 
withstand an extreme event, natural or manmade, with a 
tolerable level of losses, and is able to take mitigation 




2004 The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and 
reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain 





2006 A balance of stability and flexibility that allows for 





2006 The capacities for an enterprise to survive, adapts, and 




2006 The loss and loss recovery required maintaining the 




2006 The ability of an organization to cope with unexpected and 
unplanned situations and respond rapidly to events, with 
excellent communication and mobilization of resources to 
intervene at critical points.  
Safety systems 55
2007 The maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging 
conditions such that the organization emerges from those 




2011 The ability of the system to withstand a major disruption 
within acceptable degradation parameters and to recover 
within an acceptable time and composite costs and risks. 
Safety systems 57
2012 The ability to bounce back when hit with unexpected 
demands. 
Safety systems 46
2012 In order to be resilient one needs to learn to ‘bend, but not 
break,’ and acknowledge that adaptability is more 
important than hardiness. 
Nursing 58
2014 The capacity to cushion stresses and disturbances while 




The ability to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of 
disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery 
activities in ways that minimize social disruption and 






Table II.2 provides information on resilience engineering application areas. 
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Table II.2: Resilience engineering applications 




Effective decision-making to 
social as well as business 




Possible applications of 




Explore everyday operations 
of the Vehicle Traffic 
Service system to gain 
insights in how it contributes 
to safe and efficient traffic 
movements 
63
2013 Healthcare Improve patient safety 64
2014 Petrochemical 





Assess the factors affecting 
the plant resilient level 
66
2016 Seaport systems 
Resilience modeling of 
maritime systems using 
Bayesian belief networks 
67
Main characteristics of selected resilience and resilience engineering studies are 
summarized below: 
 Resilience theory and concepts
Woods grouped the various uses of the word ‘resilience’ into four basic
concepts – rebound, robustness, graceful extensibility, and sustained
adaptability68. In the healthcare industry, Aburn et al. identified the
following common themes - rising above, adaptation and adjustment,
dynamic process, ‘ordinary magic’ and mental illness69. The authors in this
research also concluded, ‘there is no universal definition of resilience.’
Within the area of adulthood and psychology, Infurna eta al. summarized
five tenets characterizing the resilience framework for research, practice,
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and policy70. Francis et al. summarized the concept of resilience in terms of 
a triangle with three major capacities of absorptive, adaptive, and 
recovery/restorative40. 
 Research areas
Righi et al. identified six research areas based on the systematic review
conducted by them71. These areas are theory of resilience, resilience
identification and classification, safety management tools, accidents
analysis, risk assessment, and training. Linnenluecke analyzed literature
published between 1977 and 2014 and concluded that the resilience
research has developed into five research streams72. These streams are
organizational responses to external threats, organizational reliability,
employee strengths, and the adaptability of business models or design
principles that reduce supply chain vulnerabilities and disruptions. The
other related disciplines that have also been discussed in existing literature
are systems engineering, Normal Accidents Theory, and High Reliability
Organizations—HRO.
2.2. Process System Resilience Modeling Aspects 
The sociotechnical hierarchical structure has also been considered by25 and73 as a 
basis for analyzing holistic risk control of systems, while the organizational aspect has 
been emphasized in the resilience engineering initiative41. It was in 2004 when Hollnagel, 
Woods, and Leveson introduced the concept, in terms of technological safety, by stating 
that resilience engineering is a paradigm to safety and can be used to avoid human and 
organizational failure. The definition by74 is closely related to process system resilience. 
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They define resilience, as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, 
during or following changes and the disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions”. This definition obviously comprises the 
definition of safety, as ‘ability to sustain required operations’ and is equivalent to freedom 
from unacceptable risks. However, resilience emphasizes the ability to function in both 
expected and unexpected conditions rather than just to avoid failures. Also, an anticipation 
element is included with the use of words ‘prior to’ in the definition. Resilience analysis is 
distinguished from risk assessment in several ways. Principally, conventional risk 
assessment methods are used to determine the negative consequences of potentially 
undesired events and to mitigate them. Based on work by Dekker et al.75 and Jain et al.76 in 
contrast, the resilience approach emphasizes an assessment of the system's ability to 
anticipate, survive and recover. 
2.2.1. Process Risk: Analysis and Reduction 
Reliable risk estimation and assessment is a condition for awareness of the state of 
affairs and improvement if necessary. As mentioned before, it involves two components; 
establishing both the probability of the event occurring, and the consequences if the event 
does occur. The four important components of risk analysis are hazard identification (and 
if possible reduction or elimination),  and then risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication77. Historically, primary causes of process incidents are categorized as – 
process failures, human errors, mechanical failures, instrumentation failures, and external 
events such as natural calamities. Attention is seldom paid to a) failures related to 
organizational or management system breakdowns, cognitive failures associated with 
human fatigue, and lack of training; and b) proactive approaches similar to Inherent Safety 
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(IS). Some efforts have been made in the direction of integration of such failures into the 
analysis, however it is still fragmented in nature and not implemented in the industry. The 
focus needs to be on the seamless integration of both technical and organizational 
resilience to ensure business continuity and sustainability 53. Some work on business 
continuity management and resilience have been done in recent years78, 60.  Also, ideas 
about Inherent Safety (IS) have been around for millennia and it is widely accepted that the 
IS concepts were first formalized in a process engineering context by Trevor Kletz in the 
late 1970s79. Examples of some indices developed include Qualitative Assessment for 
Inherently Safer Designs (QAISD)80, a fuzzy logic-based inherent safety index81, one of 
the first safety indices for inherent safety called the Heikkila index82, and inherent safety 
assessment based on indicators83. IS concepts can have significant impact in avoiding the 
hazards. Few efforts have involved in the incorporation of these concepts into design 
features84. Methods, tools and knowledge related to process safety have notably increased 
over the years85. Some of the major contributions in the area are summarized in Table II.3. 
Today, process safety management is well-implemented in some companies and this has 
reduced the severity of incidents compared to prior performance86. In the aftermath of the 
Bhopal disaster in 1984, research efforts and regulations for process safety gained new 
momentum87. In the last 30 years, regulatory requirements for process safety management 
systems have been established and implemented in countries such as the United States, in 
Europe through the Seveso II and III Directives, Australia, etc. However, current risk 
evaluation still lacks the proactive and the social aspects involved within the process 
systems and thus often still results in a non-comprehensive risk analysis that can overlook, 
and therefore cause, some catastrophic incidents.  
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Table II.3: Selected works on process risk analysis 
Authors Major contributions 
88 Bayesian analysis method for treatment of epistemic uncertainties. 
89 New technique called Optimal Risk Analysis (ORA). 
90 A seven-stage systematic framework for the analysis and improvement of near-miss 
programs. 
91
Comparison of application areas, methodology and relationships for 3 approaches - 
accident investigations (AI), risk analysis (RA), and safety management systems 
(SMS). 
92 Review of risk analysis tools used by 24 chemical plants in Belgium. 
Requirement of external domino accident prevention framework. 
93 Two different approaches to handle uncertainties in FTA and ETA. 
94, 95, 96 
Dynamic risk analysis methodology that uses alarm databases to improve process 
safety and product quality. 
20
Blended hazard identification (BLHAZID) methodology blends and automates two 
different types of HAZID methods: the function-driven and component-driven 
approaches. 
97 Demonstration of discrete-time Bayesian network (DTBN). 
98 Comprehensive maturity model for QRA covering potential flaws of risk assessment. 
99 Human reliability analysis for the pre-maintenance and post-maintenance activities of 
a pump (HEART methodology). 
100 Two advanced dynamic techniques, DyPASI (hazard identification) and DRA (risk 
assessment) were coupled.  
101 Areas of improvement in risk assessment - dynamic updating of risk to support real-
time decision-making. Risk Barometer: a novel method based on indicators. 
102 Review of recent contributions on what is currently wrong with QRA and future steps 
in QRA directions.  
2.2.2. Systems thinking 
In the process industries, there are numerous factors that can influence the process 
safety environment, and each factor can affect others, maybe in an immediate and direct 
manner, or in systems engineering terminology, a tightly coupled manner. Multilevel 
factors can trigger each other, and thus cannot be described in a simple, isolated, linear 
fashion. Safety is a non-linear problem, and researchers have proved this in the system 
safety context18, 103, 104. In the life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) perspective, many routine 
decisions consider performance-related factors alone, and do not focus on downstream 
costs such as operation and maintenance support. Therefore, designing a system on the 
short-term basis alone can lead to much higher costs than a more enlightened long term 
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approach. At this point, counter-intuitiveness plays a key role in explaining the difference 
and relationship between long-term and short-term behavior. For example, in the short-
term, implementing inherent safety principles in the early stages of design may seem to 
have an associated cost. On the other hand, in the long-term, it may reduce the total cost by 
diminishing one or more of maintenance, operation, and training costs, etc. Moreover, it 
can lead to increased worker motivation and process productivity. This is shown in the 
causal loop model in Figure II.1. System thinking is characterized by its holistic approach 
to problem solving while analytical methods used in traditional risk assessment can be 
viewed mainly as linearly reductionist2, 105. With a systems approach focused on resilience, 
common characteristics of failure that must be addressed in addition to pure technical 
factors include: organizational deficiencies; ineffective control and communication; poor 
reliability; disregard of human factors, etc.  
System characteristics 
The following four have been identified as key system characteristics by various 
researchers: 
 Emergence: this implies that the tasks or actions and their results at the
system or collective level arise or develop from the individual actions and
interactions between the individual components106, 107.
 Hierarchy: this characteristic represents the differences between the various
levels of a system across its vertical structure. It relates to the different
levels of authority and roles within a system.
 Communication: a reference to the mechanisms for the system to exchange
relevant information within itself system (reporting up, instructing down)
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and its environment. It provides for the flow of information among the 
subsystems. 
 Control: this characteristic is related to communication and also deals with
the level of control to changes in systems behavior, technology, etc.
Key concepts of systems thinking 
The major concept of systems thinking is the system life cycle presented as a V-
model that is an integrated top-down and bottom-up approach108. This refers to the 
application of systems engineering to integrate both evaluation of technical and social 
aspects in risk assessment for the whole life cycle. For a process system, this would 
include stages such as feasibility study, technology development, detailed design, 
construction, commissioning, start-up, inspection, operations, and decommissioning. With 
the V-model application, evaluation would be done at both the individual system level as 
well as at the level of the whole system with the goal of ensuring perfect integration. This 
is represented through a simple schematic for a process system life cycle in Figure II.2. 
Another important systems concept from the resilience perspective is the understanding 
and capability of a system to perform and function during abnormal conditions or states7,
109. These abnormal conditions may arise due to known or as yet unknown, expected or
unexpected and internal or external events. The third concept is about the dichotomy and 
trade-off analysis. System characteristics are often treated separately although they not 
only coexist and interact but also form a complementary relation. 
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Figure II.1: Causal loop diagram – safety is a non-linear problem 
They should be considered as feasible wholes with unfeasible parts110. The pair of 
productivity and safety is an example of a false dichotomy as in a process plant, 
productivity and safety both are of utmost importance but with superficial observation, it 
may seem to be contradictory. If all risks were known, and safety procedures and practices 
were followed diligently, all controls would function as expected and hence there would 
ideally be no process upsets, failures, emergency shutdowns and therefore no loss in 
production. We see that these two characteristics are complementing each other in real 
operations but have traditionally been treated separately. 
2.2.3. Early fault detection 
Research advancement in the field of signal processing and development of 
advanced and robust techniques has gained interest in the last few decades111. There has 
been a considerable amount of work done in various fields on early detection, or weak 
signals, such as in the medical field 112, 113, the aviation sector 114, 115, the nuclear industry 
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116, 117, 118, and the banking sector119, 120. Some other industrial sectors as well as natural 
disaster management units like the construction industry, the medical sector, hurricane 
response teams, and others have research studies where near-miss or similar information 
has been identified as an early warning signal to forecast major mishaps121, 122, 123. In the 
process industries, with the introduction of advanced automation and safety management 
systems, a wealth of possible signals are available and captured. As noted by124, this would 
enable monitoring of the instantaneous risk levels. Near-miss information is considered as 
a significant precursor data that can be utilized for facilitation of prediction of major 
process upsets 90, 125. Table II.4 presents the notable contributions in early fault detection 
and warning signals application in the process industries.  
Figure II.2: System life cycle V-model 
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Table II.4: Selected works on early fault detection 
Authors Major contributions 
126 Use of cumulative summation (CUSUM) control charts and artificial neural 
networks together for fault detection and diagnosis (FDD). 
127 An Early Warning Detection System (EWDS) and neural network learning system 
for early prediction of runaway reaction events. 
128 Use of multi-scale principal component analysis (MSPCA) for fault detection and 
diagnosis. 
129 Review of quantitative model based approaches to fault diagnosis and a general 
framework for analyzing and understanding various diagnostic systems. 
130 Review of fault diagnosis methods that are based on historic process knowledge. 
131 A real-time expert system for fault diagnosis of chemical processes. 
132 System Hazard Identification, Prediction and Prevention (SHIPP) methodology: a 
process accident model with predictive capabilities, which uses a combination of 
event and fault tree concepts to model the cause-consequence relationship. 
133 Original approach in the comparison between different criteria on the study of the 
onset of runaway reactions. Results fundamental for the development of an Early 
Warning Detection System. 
134 Non-linear Kernel Gaussian mixture model based inferential monitoring approach 
for fault detection and diagnosis. 
135 Review of current trends of future-oriented prevention management in the 
chemical-using industry. Two concepts for the next generation of managing 
prevention within chemical industrial areas are - integrated design-based safety 
and security; collaboration of several chemical plants to increase sustainable 
development of their activities and their environment. 
136 Comparison of two different methods of development of early warning indicators 
- The Resilience Based Early Warning Indicator (REWI) method and The Dual
Assurance method.
137 New tool - DyPASI for the continuous systematization of information from early 
signals of risk related to past events and mitigation of deficiencies of the current 
HAZID techniques in the identification of unexpected potential hazards related to 
atypical scenarios.   
2.2.4. Dynamic simulation, optimization and major events modeling 
Dynamic modeling of process systems has been used for many decades. This 
technology has greatly influenced process industry business and is critical throughout the 
lifecycle of a plant. It is a systematic method to express all operations of a chemical plant 
(pumping, flow, mixing, chemical reactions, separation processes and purification, etc.) 
using a unique set of algebraic and differential equations based on fundamental 
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engineering principles. Such simulation studies result in mathematical models that can be 
very useful in real-time monitoring and predictions, operator training, verification of 
operating and safety procedures, decision-making, control of plant during transient 
operations, investigation of any operational issues, safety and environmental issues etc.138. 
These studies have played a crucial role in design of operability and economically 
profitable and efficient plants. It is an area where numerous methods and tools have been 
developed for advanced decision-making in the process industry. Various models have 
been developed in process optimization with respect to design, control, scheduling, 
maintenance and safety problems139, 140, 141. For example, Thomaidis and Pistikopoulos 
developed a model for evaluation of undesirable and hazardous conditions via a combined 
flexibility-reliability-safety analysis142. Also, several remarkable works have been 
conducted in the area of process simulation and major events modeling with respect to 
safety as summarized in Table II.5. The current process resilience analysis framework 
research utilizes these dynamic simulation and optimization techniques to develop process, 
safety and cost models. The objective is a design optimization approach to identify and 
obtain safer operational regions at maximum average profit. 
Table II.5: Selected works on resilience and major events modeling 
Authors Major contributions 
143 Review of available techniques and future research needs for flexibility, operability 
and control aspects into the design procedures of process systems. 
43 Presents a rigorous framework for handling systematically the objectives of flexibility 
and dynamic resilience which are major components in plant operability. 
144 Analysis method to obtain risk profiles for major adverse events. 
145 Significance and challenges of modeling and simulating critical infrastructures and 
their interdependencies. 
146
Discussion on traditional safety models and their limitations, and description of new 
system-theoretic approaches to the modeling and analysis of accidents in complex 
systems. 
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Table II.5 Continued 
Authors Major contributions 
45 Presents a graphical approach called The Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) to measure the 
resilience of a system. 
47 Presents nine categories of challenges in the procedure of building RE and its adaptive 
capacity in a chemical plant.  
147
New method QRAPII (Quantitative Risk Analysis Precursor Incident Investigation) that 
combines accident investigation and QRA using information from a precursor incident as 
input to QRA. 
148 Systemic Risk Index for the industrial area is determined considering both a safety and 
security network risk index and a supply chain network risk index. 
149 Improved bow-tie analysis to overcome missing data and model uncertainty. 
150 A systems view of process safety is quantified via a safeness-index concept. 
2.3. Summary 
Process safety and risk management, in process industry is unequivocally critical 
due to potential on-site as well as off-site impacts. As noted in previous sections, there is 
an abundance of work in areas of risk analysis, early fault detection, major events 
modeling, etc. It is also important to note that process systems are complex socio-technical 
systems that comprise of various sub-systems and components151. These interconnected 
components interact in a non-linear pattern and often present trade-off challenges between 
productivity and safety, risk mitigation measures and costs involved and more. Therefore, 
it is critical to study process disasters from systems engineering perspective, and conduct a 
detailed analysis on the interfaces, which involves studying scenarios close to reality for 
effective risk management. From, systems perspective, the concept of resilience 
engineering has various features, and the one that makes it distinct from traditional process 
safety practice is the importance of coping with complexities by learning and adapting to 
ensure safety as a system undergoes changes, deterioration, hazardous situations and 
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more75. Over the last few years there has been a considerable interest and work carried out 
in the idea of application of resilience engineering for risk management. 
*Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Pasman, H. J., Waldram, S., Pistikopoulos, E. N., & 
Mannan, M. S., "Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF): A systems approach for improved risk 
and safety management," JLPPI, Vol 53, Pages 61-73. Copyright 2018 Elsevier Ltd.
Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Mentzer, R., & Mannan, M. S., "Resilience metrics for 
improved process-risk decision making: survey, analysis and application," Safety Science, Vol 108, Pages 
13-28. Copyright 2018 Elsevier Ltd.
56 
CHAPTER III  
PROCESS RESILIENCE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK* 
Hazard identification methods suffer from limitations and are not comprehensive. 
There is lately much written about it152. In addition, assessment of risk apart from scenario 
definition contains other uncertainties adhering to event probability determination as well 
as that of the severity of consequences. And even, if a particular scenario is foreseen and 
assessed, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the recommended safeguards have been 
realized. Suppose the process hazard analysis has been very effective, still an unknown 
threat may show up.  
From the second half of the 1980s, the High Reliability Organization concept 
developed, e.g., later described in the known work of 33. These authors promoted the basic 
message of mindfulness to business in general on the principles:  
 Preoccupation with failures
 Reluctance to simplify
 Sensitivity to operations
 Commitment to resilience
 Deference to expertise
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Resilience as a property of an organization became a leading thought making to launch 
their system oriented resilience engineering initiative, which is specifically focused on the 
psychological and cultural aspects of humans and organizations with the objective of 
preventing accident and promotion of safe work 41. 153 thinks in terms of performance 
fluctuations with sometimes a high positive or a deep negative “resonance” peak. The 
unexpected drawback of the latter shall be mitigated by built-in resilience.  
Resilience engineering in this social sense makes people continuously anticipate 
and adapt in a resourceful and resilient way to varying conditions41. It led to the approach 
that promoted as Safety-II, in which unlike in traditional Safety-I not is looked and 
prevented how things go wrong, but in a positive way learning and doing as much as 
possible to have it go right154. Safety-I led to do’s and don’ts and even what is called safety 
bureaucracy, while Safety-II is in the same way as a Quality Management System: doing 
things with an attitude of trying to improve. Safety-II can be implemented and works out in 
practice, it is useful to read the White Paper of155. The two approaches do not clash, but 
Safety-II enhances safety and productivity. Also, in view of the increase in complexity of 
socio-technical systems risk assessment through the eyes of Safety-II is seen as trying: “to 
understand the conditions where performance variability can become difficult or 
impossible to monitor and control”. Due to complexity and transients, the causality is often 
not immediately clear and an undesirable event just emerges. 
In this chapter, a framework of process system resilience analysis is established and the 
chapter is organized as follows. Sections 3.1 presents the Process Resilience Analysis 
Framework (PRAF) along with details of phases, aspects and metrics. Section 3.2 
describes the PRAF survey, methodology and analysis results. Section 3.3 provides the 
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concepts of matrix-based tools for quantification of social aspects with a motivating 
example. The chapter concludes in Section 3.4 with a summary. 
3.1. Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF): basic concepts and structure 
Following the concept of resilience, of course, process resilience is related to 
avoiding, surviving and recovering from disruptions due to both the technical and social 
factors. The technical and social factors are well aligned with the four dimensions of 
community resilience—technical, organizational, social, and economic (TOSE)156. Figure 
III.1 illustrates the PRAF overview applied to the process systems for effective risk
assessment and management. 
Figure III.1: Process resilience analysis framework overview 
With the purpose of establishing an effective methodology, PRAF presents an 
integrated approach that relies on data-driven, quantitative, and dynamic analysis.  The 
seven characteristics for an effective and comprehensive methodology are: 
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 Integrated: single approach incorporating both technical and social factors
analysis. 
 System-based: analysis based on interactions of various system
components, sub-components and system characteristics of emergence and
hierarchy.
 Quantitative: use of mathematical, statistical and matrix-based models to
provide measures of risk and resilience.
 Data-driven: utilization of measured process variables and resilience metrics
of the system.
 Dynamic: evaluation in real-time by use of simulation.
 Uncertainty management: use of Bayesian analysis to manage uncertainties
in limited historical data.   
 Cost-effective: incorporates profitability as one of the objective functions.
A comparative analysis of existing studies vs PRAF is summarized in Table III.1. 
It is critical to understand the functioning of such a complex socio-technical system 
and also the understanding of how it fails. In this context a process system schematic as 
shown in Figure III.2 depicts the various levels and interactions between sub-systems, 
components and sub-components. As evident, within these various levels, the process 
system exhibits the system characteristics of emergence, hierarchy, communication and 
control. 
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Table III.1: Comparative analysis of resilience models or studies 
Models/studies Characteristics 
Integrated System-based Quantitative Data driven Dynamic Uncertainty management Cost-effective 
PRAF       
42
 *     
157
    *  * 
44 *     * 
158 * *     
45 *  * * * * 
159
  * * *  
46 *  * * *  
160, 161   * *   
40
 *     * 
48
   * * * * 
: Low consideration *: Partial consideration : Complete consideration
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Figure III.2: Process plant system 
Primarily, the resilience concept is associated with the post disturbance ability of 
the system to bounce back, or return, in a low risk manner to a pre-disturbance or normal 
state. When the notion of resilience is applied to process systems, this definition broadens 
to include the pre-disturbance state, as well as, change of state from normal to a process 
upset state as shown in Figure III.3. There are three main system states: normal state, 
process-upset event state and catastrophic event state. There can be various technical and 
social failures (regulatory, human, and organizational factors), which may lead to a process 
upset event and the catastrophic top event incident. In the avoidance phase of PRAF, 
process upset event is predicted in advance (represented by activity A), and hence, the 
system remains in the normal operation state. For the survival phase of PRAF, the system 
state is assumed to be process upset event and PRAF helps the system to survive through 
the process upset condition (represented by activity B), and hence the system remains in 
the same state, possibly with a degraded performance. Finally, in the recovery phase, the 
system is assumed to be in the catastrophic event state and PRAF helps to prioritize 
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emergency barriers to enable reduction in severity of consequences and response time 
(represented by activity C), and leading to eventual resumption of the normal operation 
state.  
Figure III.3: System transition diagram 
3.1.1. Four aspects of process resilience 
The four cornerstones of resilience engineering as identified and developed by 103 
are anticipation, monitoring, response and learning. The four aspects to be considered in 
the process resilience analysis framework (PRAF) have been identified based on these four 
cornerstones of a resilient system. These four aspects are early detection; error tolerant 
design including inherently safer design; plasticity also characterized as resistive 
flexibility, and recoverability162 and are illustrated in Figure III.4.  
Early detection (ED) refers to the recognition of a system’s ‘weak’ signals that 
could be precursors of an undesired abnormal event. Weak signals will be from a variety of 
sources. There will be the usual enterprise resource planning163 information, e.g., System 
analysis And Program development (SAP) data, which will be comprehensive on the 
company business processes (accountancy, client orders, suppliers, maintenance schedules, 
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logistics). Further, there will be the process control data, and additional data on plant 
performance, such as equipment energy consumption, pump vibration, the state of 
corrosion, maintenance activities, unusual internal traffic, and temporary personnel 
concentrations. Also, an important source of signals will be lagging and leading indicator 
information. Additionally, there will be external signals on weather, environmental 
conditions such as an earthquake, flooding, utility disturbances, possible strikes, cyber and 
terrorist threat. The processing of all these data, followed by data mining and analytics to 
extract trends or to obtain coming event warnings, can provide valuable insights however, 
shall be a major effort164. Due to randomness and interdependencies, this will require 
artificial intelligence developed methods within the Big Data and Analytics application 
trend. Process safety and resiliency can ‘piggy-back’ on this contemporary development as 
important side-benefits. In case alarming information is discovered another aspect is to 
present it in a convincing way to management for a decision on the action165. 
Error tolerant design (ETD) presents the inherently safer features of a system and 
process such that undesired, and perhaps even unknown, external influences will not cause 
the system to fail in any significant way. Processes should still function well (but maybe at 
reduced efficiency and marginally increased risk). Error tolerant design encompasses quite 
a few aspects as well. It starts with the design process itself. Not without reason, 18 added a 
design pillar in parallel to the original process industry socio-technical system 
representation pillar of 25. A large fraction of major accidents is due to or co-caused by 
design errors. Also, the design organization is for its product quality dependent on its 
management virtues with all the derived characteristics as competence level, cultural 
behavior, and error-avoiding performance. But actually, error tolerant design means that 
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designs are such that an operator in its interaction with procedure and equipment cannot 
easily make an error, or if the operator makes an error, it will not immediately lead to 
complete failure, or if the machine is faulty, it will not lead to an immediate process upset. 
The latter is a feature that reminds of the inherent safer plant but also of good system 
ergonomics. Error tolerance shall hold too for the organizational structure and procedures. 
It should be such that it will not bring staff in a situation of making an error easily, and it 
should motivate staff positively. The latter will be in line with the Safety-II idea to 
approach things from the positive side and to seek conditions to produce sound work and 
wherever possible improvement. 
Recoverability (R) indicates how quickly the system can recover back to a normal 
state of operations in the case of an abnormal event. Recovery starts with an emergency 
response operation. For an effective functioning of this response, preparation and 
capabilities are required. An Emergency Command Center is a basic requirement. Also, 
this pillar has to rely on risk assessments. For preparation, representative scenarios are 
selected and with this scenario-analysis is performed. This consists of determining which 
of the functions of firefighting, medical support or keeping order, is at what location 
needed most, and what should be their capabilities. Scenario-analysis will also serve to 
find out at what stage assistance and extra capabilities must be demanded. Resiliency, 
however, requires too a whole series of other provisions and contingencies, so that the 
company activity is disturbed only minimally. Because all investment is limited, the risk 
assessment results will provide a basis of how to distribute resources for the best final 
result and the best chance of business continuity. Where emergency response may take 
days or weeks, recovery as a whole may take a much longer time. 
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Finally, Plasticity (P) refers to how well an organization and people would behave, how 
small the effects are and how well it will resist the undesired disturbances by implementing 
planned measures and improvising others, when a seamless transition from a normal state to 
an upset state occurs and shall be reversed.  Plasticity is the openness of mind to recognize 
possible threats and changes, devise ways to cope with it without generating risk elsewhere. 
Again, it is a way of behavior that has to come from the top and be anchored in the culture. 
It also requires competence comprising knowledge, and insight and experience. Like in 
designing, plasticity will need the support of process simulation techniques, and risk 
assessment methods. As in case of an aircraft pilot or a command cell, it is very useful to 
have simulator training for crisis situations and to have been exposed to scenarios. Although 
the presence of mind and staying cool in a pressure situation is a general requirement, to 
have experienced a scenario and recognizing its features is of a great help. 
Figure III.4: Resilience aspects under PRAF 
3.1.2. Three-phase analysis 
With an objective to study the complete failure process of any complex system 
such as critical civil infrastructure systems, spaceflight, financial services organizations, 
and energy, the resilience approach has been segregated into actions or impacts prior to, 
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during or after disturbance 36, 74, 109-110, 166. These actions and impacts for a system are 
covered in the ‘avoidance’; ‘survival’ or ‘recovery’ phases based on the disturbance time. 
The National Response Plan implemented by the Department of Homeland Security in the 
United States, and related plans in other countries, comprising of Prevention and 
Preparedness and Response and Recovery steps contain similar phases for an intentionally 
caused incident. In order to cover the whole anatomy of a process safety incident, the three 
phases are distinguished as presented in Table III.2. 
Table III.2: Different phases of process resilience 
Phase Description 
Available data  
(from indicators) 





Includes actions or efforts 
targeted to identify threats or 
vulnerabilities based on weak 
signals or inference by 
analysis of system 
observations to prevent an 
upset condition or predict a 
LoC scenario 37.  
more more less 
Survival 
Includes actions or efforts to 
understand the upset condition 
and identify resources and 
prioritize them to reduce 
likelihood of further impact. 
medium medium medium 
Recovery 
Includes actions or efforts 
required to return to a normal 
state by reducing response 
time and hence strongly 
reducing likelihood of severe 
consequences.    
less less more 
*Loss of containment: An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from containment, including
non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or
compressed air) 167.
In the case of a looming threat, three phases are distinguished: 
Avoidance phase – includes actions or efforts targeted to identify threats or vulnerabilities 
based on weak signals or inference by analysis of system observations to prevent an upset 
condition.  
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Survival phase – includes actions or efforts to understand the upset condition and identify 
resources and prioritize them to reduce likelihood of further impact. 
Recovery phase – includes actions or efforts required to return to a normal state by 
reducing response time and hence strongly reducing likelihood of severe consequences.   
It is explicit from Figure III.5 that there is - more information available from metrics, more 
time to react to a disruption or threat, fewer resources or lower cost involved in the 
avoidance phase as compared to the survival and recovery phases.   
Figure III.5: Resilience analysis diagram in three stages with aspects and metrics 
3.2. Resilience metrics 
With respect to resilience engineering, risk and safety management of a process 
facility is a top-level system requirement and cannot be considered in isolation. In order to 
analyze the impact of different sub-systems, components, sub-components and their 
interaction as a whole it is critical to monitor and measure. This has been already explained 
and practiced by monitoring the effectiveness of the safety management system by means 
of indicators 168. Hence, one of the other key tasks is to develop metrics specifically for 
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process resilience. These metrics, or indicators, will be critical in the quantification of 
overall process resilience and will also provide the essential information for senior 
management to make informed risk related decisions. These decisions will be guided by 
the top-level requirements of the process system, and their purposes could be wide-
ranging, multi-dimensional and sometimes have conflicting immediate objectives similar 
to the trade-off analysis concept. In such situations, performance monitoring indicators or 
metrics will give insights into the time dependent prediction, survival and recovery 
analysis and can help track the overall resiliency of the system. For Process Resilience 
Analysis Framework (PRAF), metrics have been developed considering the performance 
indicators established by API RP 754 169 and also based on the process resilience aspects of 
early detection (ED), error tolerant design (ETD), recoverability (R) and plasticity (P). 
These have been categorized into technical (ED, ETD, R) and social resilience (P). At 
present there are a total of 24 resilience metrics identified under the three phases of process 
resilience. The avoidance phase for predicting a process upset event included metrics such 
as alarm rate (ED), unplanned maintenance jobs (ED), process safety near miss data (ED), 
and learning from incidents (LFI) communication (P). The survival phase for surviving a 
process safety or LoC event comprises of metrics such as changes executed through 
Management of Change procedure (ETD), safety critical equipment inspection (ETD), 
maintenance backlogs (P), and shift handover communication (P). The recovery phase for 
recovering from a process upset or catastrophic condition comprised of metrics such as 
tests of emergency systems and procedures (R), mock drills for emergency situations (R), 
and review/revision of required procedures. (P). Metrics are significantly needed to make 
predictions about disruptions, assist in decision-making, and take corrective actions. 
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Additionally, it is important to assign weights to these metrics in order to obtain the 
contribution of each of the three phases to overall resilience. For this purpose, a survey 
questionnaire called ‘Process Resilience Analysis Framework’ has been circulated to a 
wide variety of practitioners and response was analyzed.  
The use of metrics in risk assessment and management of chemical process systems 
is a well-known area of research.  There are numerous sources, which provide a 
comprehensive list of such metrics categorized into leading or lagging and technical or 
social.  It is only since the BP Texas City Refinery incident in 2005, that the need for 
process safety indicators has gained momentum. Primarily two types of process safety 
metrics have been defined in literature – leading and lagging. Recent investigations 
discovered that consideration of only lagging indicators over leading indicators is not a 
good practice. Lagging indicator data might be useful for organizational benchmarking 
purposes, however, it lacks the potential of enlightening the management on the true 
process safety statistics and safety culture. Several works have been undertaken to develop 
approaches using metrics. 170discussed an approach for the inherent safety metric and 
demonstrated its application through comparison of LNG regasification technologies. 
171established the risk-based process performance indicators for improving the existing 
safety performance indicators. There are numerous sources, which provide a 
comprehensive list of such metrics categorized into leading or lagging and technical or 
social. Table III.3 summarizes some of the selected works on process safety or risk 
management metrics existing in the literature. It is important to note that resilience 
emphasizes human and organization aspects, as well as technical aspects. Table III.4 lists 
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some of the models or studies, which have developed resilience metrics, principles, and 
elements. 
Table III.3: Selected list of works on process safety or risk management metrics 
Sources Process safety or risk management metrics 
172 Guidelines to develop process safety indicators 
173 Description and use of Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics 
174 Comprehensive document providing guidance to assist industry, public 
authorities, and communities to prevent and prepare for chemical accidents 
169 Standard API RP 754: Process Safety Performance Indicators for the 
Refining and Petrochemical Industries 
175 Report on Process Safety: Recommended Practice on Key Performance 
Indicators 
176 New normalization factors for process safety lagging metrics 
177 Two categories for major hazard risk indicators within the oil and gas 
industry: precursor events and barrier elements 
178 Various indicators are reviewed to answer which indicators qualify to 
provide insight and knowledge in levels of safety of processes or business 
These metrics are critical in the quantification of overall process resilience and also 
provide the essential information for senior management to make informed risk decisions. 
However, not many researchers have attempted to cover all aspects of resilience for 
augmented risk management or assigned weights to the resilience metrics. In the current 
study, the motivation is to obtain the relative significance of metrics and the contribution 
of each of the three phases to overall resilience based on the Process Resilience Analysis 
Framework (PRAF)162, 182. Therefore, a survey called ‘Process Resilience Analysis 
Framework’ survey was conducted. The research questions, 110 addressed in this study are:  
 RQ1: What are the most important metrics for each of the three phases of PRAF –
avoidance, survival, and recovery?
 RQ2: Are there any differences in viewpoints of various groups of survey
respondents?
 RQ3: What are the weights for each of the metrics?
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Table III.4: List of works on resilience metrics 
Authors Metrics or principles or elements of resilience 
158 Seven themes of Highly Resilient Organizations (HROs): Top-level commitment, 
just culture, learning culture, awareness, preparedness, flexibility, and opacity 
179 Four cornerstones of Resilience Engineering (RE): Anticipate, monitor, respond, and 
learn 
110
Four principles: Top management commitment, flexibility, learning, and awareness 
180 Eight Contributing Success Factors (CSFs): Risk understanding, anticipation, 
attention, response, robustness, resourcefulness/rapidity, decision support, and 
redundancy 
181
Three elements for emergency management: Proactive emergency management 
through early risk anticipation, emergency management’s adaptation to new and 
future work practices such as distributed 
actors, and emergency management’s adaptation to new and future work practices 
such as new technology 
46 Six principles: Flexibility, controllability, early detection, minimization of failure, 
limitation of effects, and administrative controls/procedures 
65 Integrated Resilience Engineering Factors: Self-organization, teamwork, 
redundancy, and fault-tolerant 
162, 182
Process Resilience Analysis Framework 
Four resilience aspects: Early detection, error tolerant design, recoverability, and 
plasticity 
Twenty four process system resilience metrics 
In order to answer these questions, a Process Resilience Analysis Framework 
(PRAF) survey questionnaire was prepared based on the resilience metrics.  
The metrics include both technical and social factors. For example, the technical 
factors include process or equipment related parameters such as alarm rate, vibration 
analysis of mechanical equipment, and demands on safety system. Social factors include 
human and organization related aspects such as current and accurate procedures, training 
completed on schedule, shift-handover communication, and completion of process safety 
corrective actions.  
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This section presents the resilience metrics developed for PRAF with description 
and significance to make process systems resilient and safer to operate162, 168-169, 182. These 
are categorized in three phases of PRAF: 
3.2.1. Phase I – Avoidance 
Alarm rate 
It is defined as the number of alarms per hour. In a process unit, the alarm is 
annunciated if the value of one of the measured process parameters such as pressure, 
temperature, or level is outside the set point limits. A higher number of alarms in a 
particular process unit indicates a problem with the normal operation of the process 
operation and can escalate to an abnormal condition in case the operator does not take 
appropriate action165. 
Equipment pieces operated outside fitness-for-service rating 
It is defined as the “number of equipment pieces found to have operated outside 
fitness-for-service rating per 100 or 1000 inspections or tests”169.  Such inspection results 
will indicate potential failure of primary containment. 
Unplanned maintenance jobs  
It is defined as the number of unplanned maintenance jobs in a plant, requiring 
more than an hour to complete. If some process equipment in a plant is faced with a higher 
number of major unplanned maintenance, it is a clear indication of a mechanical integrity 
problem.  
Mechanical database 
It is defined as the data gathered from mechanical equipment, and it is categorized 
primarily as the number of rotatory equipment pieces (e.g., compressor, and agitator) found 
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to have operated outside vibration rating limits and number of pump or seal leaks observed 
from mechanical equipment. 
Process safety near miss data 
It has been considered as one of the most important leading metrics in literature173. 
This metric is defined as the number of process safety near misses reported in the plant. 
Near miss has been defined as “any significant release of a hazardous substance that does 
not meet the threshold for a process safety incident lagging metric, or a challenge to a 
safety system”173. An increased number of near miss events can be an indicator of a higher 
potential for a significant LoC event. 
Unplanned shutdowns per year 
It is defined as the number of unplanned shutdowns per year in a process unit/plant. 
If there are frequent events of emergency and/or unplanned shutdowns in a process unit, 
this is an indicator of a potential problem in the plant. This metric contributes to the 
avoidance phase by providing an important history of various setbacks in the plant history. 
Learning from incidents (LFI) communication 
It is defined as the number of communications on learning from company and 
industry incidents. It is evident from literature that this is an important indicator for 
improved process safety and risk management. The literature on failure to learn from 
process safety incidents has highlighted how some of the disastrous events could have been 
avoided183. It is one of the vital metrics in avoidance phase as communications on learning 
from incidents could help the process operations team identify additional challenges or 
hazards thus supporting prediction of events. 
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Process hazard evaluations completion 
It refers to the various hazard identification and evaluation studies for a process 
plant. It is calculated as the percentage of studies completed on time vs scheduled. 
Process safety action item closure 
It refers to the different kinds of recommendations and action items generated from 
process safety studies such as incident investigations, hazard identification and evaluations 
or compliance audits. It is calculated as the percentage or number of past-due action items. 
3.2.2. Phase II– Survival 
Demands on Safety system 
This is categorized into the following three metrics, which form important metrics 
for the survival phase. 
Trips (SIF/ESD system activation): “A safety instrumented system is considered to 
have been activated when called upon to function by a valid signal regardless of whether or 
not the SIS responds”169. It is measured as the number of trips (ESD/SIF system 
activations) per month. 
Pressure relief: “A pressure relief valve is considered to have been activated when 
the system pressure reaches the device set point whether or not the pressure relief device 
performs as designed”169. It is measured as the number of activations of pressure relief 
valve/bursting disk per month.   
Mechanical device shutdown: “A mechanical shutdown system is considered to 
have been activated when called upon to function by a valid signal, regardless of whether 
or not the mechanical shutdown system responds”169. It is measured as the number of 
mechanical trip activations per month. 
75 
Plant/process unit was operated outside design limits 
It is defined as percentage of times process unit was operated outside the safe 
operating limit (SOL) applicable to the phase of operation.  
Changes executed through Management of Change MoC procedure  
It is defined as the percentage of changes executed through Management of Change 
procedure per year. This metric measures how well a process plant/unit recognizes changes 
that require use of the MoC procedure of the company and actually makes use of the 
procedure prior to implementing changes.  
Work permit compliance 
It is defined as the “percentage of sampled work permits that meet all 
requirements”169. The examples may be hot work, lockout/tagout, etc. It forms a critical 
metric for surviving through process-upset events. 
Safety critical equipment (SCE) inspection 
This metric is defined as the percentage of inspections of SCE completed on time. 
This may include pressure vessels, storage tanks, piping systems, pressure relief devices, 
pumps, instruments, control systems, interlocks and emergency shutdown systems, 
mitigation systems, and emergency response equipment. 
Safety critical equipment (SCE) deficiency management  
It is defined as the management response to the inspection findings of SCE 
deficiency (e.g., non-functional pressure relief devices and safety instrumented systems - 
SIS’s). “This may include proper approvals for continued safe operations, sufficient 
interim safeguards, and timeliness of repairs, or replacement, or rerate”169.  
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MoC and Pre Start-up Safety Review (PSSR) Compliance 
It is defined as the percentage of the sampled MoC s and PSSRs that meet all the 
requirements of the standards and procedures. 
Fatigue risk management  
It presents the human aspect of the process plant. It can be calculated based on 
various measures such as percentage of overtime, number of open shifts, number of 
extended shifts, number of consecutive shifts worked, etc.169 
Maintenance backlogs  
It is defined as the percentage of maintenance backlogs per quarter in a process 
plant. This reflects the lack of effective implementation of the mechanical integrity 
program in the plant. 
3.2.3. Phase III– Recovery 
Tests for emergency systems and procedures 
It is defined as the percentage of successful tests for emergency systems and 
procedures per year. It is an important metric for effective response and recovery from a 
catastrophic incident. 
Mock drills for emergency situations  
It is defined as the number of mock drills for emergency situations per year. It can 
be measured as the percentage of emergency response drills completed as scheduled. This 
is an important metric to assess the difficulties and time factor during actual response. 
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3.2.4. Common metrics 
Shift handover communication 
It is defined as the number of shift handover communication violations per year for 
the process unit. Human or plant operator is a critical and integral component of the 
process system in any operational activity. Therefore, this metric is common to all three 
phases of avoidance, survival and recovery. 
Process safety required training sessions completed  
It is defined as the “percentage of process safety required training sessions 
completed with skills verification” 169. This metric is conducive in robust and effective 
operators’ actions and response in the process plant. The operators in the plant are required 
to use various procedures such as operating, maintenance, and emergency and training for 
these is important. Hence, this is an important metric for both survival and recovery 
phases.  
Required procedures reviewed/revised  
It is defined as the percentage of required process safety related procedures 
reviewed or revised169. This metric is conducive to robust and effective operators’ actions 
and response in the process plant. The operators in the plant are required to use various 
procedures such as operating, maintenance, and emergency and it is critical that these are 
revised and updated. Hence, this is an important metric for both survival and recovery 
phases.  
3.3. PRAF survey  
In this section, we are reporting on the statistical analysis of the resilience metrics 
survey conducted within the process industry.  The survey respondents present a wide 
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variety of experience and employment sectors. This study aims to answer the following 
three research questions related to resilience metrics– what are the most important metrics 
for each of the three phases?; are there any differences in viewpoints of various groups of 
survey respondents?; and what is the relative level of importance for each of the metrics?  
Answers to these research questions are critical in the quantification of overall process 
resilience and also provide the essential information for senior management to make 
informed risk decisions. Therefore, a PRAF survey based on Likert type questionnaire was 
conducted, which produced categorical responses. Methods and techniques such as ordinal 
alpha, Kruskal-Wallis test, and polychoric correlations, relevant to analyze categorical 
responses have been used in the programming language R.  
3.3.1. Survey content and methodology 
The survey questionnaire comprises two parts, Part-I has 30 items with four 
possible responses graded from 4 to 1:4 -essential; 3- important; 2- helpful; 1- unnecessary 
(Likert-type format). These 30 items were questions covering the 24 resilience metrics and 
three phases of process resilience in three sections. For avoidance phase, 11 items; survival 
phase 14 items; and recovery phase 5 items were asked respectively. The avoidance phase 
included items on metrics for predicting a process upset or LoC event. The survival phase 
comprised of items on metrics for surviving a process upset or LoC event. The recovery 
phase comprised of items on metrics for recovering from a process upset or catastrophic 
condition. Part-II is the ‘Glossary’ that contained definitions for the 15 terms used within 
the survey to assist the respondents with the domain terminology. This was done with the 
objective to maintain consistency in the respondents’ understanding of the survey 
questions. In order to ensure the quality and rationality of the questions, inputs and 
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suggestions from industrial experts and academic researchers in the area were incorporated 
in the final survey questionnaire.  
The Qualtrics platform was used to conduct the survey. It was distributed via email 
after approval from the Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board - (IRB 
Number: IRB2016-0327D, IRB Approval Date: 09/22/2016, IRB Expiration Date: 
09/15/2017). The PRAF survey is based on Likert type questionnaire, which produced 
categorical responses. Methods and techniques such as ordinal alpha, Kruskal-Wallis test, 
and polychoric correlations, relevant to analyze categorical responses have been used in 
the programming language R184. The statistical analysis presented in this section made use 
of various packages within R such as rcompanion, psych, lattice, FSA, Rcmdr185, 186, 187, 188, 
189. 
3.3.2. Survey respondents 
The type of respondents for this survey had a pivotal role to answer the questions 
asked. The survey respondents were primarily identified from chemical process, and oil 
and gas fields with knowledge of process safety, risk assessment, and process operations. 
The survey was distributed to industry and academia and personal contacts of the authors. 
All survey responses were collected electronically and were anonymous. The survey 
results indicate that a total of 251 responses were recorded. Regarding the missing data, it 
should be noted that the answers do not always add up 251 because not all respondents 
answered all the survey questions. 
The respondents’ experience ranges from Process operations, Process safety to 
Other fields such as business, accounting, and purchasing departments. Industry, 
Academia, and Government are the various employment sectors representing the survey 
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respondents. Figures III.6 and III.7 present an overview of survey respondents by area of 
experience and employment sector. It is apparent from Figure III.6 that the majority of the 
respondents (72% of the total respondents) have spent most of their careers in process 
safety field. Figure III.7 shows that the respondents primarily work in industry (85%).  
Figure III.6: Respondents by area of experience 

















Respondents by employment sector 
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3.3.3. Survey quality and analysis 
The reliability of the survey questionnaire is fundamental to get accurate and good 
results. The literature on reliability has highlighted that if the alpha of the questionnaire is 
greater than 0.7, it has high internal consistency190. This survey questionnaire was tested 
for reliability for the three different phases – avoidance, survival, and recovery. There is a 
large volume of published studies describing the role of Cronbach’s alpha as frequently 
used reliability index191, 192. However, the first analyses of ordinal alpha as reliability index 
emerged in 2001, which proves to be a more accurate index for Likert-type formats191, 193. 
Tables III.5, III.6 and III.7 report the ordinal alpha (based on the Polychoric correlation 
matrix) and Cronbach’s alpha (raw and standardized based on Pearson covariance and 
correlation matrices respectively) for the three PRAF phases.  
Table III.5: Ordinal alpha and Cronbach’s alpha for Avoidance phase metrics 












Q1 Alarm rate 0.77 0.74 0.74 




0.76 0.73 0.73 
Q3 Unplanned 
maintenance jobs 





0.76 0.73 0.73 
Q5 Seal leaks 0.76 0.73 0.72 
Q6 Process safety 
near-misses 
0.76 0.73 0.73 
Q7 Unplanned 
shutdowns 
0.76 0.72 0.72 
Q8 Communications 
on learning from 
incidents 
0.76 0.72 0.72 
Q9 Process hazard 
evaluations 
completion 
0.74 0.70 0.69 
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Table III.5 Continued 












Q10 Past-due process 
safety actions 
0.74 0.71 0.7 
Q11 Shift handover 
communication 
violations 
0.74 0.71 0.71 
As can be seen from Table III.5 for the avoidance phase, all except the standardized 
alpha for item Q9 are >= 0.7, hence all alpha values are acceptable and internally 
consistent and reliable. 
Table III.6: Ordinal alpha and Cronbach’s alpha for Survival phase metrics 












Q12 ESD/SIF system 
activations 
0.83 0.81 0.81 
Q13 Pressure relief 
valve/bursting disk 
activations 
0.85 0.82 0.82 
Q14 Mechanical trip 
activations 
0.84 0.81 0.81 
Q15 Process unit 
operation outside 
design limits 
0.84 0.82 0.82 




0.84 0.82 0.82 
Q17 Work permits that 
met all 
requirements 
0.84 0.82 0.82 




0.84 0.81 0.81 
Q19 Management 
response to the 
inspection findings 
of safety critical 
equipment (SCE) 
deficiency 





Table III.6 Continued 












Q20 Management of Change 
(MOC’s) and Pre Start-up 
Safety Review (PSSR’s) 
that met all requirements  
0.83 0.80 0.80 
Q21 Human factor related to 
fatigue risk management 
0.84 0.81 0.81 
Q22 Maintenance backlogs 0.83 0.80 0.80 
Q23 Process safety required 
training sessions 
completed 
0.83 0.80 0.81 
Q24 Process safety required 
operations and 
maintenance procedures 
reviewed or revised as 
scheduled 
0.84 0.81 0.81 
Q25 Shift handover 
communication violations 
0.83 0.80 0.80 
 
From Table III.6, survival phase, all alpha values are >= 0.8, hence are good and 
internally consistent and reliable. 
Table III.7: Ordinal alpha and Cronbach’s alpha for Recovery phase metrics 











Q26 Successful tests for 
emergency systems and 
procedures 
0.75 0.73 0.73 
Q27 Mock drills for 
emergency situations 
0.76 0.72 0.72 
Q28 Process safety required 
training sessions 
completed 
0.69 0.66 0.66 
Q29 Process safety required 
operations and 
maintenance procedures 
reviewed or revised as 
scheduled 
0.7 0.66 0.67 
Q30 Shift handover 
communication 
violations 
0.74 0.71 0.71 
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Lastly, from Table III.7, for recovery phase, most of the items have ordinal alpha 
(more relevant for Likert type data analysis) >= 0.7, hence are acceptable and internally 
consistent and reliable. Item Q28 has an ordinal alpha of 0.69~0.7. Overall, it can be 
concluded that the survey quality is good and acceptable as the questionnaire items are 
found to be statistically reliable and internally consistent. 
3.3.4. Results  
RQ1: what are the most important metrics for each of the 3 phases of PRAF – avoidance, 
survival, and recovery?  
The following sections present the results for three different phases of avoidance, 
survival, and recovery.  
Descriptive statistics 
Tables III.8, III.9, and III.10 illustrate the descriptive statistics such as mean, 
median, skewness, kurtosis and the standard error of the questionnaire items for avoidance, 
survival and recovery phases, respectively.  
As can be seen in Table III.8, most items except Q2, Q6, and Q10 have skewness 
between -0.5 and 0.5, which implies response distributions are fairly symmetrical or in 
other words, most responses (essential, important, helpful, and necessary) to various 
metrics occur at regular frequencies. Items Q2 and Q10 have a skewness of -0.79 and -0.61 
respectively, which means response distribution is moderately negatively skewed or a 
higher percentage of responses for these two metrics fall in the essential or important 
categories. For item Q6, skewness < -1.0, which implies distribution is far from 
symmetrical with a long tail on the left or most of the responses for this metric fall in the 
essential or important categories. Negative kurtosis for most items reflects flatter 
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distribution except for item Q2 with a positive kurtosis meaning slightly more peaked 
distribution than Gaussian, which means for Q2, the responses are more clustered around 
the mean value (3.49) and have a smaller standard deviation. This corroborates the analysis 
of the skewness value for item Q2. 
Table III.8: Descriptive statistics (Avoidance phase) 
Avoidance 
Item Description Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis 
Standard 
error 










2.79 3 -0.13 -0.5 0.05 
Q4 
Rotatory equipment 
pieces operated outside 
vibration rating 
3.04 3 -0.14 -0.81 0.05 




3.54 4 -1.18 0.68 0.05 
Q7 Unplanned shutdowns 2.98 3 -0.28 -0.65 0.06 
Q8 
Communications on 
learning from incidents 




2.84 3 -0.33 -0.69 0.06 
Q10 
Past-due process safety 
actions 





2.95 3 -0.14 -0.97 0.06 
Table III.9 represents skewness between -0.5 and 0.5 for most items except Q12, 
Q13, Q15, and Q19. This implies that the response distributions are fairly symmetrical, or 
in other words, most responses (essential, important, helpful, and necessary) to various 
metrics occur at regular frequencies. 
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Table III.9: Descriptive statistics (Survival phase) 
Survival 













3.05 3.00 -0.27 -0.23 0.05 
Q15 
Process unit operation 
outside design limits 





Change 194 procedure 
2.63 2.50 0.06 -1.1 0.07 
Q17 
Work permits that met 
all requirements 
2.65 3.00 -0.09 -0.9 0.07 
Q18 
On-time safety critical 
equipment (SCE) 
inspections completion 
3.30 3.00 -0.48 -0.9 0.05 
Q19 
Management response 
to the inspection 
findings of safety 
critical equipment 
(SCE) deficiency 
3.50 4.00 -0.79 -0.39 0.04 
Q20 
Management of 
Change (MOC’s) and 
Pre Start-up Safety 
Review (PSSR’s) that 
met all requirements  
2.94 3.00 -0.15 -0.88 0.06 
Q21 
Human factor related 
to fatigue risk 
management 
3.08 3.00 -0.12 -1.04 0.05 











or revised as 
scheduled 





2.85 3.00 -0.1 -0.86 0.06 
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Items Q12 and Q19 have a skewness of -0.59 and -0.79 respectively; which means 
response distribution is moderately negatively skewed or a higher percentage of responses 
for these two metrics fall in the essential or important. Also, skewness < -1.0 for items Q13 
and Q15 that implies distribution is far from symmetrical with a long tail on the left or 
most of the responses for this metric fall in the essential or important categories. Negative 
kurtosis for most items reflects flatter distribution except for items Q13 and 15 with a 
positive kurtosis meaning more peaked distribution than Gaussian, which means for Q13 
and Q15, the responses are more clustered around the mean value (3.43, 3.46 respectively) 
and have a smaller standard deviation. This validates the analysis of the skewness value for 
items Q13 and Q15.  
Table III.10: Descriptive statistics (Recovery phase) 
Recovery 





Kurtosis Standard error 
Q26 
Successful tests for 
emergency systems and 
procedures 
3.23 3.00 -0.76 0.06 0.06 
Q27 
Mock drills for emergency 
situations 
3.03 3.00 -0.13 -0.9 0.05 
Q28 
Process safety required 
training sessions completed 
2.88 3.00 -0.18 -0.93 0.06 
Q29 
Process safety required 
operations and maintenance 
procedures reviewed or 
revised as scheduled 




2.51 2.00 0.07 -0.99 0.07 
It is clear from Table III.10 that skewness is between -0.5 and 0.5 for most items, 
implies response distributions are close to symmetrical, or in other words, most responses 
(essential, important, helpful, and necessary) to various metrics occur at regular 
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frequencies. Item Q26 has a skewness of -0.76, which means response distribution is 
moderately negatively skewed or a higher percentage of responses for these two metrics 
fall in the essential or important. Item Q30 has a positive skewness that means it has a 
slightly long tail to the right or most of the responses for this metric fall in the helpful or 
unnecessary categories. Negative kurtosis for most items reflects flatter distributions 
except for item Q26 with a positive kurtosis meaning more peaked distribution than 
Gaussian, which means for Q26, the responses are more clustered around the mean value 
(3.23) and have a smaller standard deviation. This supports the analysis of the skewness 
value for item Q26.  
Metrics significance based on respondents’ perception 
All survey respondents were asked to rank the metrics in each of the three phases 
according to their effectiveness. The results are presented in Figures III.8, III.9, and III.10. 
Figure III.8: Avoidance phase metrics and respondents perception on effectiveness 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Process safety near-misses
Equipment pieces operated outside…




Rotatory equipment pieces operated…





Essential Important Helpful Unnecessary
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Some conclusions that can be drawn from Figure III.8 are as follows: 
 Most of the metrics except LFI communication are either essential or
important to >75% of respondents on average.
 Process safety near misses was the metric perceived most as the essential
metric to predict a process upset event by most respondents.
 Equipment pieces operated outside fitness-for-service rating, and the past
due process safety actions are considered to be other essential metrics after
near misses for prediction of process upset events.
 LFI communication is considered to be helpful by most respondents, yet
>10% of responses found it unnecessary for predicting process upset.
Further analysis is done to see variations between different groups based on 
area of experience and employment sector. 
 It is surprising to note that alarm rate was found to be unnecessary in the
prediction of process upset events by ~7% of respondents. It would be
interesting to learn more about the respondents’ background to gain more
insights on the same.
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Figure III.9: Survival phase metrics and respondents perception on effectiveness 
Following are some of the interesting conclusions from Figure III.9: 
 A higher number of respondents found Process unit operation outside
design limits, Pressure relief valve/bursting disk activations and
Management response to findings of SCE deficiency as the essential metrics
to prevent LoC events; markedly more than other metrics.
 Mechanical trip activations and Maintenance backlogs are considered to be
important metrics in the survival of LoC events. The response to the first six
metrics look very similar, within an accuracy of the analysis.
 The majority of the respondents found some of the social factors such as
Procedures revised and updated, Process safety related training sessions
91 
completed important and useful. Human factor related to fatigue risk 
management is the most important metric based on the results. This 
provides an indication of strong significance of social metrics in the risk 
and resilience assessment.  
 On-time SCE inspections completion, Management response to findings of
SCE deficiency, and the Human factor related to fatigue risk management
were found to be necessary by all respondents.
 It is surprising to find that ~11% of responses considered robust work
permit system and changes executed through MoC as unnecessary to
survive a LoC event.
Figure III.10: Recovery phase metrics and respondents perception on effectiveness 
From Figure III.10, the following can be concluded: 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Successful tests for emergency
systems and procedures
Mock drills for emergency
situations






procedures reviewed or revised…
Recovery phase
Essential Important Helpful Unnecessary
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 Of the five metrics, a higher number of respondents found Successful tests
for emergency systems and procedures as the essential metric to recover
from a process upset/LoC event.
 Though not thought as essential Mock drills for emergency situations was
most important metric and had least counts as an unnecessary metric.
 Some of the social factors such as procedures revised and updated, and shift
handover communication violations were perceived to be important and
helpful by the majority of the respondents but not essential. The authors
believe there is still some unexploited potential and is an area for
improvement.
Correlation analysis 
The rule of thumb is if r > 0.8 or r < -0.8, variables correlate too highly and if -0.3 
< r < 0.3, they correlate too lowly with other variables. If the variables relate too highly, it 
means that it is difficult to determine how the variables contribute uniquely to the factor195. 
If the variables relate too lowly, it means that they measure different underlying construct 
as the other variables. 
As seen from Table III.11, most of the correlations (underlined) are too low (-0.3 < 
r < 0.3). This implies they measure different underlying construct as the other metrics. It is 
evident from Table III.12, most of the correlations (underlined) are too low (-0.3 < r < 0.3). 
This implies that most of the metrics measure different underlying construct as the other 
metrics. 
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Table III.11: Polychoric correlation matrix (Avoidance) 
Correlation matrix (Polychoric), Avoidance 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 
Q1 1 0.24 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.13 0.2 0.17 0.15 
Q2 0.24 1 0.19 0.31 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.21 0.32 
Q3 0.08 0.19 1 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.28 
Q4 0.21 0.31 0.12 1 0.29 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.17 0.28 
Q5 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.29 1 0.2 0.17 0.2 0.32 0.28 0.2 
Q6 0.18 0.27 0.14 0.15 0.2 1 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.33 0.24 
Q7 0.22 0.16 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.29 1 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.23 
Q8 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.2 0.14 0.24 1 0.43 0.29 0.31 
Q9 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.43 1 0.62 0.42 
Q10 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.62 1 0.44 
Q11 0.15 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.2 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.44 1 
Table III.13 shows that few of the correlations (underlined) are too low (-0.3 < r < 
0.3). Most of the correlations are <0.8. This implies that most of the metrics contribute 
uniquely to the recovery factor as they are neither correlated highly nor lowly. 
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Table III.12: Polychoric correlation matrix (Survival) 
Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 
Q12 1 0.54 0.61 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.53 0.3 0.3 0.21 0.27 
Q13 0.54 1 0.66 0.4 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.23 0.12 -0.23 0.2 0.15 0.05 0.22 
Q14 0.61 0.66 1 0.32 0.09 0.1 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.2 0.29 0.31 0.19 0.22 
Q15 0.3 0.4 0.32 1 0.2 0.1 0.06 0.52 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.29 
Q16 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.2 1 0.49 -0.02 0.14 0.41 0.24 0.3 0.25 0.32 0.33 
Q17 0.15 -0.02 0.1 0.1 0.49 1 0.25 0.24 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.32 0.26 
Q18 0.29 -0.02 0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.25 1 0.46 0.55 0.24 0.47 0.37 0.33 0.3 
Q19 0.24 0.23 0.32 0.52 0.14 0.24 0.46 1 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.27 -0.01 -0.01
Q20 0.29 0.12 0.28 0.18 0.41 0.5 0.55 0.37 1 0.37 0.40 0.46 0.52 0.36 
Q21 0.53 -0.23 0.2 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.38 0.37 1 0.35 0.43 0.23 0.26 
Q22 0.3 0.2 0.29 0.09 0.3 0.25 0.47 0.35 0.40 0.35 1 0.48 0.37 0.54 
Q23 0.3 0.15 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.37 0.27 0.46 0.43 0.48 1 0.47 0.5 
Q24 0.21 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.33 -0.01 0.52 0.23 0.37 0.47 1 0.43 
Q25 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.3 -0.01 0.36 0.26 0.54 0.5 0.43 1 
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Table III.13: Polychoric correlation matrix (Recovery) 
Correlation matrix (Polychoric), Recovery 
Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 
Q26 1.00 0.50 0.35 0.32 0.26 
Q27 0.50 1.00 0.40 0.30 0.21 
Q28 0.35 0.40 1.00 0.64 0.49 
Q29 0.32 0.30 0.64 1.00 0.57 
Q30 0.26 0.21 0.49 0.57 1.00 
RQ2: are there any differences in viewpoints of various groups of survey respondents? 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to understand whether survey response to metrics, 
where responses are measured on an ordinal scale, differed based on area of experience 
and employment sector. One metric that showed surprising or unexpected results from 
each of the three phases was chosen. These metrics are- LFI communication from 
avoidance phase, Work permits that met all requirements from survival phase, and Mock 
drills for emergency situations from recovery phase. For the area of experience, the 
dependent variable is "survey response to metrics", measured on a 4-point scale from 
“essential" to “unnecessary", and the independent variable is “area of experience", which 
has three independent groups: “process safety", “process operations" and “other". For the 
employment sector, the dependent variable is " survey response towards metrics", 
measured on a 4-point scale from “essential" to “unnecessary", and the independent 
variable is “employment sector", which has three independent groups: “industry", 
“academia" and “government". 
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Table III.14: Kruskal-Wallis test results 
























0.065 2.33 0.009 4.34 0.522 7.36 
DF 2 2 2 2 2 2 
p-
value 
0.968 0.312 1 0.114 0.770 0.03 
Following are some conclusions based on Table III.14: 
• A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there was a statistically significant
difference in LFI communication metric response between the different
groups based on employment sector, χ2 = 7.36, p = 0.03 (p<0.05). This
result is consistent with the mosaic plot analysis.
• Items Q17: Work permits that met all requirements, Q27: Mock drills for
emergency situations, and Q8: LFI Communication were not statistically
different based on the area of experience.
• Items Q17: Work permits that met all requirements, Q27: Mock drills for
emergency situations were not statistically different based on employment
sector.
RQ3: what are the weights for each of the metrics? 






The scaled weights are calculated by dividing with the maximum weight within 
that phase. 
The weights for the avoidance, survival and recovery phases range from 2.4 to 
3.53; 2.61 to 3.49; and 2.49 to 3.22 with an average weight of 3.01; 3.04; and 2.86, 
respectively. The table is quite revealing in several ways: 
 Avoidance phase: Process safety near-misses metric has the highest weight
(3.53 or scaled weight of 1), followed by Equipment pieces operated outside
fitness-for-service rating (3.49 or scaled weight of 0.99) and Past-due
process safety actions (3.27 or scaled weight of 0.93). The two metrics with
lowest weights are LFI communication (2.4 or scaled weight of 0.68) and
alarm rate (2.68 or scaled weight of 0.76).
 Survival phase: Management response to the inspection findings of safety
critical equipment (SCE) deficiency has the highest weight (3.49 or scaled
weight of 1), followed by Process unit operation outside design limits (3.47
or scaled weight of 0.99) and Pressure relief valve/bursting disk activations
(3.44 or scaled weight of 0.98). The two metrics with lowest weights are
Changes executed through the Management of Change procedure (2.61 or
scaled weight of 0.75) and Work permits that met all requirements (2.65 or
scaled weight of 0.76).
 Recovery phase: Successful tests for emergency systems and procedures has
the highest weight (3.22 or scaled weight of 1), followed by Mock drills for
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emergency situations (3.02 or scaled weight of 0.94). The metric with 
lowest weight is Shift handover communication violations (2.49 or scaled 
weight of 0.77). 
Additional results 
Relationship analysis using mosaic plots 
A mosaic plot is a graphical display that allows you to examine the relationship 
between two or more categorical variables. In this section, three mosaic plots are presented 
in Figures III.11, III.12, and III.13 and results from each plot are summarized.  
Figure III.11: Relationship between experience areas (LFI communication metric) 
This is a mosaic plot looking at the relationship between the area of experience 
group (process safety, process operations, and other) and significance (essential, important, 
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helpful, and unnecessary) of the LFI communication metric. From Figure III.11, we can 
note the following: 
 The respondents from process safety and process operations categories have
approximately equal percentages of significance as important, helpful, and
unnecessary.
 The other category respondents have a higher percentage of significance as
helpful.
 The process operations category respondents have a slightly higher
percentage of significance as essential.
Figure III.12: Relationship between employment sectors (LFI communication metric) 
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This is a mosaic plot looking at the relationship between employment sectors 
(industry, academia, and government) and significance (essential, important, helpful, and 
unnecessary) of the LFI communication metric. It is apparent from the Figure III.12 that: 
 The respondents from all three employment sector categories have varying
proportions for various significance levels.
 A higher percentage of unnecessary significance is observed for industry
sector respondents. Also, a higher percentage of helpful significance is
recorded for industry sector.
 A higher percentage of essential significance is observed for government
sector respondents. Also, no respondents from the government sector
perceived LFI communication as unnecessary.
Figure III.13: Relationship between phases and significance 
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This is a mosaic plot looking at the relationship between three PRAF phases 
(avoidance, survival, recovery) and significance (essential, important, helpful, and 
unnecessary) of the shift handover communication violations metric. It can be seen from 
Figure III.13 that: 
 A larger percentage of essential significance for avoidance phase.
 All phases have approximately equal percentages of helpful significance
level.
 A slightly higher percentage of unnecessary significance level is recorded
for recovery phase.
Observations 
During the survey response data analysis, following observations were made: 
 No data-driven or validated method was followed to determine the phase/s
of application of each metric. The allocation of metric phases was based on
limited literature sources on the topic and professional experience of the
authors. For example, some experts suggested that Management of Change
(MOC’s) and Pre Start-up Safety Review (PSSR’s) that met all
requirements to be far more significant metric in avoidance phase than in
survival phase.
 It would be interesting to test the level of significance of some of the
metrics such as LFI communication, Changes executed through the
Management of Change procedure based on all three phases. This could be
one of the potential reasons that these metrics were reported as unnecessary
for a particular phase.
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 For Shift handover communication violation metric, further analysis in way
of interviews with experts in the field to understand the reasons for finding
that this metric was most significant in avoidance phase, than survival and
recovery would be advantageous.
 Another remarkable contribution would be to find the relative level of
significance of three phases – avoidance, survival, and recovery in the
overall risk and resilience assessment.
3.3.5. Application 
Risk and resilience assessment 
Within the PRAF, the uncertain variables for an actual scenario in resilience 
assessment can be described in the form of a probability distribution function. The 
posterior values of the statistical parameters of these uncertain variables would be inferred 
based on the prior, and likelihood function formed from the resilience metrics information. 
This would reduce the uncertainty in the measured process parameters. It will be erroneous 
to give equal weightage to all metrics in the assessment. Hence, in order to have a 
comparatively accurate analysis, resilience metrics weights obtained in the current study 
would be utilized instead of equal weights. 
General purpose 
Another application of the results obtained in this study can assist an organizations’ 
senior management in the process industries in identification of the most significant 
metrics. For example, it is evident from the analysis that the Process safety near-misses, 
Management response to the inspection findings of safety critical equipment (SCE) 
deficiency, and Successful tests for emergency systems and procedures metrics are the 
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most significant for avoidance, survival and recovery phases respectively. These results 
can be applied to various risk, safety, and resilience assessment studies. This would be 
conducive in making decisions on optimal allocation of resources such as financial, and 
manpower towards the metrics management system (collection of data, measurement of 
metrics, trending analysis, making recommendations or having corrective actions) within 
their organizations. Also, it would be beneficial for small and medium level organizations 
to initiate the implementation of a metrics management system. The current study can be 
extended to develop correlations with the use of actual data on these metrics and process 
upsets and/or incidents. 
3.4. Quantification of social aspects (DSM) 
As established in previous chapters, process systems are complex socio-technical 
systems and this characteristic makes them vulnerable to upset conditions or in the worst 
case scenario disastrous incidents. Many incidents in literature have been reported to occur 
due to lack of understanding of social factors (human and organizational) impact or both 
individual and mutual contribution and their quantification. Considering the significance of 
these social aspects in process system risk and resilience analysis, there is a need to 
develop quantification methods for these aspects. Some efforts have been focused in this 
direction in the past years, however, these are limited in their approach or are not applied 
to the process systems analysis. One of the prior research has been applied in the software 
and healthcare industry to study the expected and actual interactions between the 
engineering and emergency care teams. This study builds on that previous research method 
and develops it for the process industry. A case study of reactor charging is used to 
demonstrate the methodology. An overlay of expected and actual interactions in the form 
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of a matrix is built which is utilized to calculate the socio-technical congruence metric. 
Analysis and quantification of social aspects demonstrate that merely engaging the right 
stakeholders such as operators, shift supervisors in the process, the MDM can itself lead to 
performance improvement. This type of analysis sets the basis for future studies on 
quantification of these social aspects such as training, operating procedures, learning from 
incident communication etc. in the process systems risk and resilience assessment. 
3.4.1. Motivating example 
Congruence analysis is conducted to quantify the interactions within the socio-
technical system196, 197. In order to do so, we consider the reactor charging procedure and 
construct a multi-domain matrix (MDM) to model the two domains involved in this 
procedure—process and people—and the interactions across them. 
The steps in the reactor charging procedure make up the process domain, and the 
personnel performing those steps make up the people domain. Thus, the MDM contains 
four quadrants, two design structure matrices (DSMs) representing interactions within the 
two domains and two domain mapping matrices (DMMs) representing dependencies 
across the domains. A schematic of the quadrant model representing the hierarchical MDM 
is shown in Figure III.14. 
In the Figure III.14, the upper left quadrant of the MDM, is the process architecture 
DSM depicting the technical system—the general steps of the reactor charging procedure. 
Similarly, the lower right quadrant, is the organization architecture DSM representing 
either actual or reported communication among the members of the team. The upper right 
and lower left, respectively, are the two domain mapping matrices in that they map entities 
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in the technical domain (the process steps) to those in the social domain (the team 
members) and vice versa.  
The upper right quadrant is termed the “trigger task matrix” because it represents 
the activities that “trigger” a team member to perform his/her task. That is, a marking in a 
cell within this quadrant indicates that the person listed in the corresponding column is 
triggered to complete some task by the completion of another task listed in the 
corresponding row. This signaling is termed “trigger communication.” The lower left 
quadrant represents a much simpler relationship, the tasks for which each team member is 
responsible.  
Figure III.14: The four quadrants of a two-domain MDM for reactor charging 
The integrated analysis of these matrices leads to a process map of reactor charging 
procedure as shown in the Figure III.15. This process map represents the reactor charging 
procedure and is derived from the MDM and is based on the ISA 88 standard 198. It is a 
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sequence of steps that need to be followed in the reactor charging procedure and has the 
triggers and checks that can be both manual and automated. Using this, congruence matrix 
is constructed which is discussed in the results section. 
Figure III.15: Reactor charging procedure 
The expected and reported interactions in the reactor charging procedure were 
compared by overlaying the two matrices according to the framework, which is based on a 
formalism originally developed by199. Avnet expanded the formalism and called the result 
the congruence matrix200 
The result, which is referred to here as the congruence matrix, can be used to 
highlight four distinct cases in mapping expected to reported communication: # 
(interactions expected and take place), X (interactions expected but does not take place), O 
(interactions not expected but take place), and <blank> (interactions neither expected nor 
happened). A congruence matrix comparing reported interactions to the expected 
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Figure III.16: Reactor charging procedure: congruence matrix 
Along with the congruence matrix, a summary of the statistics for the counts of the 
cell values is given in Figure III.17. These counts are used to calculate the socio-technical 
congruence metric (Cst) by Eq. (3.2). The value of congruence belongs to the [0,1] interval 
that represents the proportion of coordination requirements that were satisfied through 
some type of coordination activity or mechanism. 
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where N is the number of team members depicted in the matrix 
Cst = 0.26 
The higher value close to 1 implies good performance of the socio-technical 
system. This result based on plant specific data is utilized in the statistical analysis to 
derive an improved uncertainty probability distribution. 
3.5. Summary 
In general, systems based resilience theory has gained momentum and has recently 
been applied by organizations to various critical infrastructure elements which are 
subjected to internal and external, as well as known and unknown, disruptions7. Resilience 
engineering is an idea that cannot at present be regulated and it is the ingenuity and 
responsibility of the organization and society to understand the business case for resilient 
systems and organizations thus promoting overall business resilience – and in the long 
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term profitability. The concepts of process system resilience and a unified taxonomy for a 
common reference framework are proposed in this chapter. Further, a novel, integrated, 
time dependent, quantifiable framework for process resilience termed PRAF - ‘Process 
Resilience Analysis Framework’ is presented in the context of improved risk and safety 
management. As illustrated, the key aspects of process system resilience are early detection 
(ED), error tolerant design (ETD), recoverability (R), and plasticity (P). In application, use 
of these aspects to conduct predictability, survivability and recoverability analysis for a 
process system is not trivial. Nonetheless, the proposed resilience metrics including both 
technical and social resilience indicators would in principle allow for system optimization 
to develop effective risk management strategies in design and operations of such systems. 
With this process resilience analysis framework (PRAF), three major issues in the field of 
risk management in the process industry will be addressed: reduced LoC events, reduced 
consequences from failures and quicker recovery. 
In the resilience metrics study, for the avoidance phase, the process safety near-
miss metric has the highest weight (3.53 or scaled weight of 1), the LFI communication 
(2.4 or scaled weight of 0.68) has the lowest weight, of the eleven metrics examined. For 
the survival phase, management response to the inspection findings of safety critical 
equipment (SCE) deficiency has the highest weight (3.49 or scaled weight of 1), changes 
executed through the Management of Change 194 procedure (2.61 or scaled weight of 0.75) 
has the lowest weight, of the fourteen metrics examined. For the recovery phase, successful 
tests for emergency systems and procedures has the highest weight (3.22 or scaled weight 
of 1) and the shift handover communication violations (2.49 or scaled weight of 0.77) has 
the lowest weight, of the five metrics examined. Some of the detailed findings of this 
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study, provided additional insights such as that shift handover communication violation 
metric had a lower percentage of ‘essential’ significance for the recovery (18%) phase vs 
survival (24%) and avoidance (28%) phases. Some other additional results extended our 
knowledge on the different perception of the respondents based on their area of experience 
and the employment sector for LFI communication metric. The results of the reliability 
analysis have shown that the survey questionnaire is reliable and has internal consistency.  
Additionally, the correlation analysis of the metrics in the avoidance and survival phases 
was correlated too lowly and the metrics measured different underlying constructs as the 
other metrics. For the recovery phase, variables were neither correlated highly nor lowly. 
This implied that the metrics contributed uniquely. Overall, the information based on the 
results from the metrics study is useful for various risk assessors and decision makers. For 
example, the weights of the metrics can be applied to different process safety, risk 
assessment, and resilience studies for enhanced decision-making. Using these weights and 
not using equal weights for these metrics would accomplish this. The results of this study 
also indicate potential improvement for further research areas such as extending the survey 
to determine the most appropriate phase of the metric, additional analysis to test the level 
of significance of some of the metrics based on all three phases, find the relative level of 
significance of three phases, significance of social metrics in risk and resilience 
assessment, and establish correlations by using actual data. 
Furthermore, a matrix-based approach was developed for the quantification of 
social aspects for the process industry and was demonstrated for the reactor charging 
procedure.
CHAPTER IV 
QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT: RESILIENCE BASED INTEGRATED PROCESS 
SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS (RIPSHA)* 
Essential initial steps in process safety and risk management of any facility are 
hazard identification and hazard analysis. A large volume of work can be found in the 
literature on different hazard identification and analysis techniques and advanced 
methodologies, as summarized in section 4.1.201, 202. However, these methods have been 
considered inadequate in identifying and analyzing the hazards involved in most incidents5, 
203. This is because these techniques require competence to overcome incompleteness in
identifying potential technical causes and ignored the contribution of human, procedures or 
organizational elements that affected the analysis results19, 204, 205. Traditional methods for 
process hazard analysis focus primarily on process hazards and ignore the social aspects, 
such as management policies on resource allocation, spare parts deficiency/availability, 
training of operators and more. Most traditional methods use a linear approach and a single 
cause-consequence pair37. These methods are not complete and lack a comprehensive 
assessment approach for the system. According to Zhao et al., humans work with 
technology, social structures, and environment, which can be designated complex systems. 
*Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Rogers, W. J., Pasman, H. J., Keim, K. K., & Mannan, M. 
S., "A Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA) approach: Part I plant system 
layer," Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol 116, Pages 92-105. Copyright 2018 Institution of 
Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Rogers, W. J., Pasman, H. J., & Mannan, M. S., "A 
resilience-based integrated process systems hazard analysis (RIPSHA) approach: Part II management system 
layer," Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Vol 118, Pages 115-124. Copyright 2018 Institution of 
Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V.
111 
112 
In case of an accident system interdependencies must be addressed, and to prevent such 
accidents, the complete sociotechnical system must be evaluated206.  Therefore, a socio-
technical systems perspective covering proper and adequate hazard identification including 
both technical and social factors is paramount in development of preventive measures for 
catastrophic incidents. The socio-technical systems theory has been developed and 
explored by numerous researchers in the past207, 208, 209, 25. A socio-technical system is 
characterized as a complex organization with interaction among its elements of human and 
technology/equipment.  
In this research, a systems-based approach is further developed by including 
resilience engineering aspects. This results in creation of a holistic view of the hazard 
identification and analysis process called Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems 
Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA). This approach is applicable to different modes and 
subsystems of the process system. A bi-layered system approach is described covering the 
process system resilience aspects, multi-modes, and detailed methodology. This chapter 
provides the guidewords based on the sub-systems (plant system layer - human, 
procedures, and process equipment; management system layer – process safety culture and 
leadership, process safety systems, and operational discipline) and associated worksheets. 
Using the examples of liquefied natural gas (LNG) process system and a tank explosion, 
detailed analysis is demonstrated. 
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4.1. Overview of existing hazards identification and analysis techniques 
There are a number of hazard evaluation techniques used by the process industry as 
a systematic method to identify influences or causes that may result in incidents or process 
upsets. 210 presented a review of the eight most commonly used hazard analysis techniques. 
These included checklists, what-if analysis, safety reviews, preliminary hazard analysis, 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis 113, event tree analysis (ETA), 
and hazard and operability study (HAZOP). 
It was found that earlier researchers focused mainly on the conventional methods of 
hazard analysis211, 212, 213. Later, researchers extended the work to include new types of 
deviations, automating the methods, or exploring the development of expert systems214, 215, 
216, 217, 218. Considering batch processes as more critical, some authors focused their work in 
this area to identify and analyze hazards by developing advanced methods219, 220, 221, 222, 194. 
Also, researchers established hybrid approaches by combining HAZOP with dynamic 
simulation223. Furthermore, a comprehensive function based, systems framework approach 
called Blendid HAZID including system components as plant components, procedural 
aspects, and people was introduced224, 225, 226. A summary of selected hazard identification 
and analysis methods is presented in Table IV.1 highlighting system/human/process based 
approach. 
Summarizing, it can be concluded that a considerable amount of work has been 
conducted through exploring and applying various methods. Some examples of these 
methods are knowledge bases, combined with process models, such as Petri nets, signed 
digraphs, and dynamic simulation, with focus on improving and semi-automating hazard 
identification. Nevertheless more research focused on systems thinking is needed for more 
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comprehensive hazard identification and loss prevention control. Of the various 
methodologies to identify and analyze hazards, particular consideration has been given to 
HAZOP.  The HAZOP methodology is relatively convenient to implement and has been 
used by the risk assessors in process industry for very long time241. 
Table IV.1: Hazid and Analysis Methods 
S.no. Year Author/Organization/
Institution 
Hazard identification and analysis 
method 
System (S) or 
Process (P) or 
Human (H) 
1 1974 Lawley Operability Studies And Hazard 
Analysis 213 
P 
2 1995 Vaidhyanathan and 
Venkatasubramanian 
HAZOP Digraph (HDG) Model 227 P 
3 1997 Liu and Chiou The use of Petri Nets for failure 
analysis 228 
P 
4 1997 Jens Rasmussen Accimap 25 S 
5 1998 Kennedy and Kirwan SCHAZOP—safety culture hazards 
and operability study 229 
S 
6 1999 Redmill et al. System Safety: HAZOP and 
Software HAZOP 230 
S 
7 2002 Baybutt LOPA-HF—an application of 
LOPA for human failure analysis 231 
H 
8 2003 Baybutt Major Hazards Analysis (MHA) 232 P 
9 2006 Leveson et al. Resilience Engineering 233 S 
10 2007 Kariuki and Lowe Integrating human factors into 
process hazard analysis 234 
S 
11 2007 Scott Jackson System resilience 235 S 
12 2009 Seligmann et al. Blended HAZID 236 S 
13 2009 Leveson et al. 
STAMP or Systems- 
Theoretic Accident Modeling 
and Processes 237 
S 
14 2013 Paltrinieri et al. DyPASI tool 137 P 
15 2013  Khakzad et al. 
Dynamic safety analysis by 
mapping bowtie into Bayesian 
network 238 
S 
16 2015 CA Ericson 
System safety hazard analysis 
techniques 239 
S 
17 2017 Xin et al. 
Dynamic hazard identification 
using Bayesian network 240 
S 
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4.2. Overview of existing evaluation studies for the management layer 
There are a few studies that cover the analysis of a management layer in hazard 
identification. Table IV.2 presents a brief summary of works on evaluation studies for the 
management layer.  
Table IV.2: Works on evaluation studies for the management layer 
Authors Major contributions 
242
The Management Oversight and Risk Tree 65 technique uses a predefined 
qualitative fault-tree approach to show the possibly failing inter-
relationship of management systems with safety. 
25-26
Accimap accident investigation method based on socio-technical system 
includes six organizational levels and has the ability to link factors both 
within and across these levels. 
229 SCHAZOP—safety culture hazards and operability study. 
243 System-theoretic process analysis (STPA) by probing for failure all control 
loops in the system. 
91
Comparison of application areas, methodology and relationships for 3 
approaches - accident investigations (AI), risk analysis (RA), and safety 
management systems (SMS). 
20
Blended hazard identification (BLHAZID) methodology blends and 
automates two different types of HAZID methods: the function-driven and 
component-driven approaches. 
137 DyPASI reduces deficiencies of the current HAZID techniques by 
querying accident data bases and building a bowtie. 
244 Strategies Analysis for Enhancing Resilience (SAfER) based on a task 
analysis and a decision ladder. 
245, 246
Using FRAM to model complex socio-technical systems, defining 
functions, analyzing the structure while portraying the functional links 
between human and equipment and guiding to performance variability 
parameters.  
240 Dynamic hazard identification using Bayesian network. 
Some details and limitations of the most common methods such as Accimap, 
System-theoretic process analysis (STPA), Blended Hazid (BLHAZID), and Dynamic 
Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI) are summarized below.  
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4.2.1. Accimap 
25-26introduced the concept of the socio-technical system (STS) existing since the 
1950s, to investigate and describe accident causation. An STS consists of six 
organizational levels: government policy and budgeting; regulatory bodies and 
associations; local area government planning and budgeting; technical and operational 
management; physical processes and actor activities, and equipment and environment. 
Causes are considered failing factors, components, and connections across the overall 
system, including higher governmental and regulatory levels. The diagrams show the 
cause-consequence links. 
4.2.2. System-theoretic process analysis (STPA) 
Leveson et al. applied the socio-technical system concept too and considered the 
function of each level as a control73, 243. For an STS, safety is an emerging outcome and the 
layers can be depicted as control loops consisting of process, sensor, processor, and 
actuator. Each loop can be queried for presence, correctness, and timely activation of 
control action. It is claimed that completeness of scenario identification is obtained. The 
result of an analysis is shown as a causal flow diagram.  Due to the current lack of 
supporting software the effort of an analysis on all layers is relatively large. 
4.2.3. Blended Hazid (BLHAZID) 
20developed on the basis of the Functional Systems Framework approach a highly 
digitized hazard identification and scenario definition method. The method blends two 
different types of HAZID methods: the function-driven HAZOP and component-driven 
FMEA. The scenarios describe triplets of cause, process deviation, and implication. Failure 
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can be in the plant, people, and procedures. The scenarios are stored in a compact fashion 
and due to the digitization, IT support is high. 
4.2.4. Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification (DyPASI) 
137developed a method that mitigates deficiencies of the current HAZID techniques 
by querying accident databases applying a similarity algorithm, and so identifying atypical 
scenarios. Scenarios are presented in a bowtie form, also enabling seeing the location of 
preventative and protective safeguards in the causation trees. For human and organizational 
factors DyPASI is dependent on the representation of these factors in accident descriptions. 
4.3. Systems hazard analysis vs process hazard analysis 
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a methodical identification, assessment, and 
documentation of potential process hazards and incident scenarios related to a process 
plant. It is the most common and easy to implement method used by process industry. It 
can be performed by using various techniques, such as HAZOP, What-if analysis, safety 
review, and more.  
It has been documented that numerous incidents in the process industry including 
the chemical, petrochemical, and offshore oil and gas platforms occurred as a result of 
multiple causes or interdependent failures. The incidents occurred because of breakdown 
of various system components, such as organizational behavior, human errors, or 
procedural elements247, 234, 229, 248, 25. Hence, it is critical to understand and analyze the 
human, procedures, and other social factors along with the technical factors like process 
parameters. It has been observed that PHA has a significant limitation where it lacks social 
and organization factors associated with the operations in a single approach249.   
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Various research works have been carried out in field of system safety. The concept 
of safety culture and its relation to the system property has been explained250. Researchers 
have proposed different accident models demonstrating the influence of human, 
organizational, and managerial factors73, 251, 252. Furthermore, aspects such as design, risk 
analysis informed anticipation, early detection, learning from incidents, and emergency 
response time are critical to prevent catastrophic incidents. Previous research has 
demonstrated the importance of these aspects253, 254.  
The highly complicated and hazardous launching and landing operations at U.S. 
Navy aircraft carriers emphasize on tracking and monitoring small failures, less 
oversimplification, sensitivity towards operations, ensuring resilience capabilities (such as 
adaptive, absorptive, restorative etc.) and taking benefit of shifting locations of expertise. 
Inspired by the smoothness of U.S. Navy aircraft carrier operations several researchers 
have proposed the High Reliability Organization255 concept. Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011 
described the concept in extension and explained the Principle of “Preoccupation with 
Failure”, which focuses on several small errors that conditionally can lead to a bigger 
disaster. Hence, by reducing smaller errors a catastrophic incident could be prevented33.    
As defined by Stephans, “System safety analysis is the formal analysis of a system 
and interrelationships among its various parts (including plant and hardware, policies and 
procedures, and personnel) to determine real and potential hazards within the system and 
suggest ways to reduce and control those hazards”256. Unlike PHA, systems hazard 
analysis (SHA) focuses on the complex combinations of subcomponents acting together. 
Macro-ergonomics is one of the proposed top-down approaches for systems hazard 
analysis of a socio-technical system208, 257.  
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4.4. RIPSHA: Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard Analysis 
The majority of the largest incidents in the process industry are a result of human, 
organizational, management, mechanical, and operational failures258, 259. The process 
industry can benefit from learning from other industrial sectors such as transportation, 
nuclear, shipping, and aviation260, 261. Current methods for hazard identification and 
analysis have focused on process hazards and researchers have explored isolated methods 
for human error analysis. Further, most methods lack the anticipation element and also the 
full anatomy of incident – initiation, propagation, and termination. The key methods used 
today in the industry follow a univariate analysis and are limited in their approach to 
consider multiple factors, complex interactions among system components and their 
relationships259. The hazard analysis method for a complex socio-technical system such as 
a process plant should have the following characteristics: consideration of all system 
components (processes, human operations, equipment, instruments, control systems, etc.), 
all plausible deviations, a multi-disciplinary team, and proper documentation.  Further, the 
concept of resilience engineering has been identified as one of the vital aspects in process 
safety85. RIPSHA is a novel hazards analysis approach based on resilience engineering 
concepts that incorporates both technical and social factors within a single analysis 
method. It has been found that HAZOP is the most widely used PHA method. Therefore, 
HAZOP is selected as the base methodology for RIPSHA but enhanced with resilience 
thinking. This means that the resilience concept, in its totality, should leave fewer 
overlooked deficiencies and make up for ones still remaining. The RIPSHA methodology 
for hazard analysis includes the following features: applicable to the life cycle of the 
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process system, dynamic in nature, emphasis on social factors, such as organizational 
behavior and management system.  
Several authors have developed methods based on monitoring and analysis of 
trends or variations in parameters262, 263, 264. However, these parameters have been 
primarily limited to the process.  The RIPSHA methodology is based on parameters and 
guidewords developed based on resilience metrics from four aspects. This approach 
follows the well-established HAZOP technique and covers technical as well as social 
aspects of the process system. Therefore, as we shall see the RIPSHA methodology 
provides the following benefits: 
 Analyzes both internal and external disruptions
 Considers static and dynamic states covering design and various operational modes
4.5. Bi-layered system approach
The system approach refers to both the vertical and the horizontal layers. The
vertical layers comprise of sub-layers such as Engineering, Safety & Security, 
Procurement, Construction, and Contracting activity that form the Management System 
Layer. The horizontal layers consist of an operational plant/facility including components 
such as process equipment, operators (people/human) and procedures. The RIPSHA 
methodology proposes a bi-layered approach that takes into account the two distinct layers, 
as shown in Figure IV.1. RIPSHA consists of two types of analysis – management system 
layer and plant system layer. There are two major inputs that come from safeguards and 
resilience metrics assessment, which are shown by dashed arrows. This analysis will have 
two deliverables – RIPSHA worksheet, and report. 
121 
Figure IV.1: RIPSHA: bi-layered approach 
4.5.1. Management system hazard analysis 
This is the first layer called the management system, and it can be further broken 
down into three rational sub-systems for analysis: process safety culture and leadership; 
operational discipline, and process safety systems. It has been observed that deficiencies in 
these sub-systems lead to weaknesses of the whole system potentially causing disastrous 
consequences such as BP Texas City refinery255, William Olefins explosion265, and the 
Esso Longford gas explosion266, 267. An important or critical example of a hazard due to 
organizational factors is lack of trade-off analysis between production and safety given 
business priorities and pressures. This hazard can result in reduced vigilance to maintain 
barriers and a degradation of organizational resilience.  
Effectiveness of a management system has to be measured applying indicators. 268 
described the benefits of resilience metrics to achieve progress towards being more 
resilient and stressed the need for leading indicators for resilience as opposed to lagging 
ones. Metrics can further help to link organizational resilience with high competitiveness 
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and will contribute to demonstrate a business case for resilience investments. More 
specifically, Øien et al., 2010 proposed indicators for organizational resilience180. A 
Management system layer is the first layer in the RIPSHA approach. It consists of three 
rational sub-systems for analysis - process safety culture and leadership; operational 
discipline, and process safety systems.  
Process safety culture and leadership 
Investigation studies of some of the catastrophic incidents such as Piper Alpha 
disaster, Longford gas plant explosion and more have identified common process safety 
culture weaknesses. Hence, building, maintaining, and nurturing a strong process safety 
culture and leadership has been identified as critical to consistent and satisfactory process 
safety performance. Within the 20 elements of RBPS by CCPS, Process Safety Culture is 
listed as the first element under Commit to Process Safety269. 270presents an idealistic 
framework for Best-in-Class process safety management for high reliability organizations. 
The framework consists of ten attributes to evaluate the safety performance of 
organizations – leadership; culture and values; goals; policies and initiatives; organization 
and structure; employee engagement and behaviors; resource allocation and performance 
management; systems, standards and processes; metrics and reporting; continually learning 
organization; and verification and audit. Four characteristics of a good safety culture are 
suggested as commitment, communication, resilience and flexibility, vigilance271. 
Researchers have conducted several safety culture assessments and evaluation studies272,
273, 274. Strong leadership along with good process safety culture is essential to provide 
consistent support for process safety programs and confirm the commitment from all levels 
of management. In summary, without a way to assess process safety culture and 
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leadership, an organization will have no meaningful basis for making and measuring 
improvements. Table IV.3 lists the guidewords for process safety culture and leadership 
sub-system based on resilience aspects and metrics. 
Table IV.3: Process safety culture and leadership: suggested guidewords 






Early Detection ED5, ED6, ED7 Indicators analysis and actions 
Missing 
Inadequate 
Plasticity P1, P2 Safety studies 
Untimely 
Ineffective 








Plasticity P1, P2 
Identification of external signals such 















Plasticity P Management commitment Missing 





Plasticity P7 Resource allocation Inadequate 









Many researchers both from academia and industry have addressed the aspect of 
operational discipline. DuPont has defined Operational Discipline (OD) as “the deeply 
rooted dedication and commitment by every member of an organization to carry out each 
task the right way every time”275. Another definition of OD is “the performance of all tasks 
correctly every time.” According to 276, both organization and individuals contribute to an 
effective OD program. Some of the attributes of an effective OD program mentioned in 
literature are - equipment is properly designed, operated, and maintained, management 
systems are properly executed, and errors and deviations are consistently addressed. 277 
model of OD cover three elements – management discipline, operational discipline, and 
engineering discipline. 278 defines risk is an inverse function of an OD program. Also, it 
has been stated that the effectiveness of Process safety and risk management systems is 
dependent on the company’s implementation and support for operational discipline (OD)-
related programs. These OD programs depend on data collected from the operations from 
various sources such as plant historian, audit reports etc. to get insights about the operating 
metrics and explore the opportunities for improvement in safety164. Some of the tragic 
events that highlighted failures in the operational discipline are BP Texas City, Seveso 
disaster, Gulf of Mexico etc. It is therefore critical to identify hazards based on OD to 
recognize, monitor, track, and learn from near misses.  Table IV.4 provides the guidewords 
for operational discipline sub-system based on resilience aspects and metrics. 
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Table IV.4: Operational discipline: suggested guidewords 










Plasticity P7 Inventory 
Less 
Inadequate 
Plasticity P3 Training Missing 
Plasticity, Early 
Detection 







P, ED, ETD 












Plasticity P9 Worker fatigue More 
Error Tolerant 
Design 
ETD2 Safe operating limits 
Missing 
Unavailable 






ETD3, P8 Management of Change 
Unavailable 
Missing 
Process safety systems 
Many researchers have identified the social or management barriers. For example, 
279 has classified barriers as physical, procedural or administrative, or human action. 280 
have classified barriers as technical, human, or human/organizational. 252 classifies barrier 
systems as physical, technical, or human factors-organizational systems. 281 also 
distinguishes between the physical and management barriers. This indicates the 
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significance of social aspects of barriers or process safety systems in hazard identification 
and analysis and also overall risk assessment. Also, in literature, several features have been 
identified that characterize safety systems or barriers. Some of the features recorded by 282 
are - functionality/effectiveness, reliability/availability, response time, robustness, and 
triggering event or condition. 283 summarized the following criteria as aspects for barrier 
quality – efficiency/adequacy, resources required, robustness (reliability), delay in 
implementation, and applicability to safety-critical tasks, availability, evaluation, and 
dependence of humans. These characteristics of safety systems are critical for 
identification of hazards and their analysis. Furthermore, an effective process safety system 
such as a good alarm management program helps process operations closer to the optimal 
levels and hence lead to safer operations165. 
Table IV.5: Process safety systems: suggested guidewords 


















ED4 Vibrations, corrosion, leaks 
More 
Less 
















Table IV.5 provides the suggested guidewords for process safety systems sub-system that 
are developed based on technical and social resilience metrics. 
4.5.2. Plant system hazard analysis 
This is the second layer called the plant system and is further broken down into the 
three rational sub-systems for analysis (human/people, procedures, and plant equipment). 
This layer supports capture of deviations arising from each of the sub-systems and also 
their interactions. 
Human 
Humans or the operators in the plant form an important sub-system as they 
recognize actions to be taken based on standard operating procedures and information from 
the control systems panel. 284 raised concern related to the minimal use of human error 
analysis in the petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical industries. An error analysis 
method was proposed to identify error causes, which are helpful in defining preventive 
measures incorporating human reliability techniques into the design. Human error is 
considered to be responsible, directly or indirectly, for 50-90% of the operational risk 201, 
231. 
Procedures 
Standard operating and maintenance procedures play a crucial role in process 
safety285. These provide information for operators to perform various tasks sequentially in 
complex plant settings. Researchers have mentioned that hazards analysis application to 
procedures would help predict potential deviations, failures in procedures, and human 
errors that could help prevent catastrophic incidents248. 
Process/Plant equipment 
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Process hazards have been well-covered by the traditional HAZOP guidewords. 
Regarding plant equipment based on the RIPSHA approach, as attributes of a socio-
technical system, reliability, availability, and maintainability of plant equipment is 
essential for high organizational resilience, but each is highly influenced, both directly and 
indirectly, by organizational factors. Design decisions involving these attributes greatly 
affect system life–cycle costs (direct and indirect) including costs of components, costs of 
failure events, and costs of maintenance. The true probability of failure on demand of a 
system component, which is of paramount importance for reliance on safeguards and 
which is not currently recognized by the majority of industry, is composed of three 
contributions due to 1) random failure of a component, 2) failure due to component offline 
for testing, maintenance or replacement, and 3) excessive supply and administrative delays 
that increase MTTR (mean time to repair) due to organizational factors. Unavailability on 
Demand, QOD, where Q is unavailability (complement of availability) is more realistic 
than probability of failure on demand, PFD, in capturing the overall failure uncertainty and 
component failure probability due to the sum of: 
 Component random failure, PFD, for failure rate ~ constant, λ (Exponential
behavior), or time dependent, λ(t), (Weibull distribution, for a shape parameter β = 1,
Weibull is Exponential, λ(t) = λ),
 Component test and maintenance, MTTR, for renewal or minimal repair,
 Organizational delays and supply delays: SAD is excessive supply and administration
delays, which for an organization with resilient leadership, SAD ~ 0, for reduced
uncertainty of MTTR within an acceptable range.
129 
It is significant to note that organizational factors and associated hazards, enter both 
directly with SAD and indirectly with quality of training/retraining for testing and 
maintenance, quality and time of testing and maintenance, quality and time of maintenance 
and replacement.  
Furthermore, an important point to note is that unavailability failure probability on 
demand, QOD, is a component resilience expression.  This is because following 
conversion of MTTR time and SAD time to probabilities (divide by mission time), it is 
composed of the three parts of the overall probability of component failure on demand. It 
further includes restoration of a component that has been tested, maintained, or replaced 
following failure or detection of failure.  On a point value basis, Q, unavailability, is a 
failure probability composed of the sum of three failure probabilities: PFD, MTTR/T, and 
SAD/T, where T is the mission time. Tables IV.6  and IV.7 list the selected guidewords for 
operator/human and the procedures sub-systems based on resilience aspects and metrics. 
Table IV.6: Operator/human: suggested guidewords 




metric Parameter Guideword 
Plasticity P9 Operator Missing 




Plasticity P4 Procedure Mistimed 
Plasticity P3 Training Missing 
Plasticity P9 Supervision Ineffective 
Early Detection ED1 Alarm Skipped 






Shift changeover, Who should 
know (verbal/written) 
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adequacy, type and 




Tagging (valves, electrical, 











Special Instructions (list of 









Process isolation Inadequate 
Wrong location 
Wrong type 
Electrical isolation Inadequate 
Location 




































































not removed) Incorrect 











temporary blind) Not checked 
Tags Not removed 
















4.6. Multi-mode approach 
The RIPSHA approach is developed such that it can be applied to various modes in 
a process system. These modes are design, normal operations, simultaneous operations and 
transient operations.  
Design: Traditional HAZOPs are primarily conducted on the design and its 
verification in e.g., the commissioning stage. Hence, there is no doubt it is paramount for 
safety. However, human and procedural elements and in rare cases also the technical 
elements are often missed during the conventional methods. There has been consideration 
given to this aspect286, 287. Hence, RIPSHA includes this as one of its modes for analysis. 
Normal operations: This mode is the one that has been studied or analyzed well 
over the years. The RIPSHA approach would follow the conventional HAZOP process for 
this mode. 
Simultaneous operations: These operations can be defined as two or more 
activities that by interaction may impact their safety or the performance of emergency 
response and planning procedures and are executed by different functional groups in the 
same location at the same time288, 289. In process units, specific activities such as 
construction, commissioning, start-up, and process operations require particular attention 
to look for additional hazards that may be created during execution of such operations. A 
study to review incidents world-wide concluded that even though hazards were known, 
operational inadequacies resulted in incidents290. Hence, this area of simultaneous 
operations has been found as an improvement area for PHAs 291. 
Transient operations: A process plant in its life cycle will experience other modes 
of operation besides its continuous or batch process operation. Changing from one mode to 
133 
another is called transition. Start-up, shutdown, catalyst changing and regeneration are 
common examples of transient operations292, 241, 293. It has been found in the literature that 
these operations are relatively rare but involve high human intervention292. A large number 
of incidents have been reported to occur during transition operations294, 293, 292. However, 
less attention has been paid to these operations. Therefore, it is critical to consider such 
operations in the RIPSHA methodology. 
4.7. Methodology 
The RIPSHA methodology has the following steps as part of the hazard 
identification and analysis: 
Step1: Team formation 
The RIPSHA team composition and experience requirements are similar to those 
for a traditional HAZOP with the following additional requirements or exceptions or 
features for design, simultaneous operations and transient operations modes: 
Design: design engineer who designs the function of the system; engineer who 
designs the human-machine interface HMI; human factor engineer who determines the 
procedural elements, and an experienced representative from the operators group of a 
similar plant. 
Simultaneous operations: project manager, discipline specialists from 
construction and/or commissioning, contractors, subcontractors, and vendors who can 
provide the detailed schedule so that the team can identify relevant hazards and verify the 
adequacy of additional control measures288. 
Transient operations: an experienced operations representative with a sound 
knowledge of transient operations, their critical nature, field operations, and controls 
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through HMI; and a process design and technology expert with specific knowledge of the 
equipment and the process under review292. 
Step 2: Charter preparation 
The RIPSHA leadership team must prepare and issue a charter to define the 
responsibilities, tasks, and objectives of the team. It should also include the unit/operation 
selection, process boundaries, and any special objectives.  
Step 3: Data and documents collection  
The RIPSHA team should collect the information (preferably electronic versions) 
as described for conventional HAZOP studies295. Additionally, effort should be made to 
gather relevant information such as  operating and maintenance procedures, standard 
operating conditions (safe operating limits), management of change documents (since prior 
PHA), learning from incident and near miss reports - from other similar processes within 
the company or industry (since prior PHA), resilience metrics information, and prior 
RIPSHAs (within the same boundaries).  
The RIPSHA team should review the documents and information for the system to 
be studied and ensure that it is sufficiently accurate for conducting the analysis. Any minor 
errors should be corrected. If there are serious deficiencies, the RIPSHA team must stop 
work, report the problem to the RIPSHA team leadership, and request that the information 
be updated. The RIPSHA team, if during the course of conducting the analysis, determines 
any inconsistency with the plant’s designation of safety critical components; equipment or 
procedures, must document that finding as a recommendation. 
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Step 4: Sub-systems procedural review 
The sub-systems procedural review should be carried out in a similar way as with a 
regular HAZOP. The sample RIPSHA worksheets for management and plant system layers 
are shown in Tables IV.8 and IV.9. This worksheet has been created similar to the 
conventional HAZOP worksheet, and there are two major differences. First, the RIPSHA 
worksheet has a section called ‘Mode’. The ‘Mode’ section would help capture the four 
different modes - design, normal operations, simultaneous operations, and transient 
operations described in Section 4.6. Second, this worksheet has sections for three sub-
systems of human, procedures, and plant equipment or three sub-systems of process safety 
culture and leadership, operational discipline, and process safety systems depending on the 
analysis layers. This is to ensure that scenarios are not missed. The input from resilience 
metrics is based on the plant performance under study, and this input provides information 
for safeguard assessment and results in more informed and accurate decision making. The 
credit for safeguard can be taken in the assessment based on the resilience metrics trending 
analysis. Guidewords or process/plant equipment are not presented here as these are 
similar to the conventional HAZOP. 
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Table IV.8: RIPSHA Worksheet: Plant system layer 









Risk without any  safeguards Risk with safeguards 
Parameter 











Risk without any  safeguards Risk with safeguards 
Parameter 










Risk without any  safeguards Risk with safeguards 
Parameter 






Safeguards S L R Recommendations Responsible 
entity 
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Table IV.9: RIPSHA Worksheet: Management system layer 










Risk without any safeguards Risk with safeguards 
Parameter Guideword Deviation Cause Consequences Severity 
(S) 
Likelihood (L) Risk 
(R) 






Risk without any safeguards Risk with safeguards 
Parameter Guideword Deviation Cause Consequences Severity 
(S) 
Likelihood (L) Risk 
(R) 






Risk without any safeguards Risk with safeguards 
Parameter Guideword Deviation Cause Consequences Severity 
(S) 
Likelihood (L) Risk 
(R) 
Safeguards S L R Recommendations Remarks Responsible 
entity 
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Step 5: Documentation of findings 
While documenting the findings, the RIPSHA team should address or reference the 
specific findings in the hazard analysis worksheet and use precise wording. The 
accountability for each finding or recommendation should be assigned to an individual. 
Step 6: Recommendations 
After hazard analysis, following key points should be followed while making 
recommendations: 
• recommendations must be made to provide additional safeguards where
appropriate,
• clear connection with the process/human/procedure hazard,
• related to degree of risk
• consider the integrity and adequacy of safeguards such as degree of
independence, dependability, resilience, auditability
The RIPSHA team should ensure that the findings, including the actions taken, are 
communicated to all employees whose work assignments are in the facility/system or who 
are affected by the recommendations or actions including any workers responsible for 
procedure or task execution where the risk moves to the unacceptable region if failure of 
that procedure or task occurs. Also, the results should be communicated to the emergency 
response (ER) team so that the ER team has the information needed to develop effective 
responses.  
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Step 7: Closure of recommendations and corrective actions 
The management should review the recommendations from the RIPSHA study. The 
response from management must be documented to each recommendation, either accepting 
as is, accepting as modified, or rejecting. A completion date should be assigned to each 
accepted/modified recommendation. An electronic system should be followed to track the 
recommendations. Management system hazard analysis will be used to ensure corrective 
actions are taken and recommendations are closed timely.  
4.8. Management system hazard analysis example:  Tank Explosion 
An example of a tank explosion incident that happened during an operation trying 
to remove a plug with a compressed air flow, is selected as the case study as illustrated in 
Figure IV.2. This incident resulted in blowing off of one end of a horizontal cylindrical 
tank due to the physical explosion and led to two fatalities. The major cause identified for 
this incident was the formation of a solid plug in the vent of this tank due to faults in steam 
tracing or insulation. The tank stored a liquid product at 100°C melting point, kept hot by a 
steam (7 bar) coil296. 
Figure IV.2: Tank explosion accident timeline 
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Based on the RIPSHA methodology297, a team is formed of members with 
knowledge about the tank operations. The charter is prepared to define the scope of the 
study within the operations for this example. Information for each hazardous substance, in 
this case the chemical, stored and handled, is collected. The information is expected to 
include similar information required under 29 CFR 1910.119(d)298, such as physical and 
chemical properties, combustibility, flammability, and explosiveness, toxicity, reactivity, 
and corrosiveness299, 300.  In addition, the vessels and piping containing these materials and 
associated process conditions are identified on drawings, such as process flow diagrams, 
piping and instrumentation diagrams, and plot plans. Furthermore, any near-miss or 
incidents reports and information from metrics that relate to management system layer are 
gathered.   
The authors believe that the RIPSHA approach would have identified some of the 
hazardous situations developed in this scenario that led to the tank explosion and instigated 
measures that would have avoided it. For example, the primary cause of this incident was 
identified as the plugged vent due to not following the management of change process. 
Another factor was lack of communication concerning previous incidents to identify and 
be aware of such a scenario. Furthermore, there was lack of resource allocation in terms of 
the emergency blow-off panel for the choked vent. With the RIPSHA method, potential 
hazards in this tank explosion incident would have been recognized under the three sub-
systems: process safety culture and leadership, operational discipline, and process safety 
systems. An illustrative RIPSHA analysis using this example is provided in Table IV.10. 
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Table IV.10: RIPSHA worksheet management system layer analysis – Tank explosion 
Project/Plant: XYZ Rev. no: 0 Date: 12-April-2017 Page: 1 of 1 
Team members: A, B, C, D, E 
System description: Blowing operation on a tank 
Mode: Under maintenance 
Node (P&ID): 101 
Subsystem: Process safety culture 
and leadership 
Risk without any safeguards 






Recommendations Responsible  entity 






S2 L2 R2 Strong LFI communication 
process 
Incident Investigation & Learning 
Manager 
Emergency Response Unavailable Absence of emergency 
blow-off panel for choked 
vent 
Lack of resource 
allocation 
End of tank blown off S3 L2 R2 Provide emergency blow-off 
panel based on evaluation 
Emergency Response & Planning 
Lead 
Subsystem: Operational discipline 
Risk without any safeguards 






Recommendations Responsible  entity 
Management of Change Missing No authorization for 
modification from 6 inch 
vent to 3 inch 
Permit to work & 
Management of 
Change not followed 
Vent plugged S4 L1 R3 Carry out a systematic 
management of change process 
based on calculations 
Process Safety Manager 





No understanding of 
power of compressed air 
and how hazardous 
choked vents can be  
S2 L2 R2 Train/retrain all employees 
involved on hazards choked 
vent and compressed air 
pressure 
Learning Center Lead 
Subsystem: Process safety systems 
Risk without any safeguards 










Vent not registered for 
regular inspection 
Lack of management 
commitment and 
operational discipline 
Replacement of the vent 
by a 3 inch hole with no 
calculations and 
documentation 
S2 L2 R2 
Inspect vent frequently to check 
it is clear 
Inspection/Maintenance Engineer 
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As the next step, a sub-system procedural review is carried out using the sample 
worksheet and guidewords. Table IV.10 illustrates the RIPSHA worksheet, providing a 
brief sample of the management system layer analysis carried out for the tank explosion for 
a blowing operation on a tank. The operation mode is ‘under maintenance’. In this 
analysis, different potential hazards with respect to three sub-systems – process safety 
culture and leadership (communication and emergency response), operational discipline 
(management of change and training), and process safety systems (inspection) have been 
identified. The potential severity levels considered are catastrophic (S4), critical (S3), 
moderate301, and minor (S1). The probability of occurrence is categorized as frequent (L4), 
occasional (L3), remote (L2), and unlikely (L1). Among all the hazard scenarios 
highlighted, one scenario was identified as the most dangerous one and four scenarios were 
identified as the medium risk. The main advantage of the RIPSHA approach is that it 
captures potential hazardous scenarios related to management layer sub-systems. Another 
advantage of the RIPSHA method is the ability to analyze various modes of operation, like 
in this example under maintenance.  
4.9. Plant system hazard analysis example: a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility 
A typical LNG process system consists of the following process sections: gas 
production, pipeline transmission, liquefaction plant, shipping, unloading, regasification, 
and send-out302. The LNG storage tanks are common to all the LNG facilities, such as 
import/export terminals and the peak-shaving facilities. Therefore, a LNG storage tank 
area is selected for the RIPSHA analysis.  
Natural gas is composed primarily of methane and contains minor amounts of 
ethane, propane, butane, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide. The major hazards associated with 
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LNG are its cryogenic temperature, flammability (flammability range in air is between 5% 
and 15% by volume), and vapor dispersion properties. Figure IV.3 represents the 
simplified piping and instrumentation diagram for the LNG storage tank. The LNG storage 
tank used in this example is a double containment type. The transient operations mode is 
considered as an example in which tank start-up is studied and demonstrated.  
Figure IV.3: LNG storage tank P&ID 
Based on the RIPSHA methodology, a team is formed of members with knowledge 
about the tank start-up operations. The charter is prepared defining the scope of the study 
within the operations for this example. Information for each hazardous substance, in this 
case LNG, stored, handled, and processed onsite is collected.  The information is expected 
to include similar information required under 29 CFR 1910.119(d)303, such as physical and 
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chemical properties, combustibility, flammability, and explosiveness, toxicity, reactivity, 
and corrosiveness.  In addition, the vessels and piping containing these materials and 
associated process conditions are identified on drawings, such as process flow diagrams, 
piping and instrumentation diagrams, and plot plans. Furthermore, any near-miss or 
incidents reports also are gathered. An example of this is shown in Table IV.11.304  
Table IV.11: Incidents in LNG facilities 
The RIPSHA approach would have identified some of the hazardous scenarios 
developed in the facilities mentioned in Table IV.11 that led to the incidents. For example, 
the primary cause of the Plymouth incident was identified as the substandard purge 
performed, which led to the auto-ignition of the flammable gas mixture during the start-up. 
Inadequate procedure (wrong start-up sequence), and incorrect operation were recorded as 
some of the contributory causes of the incident308. Another example is the Skikda gas-
Year Ship/Facility Name Location Reference 
1944 East Ohio Gas 
LNG tank 
Cleveland, Ohio, US 305
1979 Columbia Gas, LNG 
Terminal 
Cove Point, Maryland, 
US 
306, 307
1985 LNG Peakshaving facility Pinson, Alabama, US 307
1989 Tellier Algeria 307
1989 LNG Peakshaving facility Thurley, United 
Kingdom 
306
1993 Indonesian liquefaction 
facility 
Indonesia 307
2002 LNG Ship, Norman Lady East of the Strait of 
Gibraltar 
307
2004 Skikda Algeria 305
2010 LNG Edo Nigeria 307




liquefaction plant incident. Inadequate emergency preparedness and hiring and 
management policies were ascertained for higher number of casualties309. With RIPSHA 
method, the potential hazards in the Plymouth incident would have been recognized under 
the ‘procedure’, and ‘operator’ sub-systems using resilience metrics such as P3 and P4. 
Additionally, for the Skikda incident, application of recoverability metrics such as R1, R2 
in RIPSHA approach would have identified potential gaps in emergency response plans 
and procedures. 
As the next step, a sub-system procedural review is carried out using the sample 
worksheet and guidewords. Table IV.12 illustrates the RIPSHA worksheet, providing a 
brief sample of the plant system layer analysis carried out on the LNG storage tank for a 
transient operation, start-up. In this analysis, different potential hazards with respect to 
three sub-systems – ‘procedure’ (start-up procedure), ‘plant equipment’ (storage tank), and 
‘operator’ (field/control room operator) have been identified. The potential severity levels 
considered are catastrophic (S4), critical (S3), moderate S2, and minor (S1). The 
probability of occurrence are categorized as frequent (L4), occasional (L3), remote (L2), 
and unlikely (L1). Among all the hazard scenarios highlighted, one scenario was identified 
as the most dangerous one; three scenarios were identified as medium risk and two 
scenarios as low risk. The main advantage of the RIPSHA approach is that it captures the 
potential hazardous scenarios related to sub-systems ‘procedure’, and ‘operator’. Another 
advantage of the RIPSHA method is the ability to analyze various modes of operation, like 
in this example transient operations. Furthermore, with the use of this method safeguard 
analysis is incorporated effectively in the worksheet.
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Table IV.12: RIPSHA worksheet plant system layer analysis – LNG storage tank 
Project/Plant: XYZ Rev. no: 0 Date: 28-Dec-16 Page: 1 of 1 
Rev. no: 0 
Team members: A, B, C, D & E 
System description: LNG storage tank (start-up) 
Mode: Transient operations 
Node (P&ID): 101 
Subsystem: Procedure Start-up procedure 
Subsystem intention 





Parameter Guideword Deviation Cause Consequences S L R Safeguards S L R Recommendations Responsible  entity 









Damage of in-line equipment (pumps, 
valves) resulting in total failure 
S3 L2 R2 Low point 
drains; end 
caps on piping 
S2 L1 R1 Ensure proper cleaning procedures are 
followed, foreign particles are 









Water/water vapor can freeze in 
valves/pumps/low points in the piping; 
damage to valve seats; delay in start-up 
schedule; increased costs 










Lack of knowledge Freezing of purge gas under cryogenic 
temperatures 
S3 L1 R2 no safeguards S3 L1 R2 Compatibility check of the purge gas 
(temperature & dryness) 
Process engineer 
Cooling down Inadequate Inadequate 
cooling down 
Lack of cool down 
criteria analysis 
Piping stress S3 L2 R2 no safeguards S3 L2 R2 Cool down large bore LNG piping 







To store the cryogenic LNG liquid safely. 
Parameter Guideword Deviation Cause Consequences S L R Safeguards S L R Recommendations Responsible  entity 




normal & spare 
pump 













To follow the procedure and communicate effectively. 













Problems in cleaning-up or purging S4 L2 R3 no safeguards S4 L2 R3 Establish & follow communication 
protocol; ensure checklist, 






A review of current hazard identification and analysis methods was presented. It is 
observed that existing methods do not follow an integrated systems approach, and hence a 
new resilience-based RIPSHA method has been proposed. This method follows the 
resilience metrics to develop guidewords for hazard identification and analysis. The 
approach is an integration of two layers – management system (process safety culture and 
resilient leadership; operational discipline, and process safety systems) and plant system 
(process/plant equipment, operator/human and procedures). A significant feature of 
RIPSHA methodology is that it covers four different modes of analysis – design, normal 
operations, simultaneous operations, and transient operations to be applied throughout the 
life cycle of a facility. The life cycle approach allows for the identification of issues early 
enough in the design phase to incorporate design changes and mitigate hazards more 
economically, and, at the same time, allows for the review still to be valid through detailed 
design.  Continuing the review throughout detailed design, construction, commissioning, 
and throughout operation during the life-cycle of the facility ensures that the original siting 
analysis conducted remains valid for the life of the facility, and that the facility is 
constructed, tested, and operated in a manner consistent with the original siting analysis. 
The RIPSHA methodology is applied to a tank explosion and a LNG case study. 
This provides an example of a comprehensive and systematic method to identify and 
analyze hazards for the management system and plant system layers. The study results 
illustrate that the resilience-based approach is useful for identification of unknown 
scenarios from human and organizational perspective.
CHAPTER V 
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT: PREDICTABILITY ANALYSIS* 
There are uncertainties involved in the risk assessment of process systems 
operations. Also, systems are complex and deteriorate gradually with time or due to 
exposure to expected or unexpected disturbances/events. Questions such as, what is the 
frequency of a process upset?; can we predict incidents?; what are the safe operational 
limits for the process?, are yet to be explored and answered. With the use of Process 
Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF), this chapter presents a resilience-based approach 
to manage uncertainties to better predict process upsets and determine the feasible 
operational region. The application of the predictability assessment for uncertainty 
management, flexibility analysis, and optimization is demonstrated using a batch reactor 
process system. Three types of uncertainties: medium temperature, agitator failure and 
reactor charging are considered. These uncertain parameters are analyzed using Global 
Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) using the gPROMS platform and exchanging information with 
MATLAB through goMATLAB. As a next step, uncertainty analysis is conducted using 
the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) models to find out the actual operation bounds. 
Further dynamic feasibility and optimization provides the maximum operational bounds 
and economic optimization results. It is concluded that with the use of resilience metrics 
data, robust process simulation, and uncertainty management, the variance of statistical 
parameters can be updated leading to high probability regions of the parameter space 
*Reproduced in part with permission from Jain, P., Chakraborty, A., Pistikopoulos, E.N., & Mannan, M. S., 
"Resilience-Based Process Upset Event Prediction Analysis for Uncertainty Management Using Bayesian 
Deep Learning: Application to a Polyvinyl Chloride Process System," Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 
Research, Vol 57 (43), Pages 14822-14836. Copyright 2018 American Chemical Society
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responsible for the observed data. This helps the risk assessors to ascertain the critical 
parameters impacting the key performance indicators, determine the maximum feasibility, 
and thus make more accurate and informed process risk decisions. 
5.1. Background 
Process systems are complex socio-technical systems that are susceptible to 
catastrophic incidents as there are certain process or mechanical or instrumentation or 
human hazards in the plant89. Uncertainty management in the risk assessment has a pivotal 
role to predict any process upsets or prioritize safeguards to survive through upsets or 
minimize emergency response time to reduce the severity of consequences.  
The avoidance phase of PRAF deals with the objective of predicting process upsets 
for better flexibility and control of the process systems. The primary objective of the 
predictability assessment is to predict the process upsets to avoid the propagation of event 
to the catastrophic incident state and achieve better flexibility and control of the process 
system. With this study, it is aimed to: 
 integrate the social factors analysis in a single approach rather than having a separate
human risk analysis while covering any missed scenarios in HAZOP studies,
 move from traditional point values for occurrence of loss of containment events (used
in QRAs) to a range similar to the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods,
 manage the uncertainties in the limited historical database on frequency or failure
rates by using resilience metrics and thus incorporating the process plant performance
data of the plant under study,
 and determine the feasible operational region.
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In order to demonstrate the application of the methodology, batch reactor operation 
has been selected as the principal example. Table V.1 presents the statistical data on the 
prime causes of batch reactor incidents163, 310, 311. 
Table V.1: Major causes of batch reactor incidents 
1962 - 1984 1962 - 1987 1986 - 1990 1988 - 2013 
Incident cause  (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Thermo-reaction chemistry 21.4 20.1 14.8 - 
Raw material quality   7.9 8.9 9.803 10 
Maintenance factors   22.3 21.3 22.2 13.3 
Temperature control   22.2 18.9 13.9  - 
Loss of agitation 9.5 10.1 13.1 13 
Mischarging of reactants 16.7 20.7 26.2 16.7 
5.2. Predictability assessment methodology 
The predictability assessment method develops on the idea of combining robust 
process simulation and statistical methods by using the plant data for prediction of process 
upsets and achieve improved flexibility and control of the process system under study. The 
major contribution of the proposed approach is the establishment of accurate and integrated 
method to predict process upset situations by virtue of a MCMC formulation, GSA, and 
flexibility optimization backed by process resilience concepts. The overall predictability 






Figure V.1: Predictability assessment 
 
Process systems have process -inherent uncertainties and external/unknown 
disruptions. This method addresses both of these uncertainties. The prime goal is to use the 
data from the operations to determine operational limits that would lead to expected 
production capacity under the process and safety constraints and hence maximum 
profitability.  
Further, the posterior values of statistical parameters are inferred in the Bayesian 
analysis step based on the prior and resilience metrics information (plant performance data) 
to obtain the ranges of significant parameters. The incorporation of the relevant resilience 
metrics information in the analysis enables the use of various data collected in the plant 
and more importantly, the analysis is more accurate as it is based on the performance of the 
process system or plant under study and thus helps us to understand effects on the Key 
Performance indicators (KPIs). 
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This methodology has the following main steps of 1) Scenario analysis, 2) Process 
simulation, 3) Global Sensitivity Analysis, 4) Bayesian analysis, and 5) Dynamic 
optimization. The scenario analysis comprises of identification of triggers or events that 
may cause the system to transit to the process upset state from the normal operations state. 
Robust process simulation is conducted that comprises of sensitivity analysis using 
global methods to explore the process decision space rapidly and effectively. GSA is a tool 
used to quantify the significant model parameters and their ranges with regards to the 
model output. For example, for the runway reaction scenario, impact of three uncertainties 
(or model parameters) would be studied on the reactor temperature (model output). The 
posterior values of statistical parameters are inferred in the Bayesian analysis step based on 
the prior, resilience metrics information (plant performance data) and congruence analysis 
(social aspects quantification) results. The incorporation of the relevant resilience metrics 
information in the analysis enables the use of various data collected in the plant and more 
importantly, the analysis is more accurate as it is based on the performance of the process 
system or plant under study. Within the resilience metrics, some are social metrics and in 
cases of mutual impact of such social metrics, it is important to quantify them before 
including them in the model. A matrix-based method called  congruence analysis as 
explained in Chapter III, is used to quantify the individual and mutual effects of these 
social metrics312. For example, mutual impact of social metrics such as procedures revised 
and updated and trainings completed on procedures is combined with observations such as 
shift handover communication violations to obtain a socio-technical congruence metric 
(Cst). This metric is then utilized in the assessment. Figure V.2 illustrates the flow diagram 
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consisting of the procedural steps, which are taken to calculate the posterior distribution of 
parameters using Bayes theorem.  
The step 5 of this methodology is optimization. In this step, flexibility optimization 
and optimization for maximum profitability is conducted. The economic optimization step 
is employed to assess the maximum profitability of the system under process and safety 
constraints within the feasible operational region.  
Figure V.2: Bayesian analysis for uncertainty management 
5.2.1. Bayesian methods 
The two formal statistical methodologies are frequentist and Bayesian. The 
Bayesian methodology uses Bayes’ theorem. It is based on the idea that there might be 
prior information (knowledge or belief) about the distribution of a parameter value before 
taking a sample of observations. The Bayesian methodology provides a way to update our 
prior information about the model parameters using sample information. Generally, the 
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prior information is summarized in the form of a probability rule called the prior 
distribution of the model parameters. The posterior distribution of the parameters is 
proportional to the product of the likelihood and the prior distribution313. 
Recently, safety assessment methods based on Bayesian analysis have been 
extensively developed and used in the chemical process industry. It has been realized that 
techniques such as hierarchical Bayesian analysis and Bayesian network are effective to 
overcome limitation of conventional techniques like fault tree in lack of application to 
dynamic safety analysis314. The paper by315 summarizes some of the recent progresses in 
the process systems engineering field such as Bayesian Q learning, Bayesian-adaptive 
Markov Decision Processes, and Bayesian reinforcement learning. Some examples of work 
on the Bayesian network methods include the work of316 on Bayesian network method for 
vulnerability assessment of chemical facilities to intentional attacks, another Bayesian 
network model extended to dynamic Bayesian network based on Dynamic Operational 
Risk Assessment317. Additionally, there are other application methods developed such as 
Bayesian–LOPA methodology for the LNG industry318 and new algorithm using the 
Bayes’ rule for diagnosis of known, multiple and unknown faults319.  
5.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is the investigation of how sensitive the output of a 
model is to variation in the values of its input parameters. Parameters that are non-
consequential, quantified by a Sensitivity Index (SI), are fixed at their nominal or originally 
presumed value, as they appear not to have a significant effect on the model output. 
Sensitivity analysis methods are commonly grouped in three main categories, namely 
screening, local, and global methods. A comparative analysis of these methods is presented 
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in Table V.2. It can be concluded from the comparative analysis that global methods 
perform better in comparison to local or other methods, especially in cases of non-linear 
ODE models320. 
Table V.2: Comparison of screening, local, and global methods 
Sensitivity Analysis321 
Screening Local Global 
mutual interaction 
between parameters not 
considered 
- 
mutual interaction between 
parameters considered 
indicate the most 
important factors 
 only account for small 
variations from the 
parameter nominal values 
applicable to the whole range of 
the model’s existence 
calculation of only first 
order effects 
- calculation of higher order effects 
lack precision, especially 
when used on nonlinear 
models 
can be used for non-linear 
models 













cannot account for 






5.2.3. Global Sensitivity Analysis (GSA) 
GSA is a global tool used to quantify the importance of model parameters and their 
interactions with regards to the model output320. The two main properties are (i) varying all 
parameters simultaneously and (ii) sensitivity measurement is done over the complete 
range of each input parameter. A number of global sensitivity methods such as FAST, 
extended FAST, the Sobol’ indices and the Morris method are available.  The Sobol’ 
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indices method has been found to perform better with respect to – application to nonlinear 
and non-additive models, calculation of the total sensitivity indices, distinguish between 
individual and total sensitivity index and more. Hence, in this work, Sobol sensitivity 
indices have been used that are based on an ANOVA type of a high dimensional model 
representation322. 
5.2.4. Flexibility analysis 
In order to determine the capability of a process to operate within the maximum 
parameter range under constraints such as product quality, safety, and demand, flexibility 
or feasibility analysis is conducted. The pioneering work of Grossman and his coworkers 
developed some sophisticated mathematical formulations to determine the feasible region 
for steady state operations323, 324, 325, 326, 140. Dimitriadis et al. presented an advanced 
approach for the flexibility analysis under dynamic conditions327. A dynamic optimization 
formulation was demonstrated for two cases: 
 when uncertain parameters variation with time was known or
 when the feasible region could be presented by a rectangular region where
the critical points that limited feasibility were vertices 
A MINLP formulation was suggested for cases other than above by following an 
explicit discretization scheme for the differential equations and combining it with an active 
constraint strategy.  
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5.3. Case study: Batch reactor case study 
5.3.1. Process description 
The batch reactor process system used in this work to demonstrate the methodology 
has been considered by328. This process system consists of a batch reactor and a jacket 
cooling system as illustrated in Figure V.3. 
Figure V.3: Batch reactor process system 
The typical process has two exothermic reactions being carried out in parallel in the 
reactor as shown below: 
𝐴 + 𝐵 → 𝐶 
𝐴 + 𝐶 → 𝐷 
Here, A and B are the raw materials, C is the desired product, and D is the 
undesired by-product. The batch reactor dynamics is modeled based on first principles as 








= −𝑘1𝑀𝐴𝑀𝐵 (5.2) 
𝑑𝑀𝐶
𝑑𝑡
= +𝑘1𝑀𝐴𝑀𝐵 − 𝑘2𝑀𝐴𝑀𝑐 (5.3) 
𝑑𝑀𝐷
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𝑊 = 𝑀𝑊𝐴𝑀𝐴 + 𝑀𝑊𝐵𝑀𝐵 + 𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑀𝐶 + 𝑀𝑊𝐷𝑀𝐷 (5.9) 





𝑄𝑟 = −∆𝐻1(𝑘1𝑀𝐴𝑀𝐵) − ∆𝐻2(𝑘2𝑀𝐴𝑀𝐶) (5.12) 





The reactor temperature is a critical process parameter to watch and has the 
following constraints: 
 First set point: 90°C (within 70 minutes)
 Second set point: 105°C
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 System failure: 150°C
5.4. Methodology application 
Step1: Scenario analysis  
A report published by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board illustrated that around 35 % 
of incidents were caused due to runaway reactions329. In the batch reactor process system, 
there are three main system states: normal operation, process-upset event, and catastrophic 
state as shown in Figure V.4. As noted in literature, rate of heat removal vs heat generation 
is critical for a thermal runaway reaction330. The literature on exothermic reaction leading 
to a thermal runaway has highlighted several causes330, 331. Some of them are 
thermochemistry, reactants mischarging, temperature control, inadequate agitation, 
maintenance, and human errors. In this example, the purpose is to predict the high 
temperature situation in the reactor. Hence, the initiating events IE1, IE2, IE3, IE4 – these 
are medium temperature, agitator failure, mischarging of reactants, and unknown 
disruptions respectively - selected for this study are the ones that relate closely to the 
selection of optimal operating conditions. 
Figure V.4: Batch reactor process system transition diagram 
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Step2: Process simulation 
The impact or variability in the reactor temperature can occur due to various 
uncertainties. This research focuses on evaluating the following uncertainties: jacket 
medium temperature, no/partial mixing caused due to issues with equipment such as 
agitator, and mischarging of reactor. The process simulation for a wide range of input 
process parameters is carried out in the gPROMS platform to study the impact of 
variability of these parameters on the output indicators of interest. The following 
modifications are made in the reactor system by Podofillini328, in order to study the 
problem as described: 
 The heat transfer coefficient is not considered as constant and the following

















 Equations (5.15) and (5.16) are added to incorporate the uncertainties involved in
the reactor feed,
𝑀𝐴 = 𝑀𝐴𝑖 + 𝑀𝐴 (5.15) 
𝑀𝐵 = 𝑀𝐴𝑖 + 𝑀𝐵 (5.16) 
 A Proportional-Integral (PI) controller is added to the reactor dynamics to simulate
both the controlled and uncontrolled cases using the following equation,
𝑢(𝑡) =  𝐾𝑝𝑒(𝑡) + 𝐾𝑖 ∫ 𝑒(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
      (5.17)
where u(t) is the control variable, e(t) is the deviation of the output compared to the 
set point. Kp and Ki are the PI controller design parameters. 
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Robust simulation results 
The four plots presented in Figures V.5, V.6, V.7, and V.8 illustrate how the three 
uncertainties affect the profile of performance indicators of interest, which are reactor 
temperature and product concentration with time. The red and the orange lines represent 
the uncontrolled case and black and green indicate the controlled case. On the X-axis is 
time, primary Y-axis represents the reactor temperature, and secondary Y axis shows the 
product concentration. 
The blue and maroon dotted lines indicate the first two set points of 90°C in first 70 
minutes and 105°C respectively. 
From Figure V.5, it can be observed that for the medium temperature, reactor 
temperature reaches the first set point and gets close to the second set point. As evident 
from Figure V.6, for the agitator revolutions, and inert compositions cases it remains 
within the set points desired range. Figures V.7 and V.8 depict that the product 
concentration is affected by the inert compositions presence in the raw materials A and B. 
Some conclusions that can be drawn are: 
 Reactor temperature has highest sensitivity to medium temperature,
followed by agitator revolutions.
 Product concentration is impacted by inert compositions in the feed.
 In the controlled case, the process operations is stable with respect to both
reactor temperature and product concentration.
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Figure V.5: Effect of medium temperature on the KPIs 
Figure V.6: Effect of agitator revolutions on the KPIs 
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Figure V.7: Effect of inert composition (A) on the KPIs 
Figure V.8: Effect of inert composition (B) on the KPIs 
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The plot in Figure V.9 depicts the combined or emergent effect of uncertain 
parameters on the reactor temperature and the product concentration. It is evident that the 
mutual effect of uncertain parameters is very different from their individual contribution. It 
can be seen that the reactor temperature for uncontrolled case is almost touching the third 
setpoint by reaching a temperature of 150°C. Also, the product concentration is decreased 
to slightly above 3 kmol. 
Figure V.9: Combined effect of uncertain process parameters on the KPIs 
Step3: Global Sensitivity Analysis 
GSA is the mathematical method according to which the model parameters are 
simultaneously excited, within the range of interest, and their effect on the model outputs 
is monitored. Such methods facilitate the exploration of the global parameter space, 
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handling adequately the nonlinearities, yielding a complete set of results that demonstrates 
both the sensitivity of the model to the uncertainty of the parameter values and the effect of 
one model parameter to the other332, 333.  In this work, RS-HDMR is applied to analyze 4 
parameters on the 3 differential model variables. Data are collected for the entire batch 
period (240 minutes) using a sampling time of 10 minutes. The GSA results indicate two 
significant parameters.  
The model consists of 30 differential and algebraic equations, 27 variables and 30 
parameters. The model simulation is performed in gPROMS® ModelBuilder v5.0.2.
Following the framework presented by Kiparissides et al., the model is subjected to 
sensitivity analysis for the identification of the significant parameter set332. The sensitivity 
analysis is executed through the gO:MATLAB interface that allows in tandem utilization 
of gPROMS® ModelBuilder and MATLAB®. 
Sensitivity analysis results 
The bar graphs in Figures V.10 and V.11 are showing the calculated sensitivity 
indices for the selected time points and four different input parameters for PI and no PI 
cases. A threshold value of 0.1 is generally considered to study strong significance. 
 Some conclusions are as follows: 
 Reactor temperature is affected primarily by the jacket medium
temperature.
 Other parameters have very small and really not noticeable (<0.1) SI.
 For the PI case, no parameters have noticeable SI.
The bar graphs in Figures V.12 and V.13 are showing the second order or the 
combination effects for the selected time points and four different input parameters for PI 
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and no PI cases. A threshold value of 0.04 is generally considered to study strong 
significance. The following are some conclusions: 
 There is a noticeable second order effect for the combination of P1 and P2
that is jacket medium temp and agitator revolutions.
 Other parameters combinations have very small and really not noticeable
(<0.04) TSI.
Figure V.10: First order sensitivity indices for the uncontrolled case 
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Figure V.11: First order sensitivity indices for the controlled case 
Figure V.12: Second order sensitivity indices for the uncontrolled case 
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Figure V.13: Second order sensitivity indices for the controlled case 
Step4: Statistical analysis 
Finite sample performance of statistical procedures can be largely enhanced when 
domain expertise is incorporated in such analysis334. In the current case study, domain 
knowledge and information from plant performance is utilized in the form of prior 
information and likelihood respectively. Also, there is a two-pronged objective to estimate 
the parameters in the model, and to quantify the uncertainty associated in the form of 
posterior distribution. Models for three variables are demonstrated using hypothetical data 
to quantify uncertainty incorporating the plant process and resilience metrics data. These 
metrics should be selected to utilize in the analysis based on the following two factors: 
 Relevance to the case study or scenario under study. For example, metric
such as unplanned maintenance can give an indication of the health of the
agitator or pump.
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 Availability of information on the metrics. Many organizations already
capture information on most of the metrics, although it is important to see
what information is available to conduct the analysis.
Medium temperature analysis 
Model and Prior 
Figure V.14 shows the detailed algorithm for medium temperature analysis. 
Suppose there is a set of medium temperatures (these can be observed from Historian) 
{T}ni=1 measured in Celsius scale. An additive model is proposed with three components 
for Ti ; a grand mean µ, a deterministic known effect ν and a random effect α. µ can be 
interpreted as the unknown population mean of the temperatures. The number ʋ =  ʋ(𝑋)= 
ƩwjXj is a linear weighted summary of resilience metrics (Xj ) where the weights have 
been determined based on the results of PRAF survey on the resilience metrics335. To 
accommodate further randomness due to unknown resources, a random effect that follows 
normal distribution, α~N(0, φ2) is added. With these components, the ith cooling medium
temperature Ti is assumed to be, 
  Ti = µ + ʋ(𝑋)+ α + εi ,      (5.18) 
where ε~N(0, σ2), the usual randomness in any measurement independent of the
random effect alpha. Equation (5.18) can alternatively be written as,  
Ti
∗ = μ + εi
∗        (5.19)
where Ti
∗ = Ti − υ(𝑋) and εi
∗ = α + εi . Clearly, εi
∗~N(0, τ2) where τ2 = σ2 + φ2 .
The model is complemented with a conjugate prior specification on the parameters µ and τ2: 
Ti
∗|μ, τ2 = μ + εi
∗
μ~N(μ0, σ0
2) , τ2~Inverse Gamma (β1, β2)    (5.20)
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The hyperparameters µ0, σ0
2
 are chosen to reflect prior belief on µ. The β1 and β2 are 
chosen such that the prior distribution of τ2 remains sufficiently non-informative.  
Figure V.14: Algorithm: jacket medium temperature analysis 
Analysis 
The objective is to obtain the full posterior distribution of the parameters that can 
be written as π (µ, τ2 |T, X). Often, such posterior distributions are not analytically 
tractable and hence Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques are employed to 
sample from the posterior334. The conjugate prior specification allows for conditional 
Gibbs update of the parameters and the MCMC sampler cycles through the following 
steps:  
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2. π (τ2 |T, X, µ) ∼ Inverse-Gamma (n/2 + β1 , 1/2 ∑ (𝑇𝑖
∗  − μ)2 +  𝛽2𝑛𝑖=1
In these simulation experiments, a sample size of n = 8736 (one year of hourly 
observations of temperature) is considered. The prior mean is fixed as µ0 = 71°C based on 
domain knowledge for the process with a high prior variance, σ0
2 = 30°C. Essentially, this 
choice quantifies a moderately strong belief of a process running in normal conditions. β1 
and β2 were both fixed at 0.001 which gives a sufficiently flat prior for τ
2.  
 Agitator failure analysis 
Model and Prior 
Figure V.15 illustrates the detailed algorithm for agitator failure analysis. Typical 
statistical techniques to model binary events such as agitator failure include logistic 
regression, probit regression etc.. The authors rely on analyzing underlying variables that 
are believed to drive agitator performance336. In this analysis, two variables I1 = current 
load in Ampere and I2 = number of unplanned maintenance are used. A joint distribution of 
(I1, I2) is a mixture with two components - when the agitator is more likely to fail joint 
distribution of (I1, I2), it takes the form f1(·, ·) and when agitator is working normal it takes 
the form f2(·, ·). Formally, this can be written as g(I1, I2), and the distribution of (I1, I2) as,  
g(I1, I2) = pAf1(I1, I2) + (1 − pA)f2(I1, I2)     (5.22) 
where pA denotes the agitator failure probability.  
Although f1(·, ·) and f2(·, ·) can be assumed to belong to different parametric 
families, here it is restricted to the case where both f1 and f2 belong to the same parametric 
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family possibly with different parameters. Since, I1 is a positive real number and I2 is a 
positive integer, the following data generating mechanism is assumed: 
I1~Gamma(α1, β1),     I2|I1~Poisson(c1, I1) (5.23) 
when the agitator is working normal and 
I1~Gamma(α2 + υ(X), β2),   I2|I1~Poisson(c2, I1)     (5.24) 
when the agitator is not working normally. The resilience summary ʋ(𝑋) 
determines the additional shift in shape of the distribution of I1. Since I2 is generated 
conditional on I1, this shift in scale will also influence I2. Here, it is assumed c1, c2 ∈ R+. 
The objective, given the data is to estimate pA and quantify the associated uncertainty. As 
for the priors, a conjugate Beta (a, b) on the agitator failure probability is placed to 
complete the model specification.  
Figure V.15: Algorithm: agitator failure analysis 
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Analysis 
In order to facilitate the posterior computation, a binary latent variable Z for each 
pair of (I1, I2) which indicates the underlying distribution (I1, I2) is coming from is 
introduced. Hence, I1, I2|Z = 0)~f1 and I1, I2|Z = 1)~f2.Clearly, apriori P (Zi = 1) = pA 
for all pairs (I1i, I2i). The following conditional Gibbs steps are used to update the joint 
posterior distribution of (pA, Z| I1, I2).  
1. π (pA|Z, I1, I2) ∼ Beta ∼ (a + ∑ 𝑍𝑖, 𝑏 + ∑ (1 − 𝑍𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1  ) (5.25) 
2. P(Zi=1|p,I1,I2)=
pAfγ(𝐼1𝑖 |α1,β1)fP (𝐼2𝑖 |𝑐1𝐼1𝑖) 
pAfγ(𝐼1𝑖 |α1,β1)fP (𝐼2𝑖 |𝑐1𝐼1𝑖)  + (1 − pA)fγ(𝐼1𝑖 |α2 + ν(X),β1)fP (𝐼2𝑖 |𝑐2𝐼1𝑖)  
where fγ(·|α, β) denotes the Gamma probability density function with parameters α 
and β and fP (·|λ) denotes the Poisson probability mass function with parameter λ.  
In these simulation experiments, a sample size of n = 8736 (one year of hourly 
observations of agitator), α1 = 1, β1 = 3, α2 = 10 and β2 = 3 was used. The constants c1 and 
c2 were chosen as 2 and 4 respectively. The prior parameters a and b were fixed at 0.00001 
and 0.009702. In Figure V.16 displays the values of (I1, I2) generated from the mixture 
density in eqn. (4). 
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Figure V.16: Scatterplot showing the clustering of (I1, I2) 
Mischarging of reactants 
Model and Prior 
Figure V.17 illustrates the detailed algorithm for reactor mischarging analysis. Two 
metrics, Y1 = percentage of process safety required procedures reviewed or revised as 
scheduled and Y2= percentage of process safety required training sessions completed are 
considered. Additionally, there is Cst = socio-technical congruence metric lying in the 
interval [0, 1] which depend on Y1 and Y2. In these simulation experiments, a sample size 
of n = 720 (one year of observations for every batch) is considered. The following 
decomposition is used for the joint distribution of (Y1, Y2, Cst),  
f(Y1, Y2, Cst) = pRf(Y1)f(Y2)f(Cst | Y1, Y2) + (1 − pR)f(Y1)f(Y2)f(Cst | Y1, Y2)  (5.26)  
where pR is probability of reactants mischarging. The mixture formulation can be 
interpreted in the same manner as in the agitator failure case. The individual components 
of the mixture density are products of the densities of Y1 and Y2, which are assumed to be 
independent and then the product is multiplied by the conditional distribution f(Cst|Y1, Y2). 
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In these simulations f(Y1) and f(Y2) are assumed to be Uniform (0, 1). A weighted 
sum of Y1 and Y2 is considered to generate the Cst values. Cst is formulated as, 
{
𝐶𝑠𝑡 =  
𝑒𝑍1
1+𝑒𝑍1




where Z1~N(w1Y1 + w2Y2, 1) and Z2~N(w1Y1 + w2Y2 + υ(X),1). 
Here Z1 represents a Gaussian random summary of (Y1, Y2) when there is no 
reactant mischarging. 
Figure V.17: Algorithm: reactor mischarging analysis 
If reactant mischarging occurs, the mean of the index is shifted by an amount 
determined by ʋ(𝑋). Finally, since Cst ∈ [0, 1], a logistic transformation is used to generate 
Cst. The choice of logistic transformation is not necessary. For example, it can be set to Cst 
= P (Z ≤ z) for any probability distribution function P. However, the logistic 
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transformation is the most widely used transformation in the analysis of variables, which 
lie in the interval [0, 1]. Similar to the previous section a Beta (a, b) prior on the 
mischarging probability is assumed and the prior parameters a and b were fixed at 0.00001 
and 0.9999.  
Analysis 
A binary latent variable V is introduced. These latent variables play the same role 
as Z in the agitator failure analysis. As such, P(V = 1) = pR apriori. The following Gibbs 
sampling scheme is adopted to sample from the joint posterior distribution of (pR, V1, . . ., 
Vn).  







pR𝑓U (Y1i)𝑓U (Y2i)𝑓N (log𝐶st,i | Y1,Y2)
pR𝑓U (𝑌1i)𝑓U (Y2i)𝑓N (log𝐶st,i|Y1,Y2) + (1 − pR)𝑓U (Y1i)𝑓U (Y2i)fN (log𝐶st,i|Y1,Y2 + ν(X))
Figure V.18: Scatterplot of Z1 and Z2 
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Since the distribution of Y1 and Y2 is same for the two different mixture 
components, values of Z1 and Z2 are plotted in Figure V.18 to gain a better insight into 
how a typical data generated from the above model would look like.  
Uncertainty management results 
The results for three different variables – medium temperature, agitator failure, and 
reactor mischarging – for six different choices of true mean or true probabilities are 
presented in Table V.3. Also, the true data generating parameters (µ0, p0A, p0R) are 
reported. These are complemented with the posterior mean estimate obtained from the 
model and analysis. Additionally, the 95% symmetric credible intervals of all the 
parameters, which are computed as the 0.025, and 0.975 quantile of the posterior samples 
of the parameters and the posterior standard deviation are provided. All simulations and 
analysis were carried out in the programming language R184. 
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Table V.3: Uncertainty analysis: simulation results 
Jacket medium temperature Agitator failure Mischarging of reactants 
Prior mean cooling medium temperature: 71 °C Prior mean probability of agitator failure: 0.00103 Prior mean probability of mischarging of reactants: 0.001 
Prior variance cooling medium temperature: 30 °C Prior variance probability of agitator failure: 0.001 Prior variance probability of mischarging of reactants:0.00091 
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interval 
True mean of  







Length of credible 
interval 
Case 1 
68 68.3 1.8 7.11 0.004 0.00400 0.000840 0.0035 0.006 0.00620 0.002081 0.0037 
Case 2 70 70.1 1.71 7.05 0.005 0.00490 0.000917 0.0040 0.005 0.00560 0.001951 0.0046 
Case 3 72 71.9 1.74 7.36 0.006 0.00600 0.001000 0.0044 0.004 0.00420 0.001696 0.0060 
Case 4 74 73.7 1.81 7.94 0.007 0.00730 0.001096 0.0046 0.003 0.00350 0.001549 0.0065 
Case 5 76 75.4 1.94 9.24 0.008 0.00790 0.001132 0.0050 0.002 0.00210 0.001199 0.0076 
Case 6 78 77.1 2.24 11.68 0.009 0.00900 0.001207 0.0053 0.001 0.00140 0.000988 0.0081 
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Jacket medium temperature 
Simulation results for different choices of the true mean µ are summarized in 
Figure V.19. It is evident that the posterior distribution centers around the true data 
generating µ with a very small spread around it. Posterior credible intervals were also 
formed to further gain insight into the associated uncertainty in the estimation procedure. 
The coverage probability was 0.96. 
Figure V.19: Jacket medium temperature: Prior (black) and posterior (blue) 
Agitator failure 
This section summarizes the results with boxplots of prior and posterior samples of 
agitator failure probability as shown in Figure V.20. It is also observed here that the 
concentration of the posterior distribution centers around the truth with a very small 
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spread. Similar to the temperature case, posterior credible intervals were also formed and 
the coverage probability was 0.97. 
Figure V.20: Boxplot of prior and posterior samples: agitator failure probability 
Reactor mischarging 
This section summarizes the results with boxplots of prior and posterior samples of 
reactor mischarging probability as represented in Figure V.21. It is also observed here that 
the concentration of the posterior distribution centers around the truth with very small 
spread. Similar to previous cases, posterior credible intervals were also formed and the 
coverage probability was 0.95. 
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Figure V.21: Boxplot of prior and posterior samples: reactor mischarging probability 
Step5: Dynamic flexibility and economic optimization 
Given this process model and significant uncertain parameters, dynamic feasibility 
problem is formulated to obtain the maximum feasible bounds and economic optimization 
is conducted for maximum profitability. Through robust simulation, feasible region shown 
as shaded here is obtained for two significant uncertain parameters P1 and P2. The aim is 
to find the flexibility index or how farther can operations go on the uncertain bounds. The 
optimization problem is solved in GAMS platform after discretization using the Euler’s 
method (See Appendix C). 
For the economic optimization, the objective is to compute the optimal reactor 
temperature and jacket flowrate policy maximizing the profit for a given fixed batch time 
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Dynamic flexibility optimization results 
Figure V.22: Feasible region 
The dynamic flexibility index for the uncontrolled case is obtained as 1.15 after 
optimization and 1.875 for the controlled case. The plot in Figure V.23 depicts the reactor 
temperature and product concentration profiles at the critical points for the controlled and 
uncontrolled cases. It is evident that the temperature constraints are satisfied. This type of 
information is useful to assess how farther one can stretch the operational region and still 
satisfy any product quality or safety constraints. The plot in Figure V.24 shows the 
required profile of the jacket flowrate for the system to operate feasibly at the critical point. 
183 
This type of analysis is useful to determine if there is a combination of events for 
uncertainty space considered, that can lead the system to any dangerous operating zones. 
Figure V.23: KPIs vs time at critical point 
Figure V.24: Jacket flowrate vs time at critical point 
The product concentration increases from 6.63 to 7.06 kmol for the optimized case 
and the profit increases from around 535 USD to 718 USD. Different objectives and 
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constraints can be set based on intended application such as product quality or 
specification. 
5.5. Summary  
With changing technology and increasing regulatory standards in process 
industries, process safety management and risk analysis have become challenging. There 
are uncertainties involved in the risk assessment of process systems operations due to 
exposure to expected or unexpected disturbances. In this chapter, an integrated resilience-
based approach to manage uncertainties for predictability assessment of process-upset 
conditions and determination of feasible operational region has been conducted using plant 
performance data, sensitivity analysis, robust process simulation and optimization, and 
advanced statistical methods. The use of resilience metrics data in quantifying 
uncertainties, determining the maximum feasible operating region with maximum profit, 
and prediction of process upset event of high reactor temperature in the batch reactor 
process system has been demonstrated. The statistical models developed for three 
uncertainties - medium jacket temperature, agitator failure and reactants mischarging - are 
robust.  
The major contribution of the proposed approach is the establishment of accurate 
and integrated method to predict process upset situations by virtue of a MCMC 
formulation, GSA, and flexibility optimization backed by process resilience concepts. 
Most of the existing risk assessment methods for failure rates use failure numbers from the 
historical databases that do not represent the true picture of the process system for which 
the risk assessment is being conducted. The proposed approach would enable the risk 
assessors to make risk decisions based on information of their process plant and hence 
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better allocate the resources towards improvement areas. The implementation of the 
developed models can (i) integrate the social factors analysis in a single approach, (ii) 
move from traditional point values for occurrence of loss of containment events (used in 
QRAs) to a range similar to the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods, and (iii) 
manage the uncertainties in the limited historical database on frequency or failure rates by 
using resilience metrics and thus incorporating the process plant performance data of the 
plant under study. This subsequently may increase safety, reliability, efficiency, and 
profitability of the process system.  
The proposed method is easy to understand and implement in the real application to 
a process system. Some of the initial challenges that the team could face are – 
identification of the process operations data and choice of resilience metrics, data 
collection format, and data pre-processing.   
Overall, this study strengthens the idea that with the PRAF approach incorporation 
of both technical and social aspects was achieved, which would help the risk assessor to 
make informed process design and operations decisions. This would lead to safer, reliable, 
efficient, and profitable process systems. 
CHAPTER VI 
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT: SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS* 
In a process plant system, safe and reliable operations are highly sensitive to 
utilities such as power, steam, cooling water, nitrogen, and instrument air. These utilities 
play an important role or act as safety barriers. A disturbance in their supply is likely to 
affect process operations downstream, may reduce the production efficiency, and may lead 
to a sudden shutdown or contribute to an unsafe condition. The focus of this chapter is to 
introduce and evaluate a model for survival of a process system under upset conditions 
using the Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF). Resilience metrics within a 
data-driven and model-based optimization approach using Bayesian regression are 
employed integrating both technical (process parameter variations) and social (human and 
organizational) factors. Based on an optimization objective function accounting for the 
overall system performance in terms of energy consumption, maintenance costs, safety 
impact, environmental impact, asset damage, and production loss, the proposed 
methodology aims to determine the optimal maintenance policy for optimal and safer plant 
operations. The implementation of the survival model within the PRAF is demonstrated on 
a cooling tower operation example problem, where optimal operation and maintenance 
(preventive, corrective, and predictive) strategies are determined based on trade-off 
analysis of process revenue, safety impact, and maintenance costs. 
*Reprinted with permission from Jain, P., Pistikopoulos, E.N., & Mannan, M. S., "Process resilience analysis 
based data-driven maintenance optimization: application to cooling tower operations," Computers & 




The complex socio-technical nature of process systems makes them vulnerable to 
process upset conditions or in the worst-case to catastrophic incidents337, 338. There are 
several reasons that can be attributed to such upsets or catastrophic events85. For example, 
mechanical failure339, instrument malfunction340, process hazards 341, organizational 
deficiency 342, poor alarm management165, poor management systems, ineffective policies 
or regulations290, and human error343. When the system transitions to a process upset 
condition, various safety barriers in the plant can save the system from leading to the 
catastrophic incident state. A considerable amount of literature has been published on the 
inclusion of safety barriers in risk analysis344, 345.  
Many studies have noted that it is important to include human and organizational 
safety barriers to study their effect on the overall risk assessment of the complex socio-
technical process system346, 347, 348, 282.  For example, 349 reports the symbolic barriers that 
pertain to the action by someone and are indirect in their nature. Some examples include 
instructions, procedures, and work permits. 347 formed an audit process for barrier 
management that consists of both hardware and behavioral elements. In addition, 
capability or functionality of safety barriers is critical to risk assessment, and this approach 
was utilized in the nuclear industry to carry out the operational decisions350. Furthermore, 
maintenance has been deemed vital for high performance and effectiveness of safety 
barriers351. 
In the process industry, with rapid advancements in technology and at the same 
time gradual system degradation, there prevails a continuous challenge to adapt to new 
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system configurations and maintain productivity. Furthermore, a balance between 
productivity, safety, and environmental performance for overall sustainability of the 
system is essential. Therefore, maintenance plays a critical role as a safety barrier in 
process system operations. In particular, the cooling tower provides cool process water for 
a wide range of applications for critical process operations. These processes are highly 
sensitive to the loss of cooling water. The poor performance of cooling towers may affect 
business and operations in various ways: 
(i) Process Safety: domino effects on downstream units that may contribute to
fire/explosion leading to loss of human life and property damage
(ii) Productivity: impaired performance, unplanned downtime, operations
interruption, unplanned shutdown
(iii)Business: high maintenance costs, production losses, increased capital
equipment replacement
(iv) Sustainability: financial losses, environmental degradation, long-term
impact on reputation
Hence, an effective maintenance program is paramount for consistently obtaining 
the needed temperature and flowrate of cooling water. This supports safer downstream 
units and is important in maximizing the operating life of the cooling tower352.  
The Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF) is an integrated, systems-
based, quantitative, and data-driven methodology. It encompasses the whole anatomy of a 
process incident through the three-phase analysis of predictability, survivability, and 
recoverability. The PRAF application in the current study concentrates on surviving 
through upsets, incorporating process, maintenance, safety, and cost models. It features (i) 
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a process model that captures the details such as availability/operability of system 
equipment; (ii) a maintenance model that decides the maintenance action type based on 
data-driven analysis of frequency, downtime, and variability in equipment life; (iii) a safety 
model that takes into account the impact scenarios and respective losses through a system 
safety threshold; (iv) a cost and an expected revenue objective function, which examines 
the trade-off between safety, maintenance, and energy costs. The application of this 
method is demonstrated with an example of cooling tower operations. The major 
contributions of this work include: 
 Definition of novel metric System Survivability Index, SSI that is
incorporated as the system safety threshold to analyze the safety impact
costs.
 Consideration of safety impact costs in the expected revenue objective
function to assess the system effectiveness.
 Introduction of Resilience Survivability Index (RSI) metric to assess the
system capacity to respond to process upset situations.
 Use of varying reliability or efficiency of the equipment in the process
model.
 Incorporation of quantitative social metrics (human and organization related
such as percentage of maintenance backlogs, percentage of required
maintenance procedures reviewed or revised as scheduled, percentage of
process safety required training sessions completed) in the analysis in
addition to the technical factors.
190 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The maintenance policies are 
outlined in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 provides the details of the problem formulation and the 
general methodology for survivability assessment. Section 6.4 gives the complete analysis 
and detailed algorithms using an application example of cooling tower operations. Section 
6.5 discusses the results of this work and conclusions are made in Section 6.6. 
6.2. Maintenance policies 
The maintenance policies in a plant are usually divided into the following three 
main types353, 354: 
(i) Preventive maintenance (PM): covers all maintenance tasks that are pre-planned
with the purpose to maintain equipment in a satisfactory working condition. These tasks 
are periodic inspection, detection of any minor faults, and reconditioning whenever 
demanded. 
(ii) Corrective maintenance CM: refers to maintenance action(s) to restore
equipment to an operating state when a failure is noted. 
(iii) Predictive maintenance (PdM): includes scheduling and performing
maintenance tasks based on the condition of the equipment to predict any failure scenarios. 
Maintenance scheduling and analysis have been investigated by many researchers 
using various methods such as statistical methods – Bayesian analysis, Markov models, 
Monte Carlo simulation; data-driven methods – Artificial Neural Network, Predictive 
models; and optimization methods – Genetic Algorithms, Optimization under uncertainty. 
An indicative list of works on maintenance optimization is summarized in Table VI.1. 
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Table VI.1: An indicative list of works on maintenance optimization 
Authors (year) Contribution 
355
Overview and analysis of maintenance optimization 
models 
356
General framework for preventive maintenance 
optimization combining Monte Carlo simulation with a 
genetic algorithm. 
357, 358, 359 
Integrated maintenance optimization model for optimal 
life cycle 
process design and maintenance scheduling under 
uncertainty. 
360
Condition-based maintenance decisions optimization 
model for asset management. 
328
Multi-objective optimization to determine the optimal 
on-condition maintenance strategy. 
361
Simultaneous optimization framework for optimal 
allocation of reliability for multipurpose process plants 
at the design stage. 
362
PM costing framework: an effective tool for cost 
assignment and tracking cost efficiency. 
363 Optimal inspection frequency model. 
364
Monte Carlo simulation-based maintenance model that 
includes imperfect maintenance and detailed spare parts 
policy. 
Some of the gaps from these methods when looking at the safety and resilience of 
the process system are identified below: 
 What is the influence of social (human/organizational) factors such as spare
parts management policy, operators’ training on maintenance procedures,
and maintenance backlogs on the maintenance policies?
 How do the safety impact costs influence the overall profitability and
sustainability of the process system?
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 How does the system reliability and maintenance policy change when
system effectiveness is the top requirement based on system safety
thresholds (explained in Section 6.3)?
6.3. Survivability assessment: model development 
The primary objective of the survivability assessment is to prevent the escalation of 
the process-upset situation to the catastrophic incident state. A plant may transition from 
process upset to a catastrophic state owing to propagation events such as poor performance 
of safeguards, unavailability of barriers, low reliability of safeguard equipment, and poor 
maintenance. In the scenario analysis, various propagation events are identified for the 
process system under analysis to aid further in the model development. The safeguard 
analysis step relates to the process system safeguards performance assessment considering 
both technical and social aspects. For the current application example, it is the data-driven 
analysis of reliability, availability, and maintenance of the cooling tower system by 
carrying out frequency, downtime and variability in equipment life assessment. The results 
of this data-driven approach provide useful quantitative information that is subsequently 
used to select the maintenance action type of preventive (PM), corrective CM, and 
predictive maintenance (PdM). This further improves the system effectiveness in terms of 
reliability, maintenance, safety, and profitability. Figure VI.1 represents the overview of 
survivability assessment.  
6.3.1. Process model 
The integrated optimization problem addressed in this chapter can be defined as 
follows: 
193 
Problem definition: The aim is to achieve optimal and safer plant operations, 
without catastrophic incidents and maximum profit, where role of safeguards can be 
incorporated in the analysis of process upset situations. Currently, safety impact cost is not 
considered in the process system upset analysis and the safeguard analysis is limited to 
historical data (only on technical aspects) rather than actual plant performance data. If 
these aspects are ignored, process systems may escalate to catastrophic situations, and 
more resources will be required to handle the cascading problems. These catastrophic 
situations could result in loss of production, bad reputation, financial losses, and business 
interruption. PRAF methodology is used in evaluating the survival of process systems by 
incorporating safeguard performance analysis, and safety impact cost in terms of system 
safety threshold. For this research, amongst the various safeguards, the focus is on the 
maintenance as an effective safeguard to prevent the acceleration of a total failure of the 
process system. 
Given: process model, system equipment configuration, cost data, maintenance 
data, safety scenarios, a cost/revenue function describing the relation between equipment 
reliability, equipment maintenance cost, and safety impact costs, 
To determine: optimal system reliability that maximizes the expected revenue and 
system effectiveness accounting for capital, operations, maintenance, and safety impact 
costs. This problem can be mathematically written as problem P as follows, 
TACs(zs, xs, ηs)zs,xs,ηs
min  and EPRs (zs, xs, ηs)zs,xs,ηs
max (6.1) 
s.t.
hs(zs, xs, ηs) = 0 (6.2) (P) 
gs(zs, xs, ηs) ≤ 0 (6.3) 
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where each operable system state s is described by a different set of equality (hs) 
and inequality constraints (gs), ηs is a vector describing the efficiency of the equipment 
that depends on the reliability, zs  is a vector of degrees of freedom specified in Z that are 
manipulated to achieve minimum total annualized cost and maximum expected revenue, xs 
is the vector of process variables specified in X, TAC is the total annualized cost, and EPR 
is the expected process revenue. The solution to the above optimization problem P can be 
obtained using solvers available with the GAMS modeling language365. 
The complete problem is solved as below in two stages, 
 Stage 1: is focused on the solution of process model to obtain process data
(such as flowrate, temperature) to calculate the System Survivability Index,
SSI and also optimize for the minimal total annualized cost, TAC.
 Stage 2: after obtaining the data, SSI is calculated and is used as the system
safety threshold in the safety model jointly with the process model and
input from the data-driven maintenance model to obtain the maximum
expected revenue, system reliability, and maintenance policy.
The process model is formulated from the first principles expressions for mass and 
energy balance. The process data is obtained from process simulation to calculate the 
system safety threshold at the minimum annualized cost. In the conventional method of 
problem formulation, the equipment efficiencies and reliability are considered constant. 
However, in practice, equipment failure, unplanned shutdown, unplanned downtime, and 
reduced equipment efficiency have a significant impact on safety and productivity. 
Therefore, these should be recognized while assessing the system effectiveness or process 
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system survivability index. Hence, in this work, equations relating to the reliability and 
efficiency of equipment are added to the process model by using ηs.  
Figure VI.1: Survivability assessment methodology 
6.3.2. Maintenance model 
Maintenance action selection 
Three types of maintenance alternatives preventive (PM), corrective CM, and 
predictive (PdM) as defined in Section 6.2 are studied. Three important variables of 
frequency, downtime, and equipment life are considered as an input to select the 
maintenance action alternative. Figure VI.2 demonstrates the model for maintenance action 
selection from preventive, corrective, and predictive maintenance. 
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Figure VI.2: Model for maintenance action selection 
Table VI.2 presents the ground truth based on the values of three factors frequency, 
downtime, and variability of equipment life to decide the maintenance action alternative. 
For the cases other than those included in the ground truth, cost values of the action type 
are considered to determine the alternative. The generic algorithm to select the 
maintenance action alternative is outlined in Appendix D. The overall system reliability for 
different states is calculated based on system reliability concepts of series or parallel 
configurations (See Appendix D) and system availability/operability (See Appendix D).  
Table VI.2: Maintenance action analysis (ground truth) 
Maintenance Action 
Frequency  




Variability of equipment 
life  
(years) 
Preventive maintenance (PM) High Low Low 
Corrective maintenance 7 Low Low High 
Predictive maintenance 
(PdM) 
Low High High 
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Data-driven maintenance model 
For the method developed in this research, the models for three variables – 
frequency, downtime, and equipment life variability are expressed covering the plant 
maintenance and resilience metrics data. Using the PRAF methodology, information from 
plant data in way of resilience metrics is utilized in the selection of the maintenance 
alternative. The resilience metrics including both technical and social aspects incorporate 
plant data from the historian, Central Maintenance Management System (CMMS), the 
PSM system, and others164. Table VI.3 lists the resilience metrics used in this work with 
their weights335. 
Table VI.3: Resilience metrics for maintenance model 
Resilience Metrics Weights 
 Number of unplanned maintenance jobs 0.79 
 Rotatory equipment pieces vibration/voltage rating/impeller 
speed  
0.87 
 Management response to the inspection findings of safety 
critical equipment (SCE) deficiency (spare parts) 1 
 % of maintenance backlogs 0.81 
 % of required maintenance procedures reviewed or revised as 
scheduled 0.81 
 % of process safety required training sessions completed 0.81 
A regression method 366 as illustrated in Figure VI.3 is utilized applying the Bayes 
concept. Models for three factors – frequency, downtime, and equipment life variability are 
expressed covering the plant maintenance and resilience metrics data.  
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Figure VI.3: Methodology for data-driven maintenance model 




where xis are the various weighted resilience metrics. 
We assume standard, semi-conjugate priors: 
β~N(b0, B0
−1)        (6.5)
where β is assumed a priori independent. Note that only starting values for β are 
allowed because the simulation is done using Gibbs sampling with the conditional error 
variance as the first block in the sampler. 
The estimate at a new time point is given by the following equation, 




6.3.3. Safety model 
The safety impact cost depends on the loss function based on the system safety 
threshold in terms of the type of incident (Tier 1 or Tier 2). Tier 1 and Tier 2 incidents are 
differentiated based on the level of consequence. Tier 1 is of greater consequence and Tier 
2 is of lesser consequence. For more details refer to API RP 754169. The four types of loss 
categories considered owing to these incidents are safety injuries/fatalities (S), 
environmental damage (E), asset damage (A), and production loss (L). The impact costs 
due to Tier 1 type incident scenario are denoted by S1, A1, E1, L1 and S2, A2, E2, L2 for 
Tier 2 type incident scenario. 
System Survivability Index 
In order to analyze the influence of safety on the system effectiveness in terms of 
overall profitability, a novel metric System Survivability Index, SSI is defined. The SSI is 
a dimensionless index and is interpreted as the ratio of the actual system effectiveness, SEa 
to the required system effectiveness, SEr 




System effectiveness is a function of process parameters and equipment 
characteristics and can be defined for various process systems. The actual system 
effectiveness is determined from the process model simulation and optimization for the 
minimum total annualized cost. The required system effectiveness is calculated based on 
the threshold specifications based on the safety scenarios for the process system under 
study.  
Additionally, another metric called the Resilience Survivability Index (RSI) for the 






where ER is the expected revenue of the system defined by eqn. (6.11). 
This metric measures the system capacity to respond to process upset situations. A 
higher value of RSI implies better system capacity to respond to process upset situations 
and a lower value of RSI means poor system capacity to respond or survive through 
process upset situations. 
6.3.4. Cost/revenue model 
The objective is to minimize the total annualized cost TAC and maximize the 
expected revenue for the process system. This cost/revenue function comprises different 
elements – capital cost, operating cost, product revenue, the energy cost of mechanical 
equipment (e.g. pumps and fan), maintenance cost, and safety impact cost.  
Total Annualized Cost 
The total annualized cost TAC is calculated as follows, 
TAC =  KfCcap + Cop        (6.9)
where Ccap is the annualized capital cost, Cop is the annual operating costs, and Kf is 
the annualized factor for investment. 
Revenue 
The expected process revenue (EPR) is calculated as follows, 
EPR = PR − Ec −  Mcost,system − SIcost     (6.10)
where PR is the product revenue, Ec is the energy cost; Mcost,system is the annual 
maintenance cost for the whole system; and SIcost is the is the safety impact cost. 
The expected revenue is calculated as follows, 
ER = ∑ 𝑝𝑠 (EPR)        (6.11)
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the expected revenue (ER) of the system is given as the weighted sum of the 
expected process revenue of each system state using as weights the probability of the 
system is in each particular state. The state probabilities ps are a function of the reliability 
and maintenance characteristics of the process equipment. 
Product revenue 
PR =  Cp − Crm        (6.12)
where Cp is the cost of products and Crm is the cost to make the products. 
Energy costs 
The energy cost for equipment (n) in the process system is calculated using the 
following equation, 
Ec =  ce ∗  ∑ Pn
n
m=1          (6.13)
where ce is the cost coefficient of electricity (US$/kWh); Pn is the power for the 
equipment (kWh).  
Maintenance costs 
The maintenance cost is included in the objective function as follows, 
Mcost,system = H ∗ [∑ (Cinsp,j +  MAcost,j)]
j
i=1      (6.14)
where H is the number of hours of operations in a year; Mcost,system is the annual 
maintenance cost for the whole system; and Cinsp,j is the inspection cost of unit j; MAcost,j is 
the maintenance cost of unit j that depends on the maintenance action type (preventive, 
corrective, or predictive analyzed from the data-driven maintenance model). 
Safety costs 
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The safety impact costs for different scenarios and loss categories are incorporated 
in the objective function depending on the system survivability index (described in Section 
6.3) as below, 
SIcost = H ∗ (1 − SSI) ∗  ∑ DCk
n
k=1       (6.15)
where SIcost is the safety impact cost; and SSI is the system survivability index 
(described in Section 6.3); DCk is the damage cost that depends on the various loss 
categories based on the safety impact scenarios mentioned in Section 6.3. 
6.4. Application to the cooling tower operations   
6.4.1. System and process description 
This section provides an example of the process system to demonstrate the 
survivability assessment methodology. The process system is a cooling tower operation 
with a fan and a network of three pumps supplying cooling water to two downstream units 
– batch reactor and distillation column. Figure VI.4 is a schematic depicting the equipment
configuration for this process system. This is a counter flow induced draft cooling tower. 
In this type of design, the air flows vertically upwards, directly opposite to the flow of 
water or counter to the current as the hot water flows downwards. For the induced-draft 
design, there is a fan mounted on the top of the cooling tower that pulls the air through the 
fill media. The cold water is pumped from the cooling tower basin to the downstream 
units. This cold water absorbs heat from the hot process streams and the warm water 
circulates back to the top of the cooling tower.  
The complete step-wise methodology applied to cooling tower and downstream 
process system is shown in Figure VI.5. Maintenance has been considered as one of the 
essential factors affecting life and energy efficient operation of the cooling tower367. In the 
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cooling tower process system, there are three primary system states: normal operation, 
process-upset event, and catastrophic state. The literature on maintenance issues of cooling 
tower components resulting in poor performance has highlighted several causes352, 368, 369. 
In the cooling tower example, the purpose is to prevent the catastrophic incident at 
downstream units by avoiding complete loss of cooling water supply. Poor or degraded 
performance of cooling towers is typically attributed to factors such as failure of the 
gearbox, bearings, motor, driveshaft; blockage and fouling of piping; corrosion; or uneven 
water distribution. Hence, the propagation events PE1, PE2, PE3, PE4 - poor pump 
performance, damaged fan blades, scale deposition, and clogged spray nozzles are selected 
for this study. These relate closely to the reliability and maintenance of cooling tower 
system components and hence maintenance has been used as the critical safeguard for this 
study and the model analysis.  
Figure VI.4: Cooling tower operations process system 
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Figure VI.5: Survivability assessment methodology: cooling tower operations 
6.4.2. Process model 
A schematic representation of the general arrangement of the counter-flow cooling 
tower is exhibited in Figure VI.4 and the underlying equations presented in Appendix E. 
In order to combine reliability and maintenance aspects, fan efficiency equation has 
been added to this model. This is determined by the overall equipment effectiveness 370, 
which is a product of availability, performance, and quality. The availability of the fan is 
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assumed as one, performance is defined as the ratio of actual air flowrate to ideal air 
flowrate (0.75) and quality is considered as the reliability. It can be mathematically written 
as, 
ηfan = 0.75 ∗  Rfan       (6.16)
From Figure VI.4, for the pump network system, a pump can be either available or 
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𝑠) is the state vector of this pump network system.
The pump network with three pumps involves a total of 23 = 8 states in which the 
system may reside with possible degradation, failure, or availability of the pump. The 
states of the pump network system are classified as structurally available/operable or 
unavailable/inoperable as shown in Appendix D. Equations (6.18) to (6.27) based on 
concepts from 371 describe all the eight states in which the system may reside by adjusting 
the values of the binary parameters 𝜔𝑗
𝑠 according to whether pump j is available or not in
the system state s. f represents the flowrates through the pumps and ηj, pcj, are the 
efficiencies and capacities of each pump, respectively.  
f1 =  f2 + f3 (6.18) 
f2 =  f4 + f5 (6.19) 
f8 =  f6 + f7 (6.20) 
f10 =  f8 +  f9 (6.21) 
f9 =  ηp3 ∗ f3 (6.22) 
f6 =  ηp1 ∗ f4 (6.23) 
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f7 =  ηp2 ∗ f5 (6.24) 
f4 ≤  pc1 ∗  ω1
s  (6.25) 
f5 ≤  pc2 ∗ ω2
s  (6.26) 
f3 ≤  pc3 ∗ ω3
s  (6.27) 
Table VI.4 presents the process specifications and process constraints for the two 
example process scenarios considered in the case study. For both the examples, cooling 
tower was required to remove 3400 kW of heat load at an ambient air pressure. For both 
the example process scenarios, film packing is used as the selected type of filling material 
as it provides the best combination of heat transfer and pressure losses so that the lowest 
total annual cost is obtained. Additionally, the draft type was chosen as the induced draft.  
In the first stage of the optimization problem, only cooling tower i.e. excluding the 
pump network and the downstream units is considered in the system boundary. The 
objective function involves the minimization of the total annual cost, TAC,  
minimize TAC =  KfCcap + Cop      (6.28)
where Ccap, Cop, Kf are described in Section 6.4. 
Table VI.4: Process specifications of process example scenarios 






Heat load, Q 257 3400 3400 
Dry-bulb temperature of the air 
at tower inlet, TAin (°C) 
22 22 
Wet-bulb temperature of the air 
at tower inlet, TWBin (°C) 
12 12 
Minimum process inlet 
temperature, TMPI (°C) 
55 65 
Minimum process outlet 
temperature, TMPO (°C) 
30 25 
Minimum allowable temperature 
difference, ΔT min (°C) 
10 5 
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This cooling tower MINLP model is presented in Appendix E and can be solved 
using the BARON372 or ANTIGONE373 solvers available with the GAMS modeling 
language365. For this work, ANTIGONE solver was used to obtain the solution. The 
solution from stage 1 of the optimization problem stated above gives the process data such 
as flowrate and temperature at the minimum TAC. This data is used to calculate the SSI, 
which is used as a system safety threshold in the second optimization problem. Here, the 
system includes the pump network and the two downstream units. The objective function 
is below, 
maximize EPR =  PR − Ec −  Mcost,system − SIcost    (6.30)
where PR, Ec, Mcost,system ,and  SIcost are described in Section 6.4. 
6.4.3. Maintenance model (Safeguard analysis) 
Frequency analysis 
For the frequency analysis, the failure rate captured from the data is augmented 
using the following metrics that authors identified and included them as covariates: 
weighted 24-h rolling vibration mean (x1), weighted 24-h rolling voltage mean (x2), 
weighted number of unplanned maintenance jobs (x3), and weighted percentage of 
maintenance backlogs (x4). The model estimated is: 
F=β0+β1*x1+β2*x2+β3*x3+β4*x4      (6.31) 
Downtime analysis 
For the downtime analysis, the repair time captured from the data is augmented 
using the following metrics that authors identified and included them as covariates: 
weighted percentage of SCE inspections findings managed consistent with company 
expectations based on the management response (x5), weighted percentage of required 
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maintenance procedures reviewed or revised as scheduled (x6), weighted percentage of 
process safety required training sessions completed (x7). The model estimated is: 
DT=βα+β5*x5+β6*x6+β7*x7       (6.32) 
Equipment life analysis 
For the equipment life analysis, the variability in equipment life captured from the 
data is augmented using the following metric that authors identified and included it as a 
covariate: weighted 24-h rolling impeller speed means (x8). The model estimated is: 
EL=βτ+β8*x8         (6.33) 
For this purpose, synthetic dataset containing 8760 data points over one year was 
generated. Figure VI.6 shows a snapshot of the final extracted features file for the 
frequency model. The model identification was done using the Monte Carlo Markov Chain 
regression method to find the coefficients or the βi values. All analysis was conducted in 
the programming language R184. 
Figure VI.6: Extracted features snapshot 
The methods and diagnostics tests used in this study to assess convergence are: 
• Trace plots: plot (), these are plots of the sampled parameter values versus the 
iteration number. It is good convergence if the lines are ‘wiggly’.
• Autocorrelation plots: acf (), these are used to determine the correlation 
between the values. It is a good sign if the correlation plots decay rapidly.
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• Heidelberg-Welch diagnostic: heidel.diag (), the null hypothesis that the 
sampled values come from a stationary distribution is tested using the Cramer-
von-Mises statistic.
6.4.4. Safety Model 
Safety Scenario 1 
The temperature control of a batch reactor is critical to the safe operation and 
product quality. In this scenario, the downstream unit is a batch reactor, where the supply 
of cooling water is safety critical as it maintains the jacket temperature of the reactor. 
When the cooling water supply is disrupted or not adequate or not temperature controlled, 
it can lead to runaway reaction situation leading to disastrous consequences such as fire, 
explosion etc. This would result in consequences in all four loss categories - safety 
injuries/fatalities, environmental damage, asset damage, and production loss. 
Safety Scenario 2 
This scenario is same as the Safety Scenario 1 where the downstream unit is a batch 
reactor. The only difference is in the severity of consequences as this is a Tier 2 type 
incident scenario. 
Safety Scenario 3 
The downstream unit, distillation column, in this case, requires the cooling water at 
a specific temperature and flowrate for overhead vapor condensation. In case of absence of 
cooling water at the required specifications, there will be a buildup of overhead vapors in 
the column. This would lead to relief through pressure safety valve to the flare system. 
There would be consequences in two loss categories – environmental damage, and the 
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production loss. The Safety Scenario 3 has been considered as more severe and hence Tier 
type 1 incident in the analysis. 
Safety Scenario 4 
This scenario is same as the Safety Scenario 3 where the downstream unit is a 
distillation column. The only difference is in the severity of consequences as this is a Tier 
2 type incident scenario. 
The required water mass flowrate and outlet water temperature for these four safety 
scenarios are taken as 30kg/s and 25°C. 
System Survivability Index 
The System Survivability Index is a dimensionless index and is defined in Section 
6.3. For the cooling tower operations, the system effectiveness is described as the cooling 
capability in terms of energy consumption. For current work, the cooling capability index 
374 is modified to include pump network. Therefore, it is a function of outlet water 
temperature of the cooling tower, water mass flowrate to the pump network, and the 
product flowrate of the cooling tower to the downstream units. It is expressed 








The overall pump network efficiency is the ratio of the energy delivered by the 
pump to the energy supplied to the pump shaft(s), which is a function of f10 (output 
flowrate from pump network to downstream units). TWin is the water temperature at the 
tower inlet, TWout is the water temperature at the tower outlet, f1 is the input flowrate to 
the pump network, Pfan is the electric power of the fan, and cp is the specific heat. The 
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required system effectiveness, SEr is evaluated based on the four different safety scenarios 
and the requirements as provided in this section.  
6.4.5. Cost/revenue model 
The cost values of various safety loss categories, maintenance activities, and 
process operations used in the example case study are listed in Appendix F. Different 
safety impact scenarios have been considered as described in Section 6.3. In addition, 
different cost structures of corrective and predictive maintenance, CCM/CPdM are 
employed in the study.  
6.5. Results and Discussion 
The results for the two example process scenarios for the first optimization problem 
are presented in Table VI.5. It is noticeable from the results that tower approach increases 
with the decrease in ΔTmin. In addition, for both the process example scenarios, with the 
decline in reliability of the fan, more power is consumed in order to maintain the flowrate 
and the outlet temperature of the tower. This results in an increase in the operation cost and 
hence an increase in the total annualized cost of the tower. 
Table VI.5: Optimization results 
Optimization results 
Process example scenario 1 Process example scenario 2 
Reliability of fan, ηfan 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.50 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.50 
Mass flow rate of 
water, mw (kg/s) 
32.74 32.88 33.14 33.28 33.84 34.56 35.31 36.91 
Water temperature at 
tower outlet, TWout 
(°C) 
20.2 20.3 20.5 20.6 26 26.5 27 28 
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Table VI.5: Continued 
Optimization results 
Process example scenario 1 Process example scenario 2 
Water temperature at 
tower inlet, TWin (°C) 
45 45 45 45 50 50 50 50 
Electric power of fan, 
Pfan 257 
74.5 79.8 95.8 100.2 23.3 24.9 29.9 31.3 
Range (°C) 24.8 24.7 24.5 24.4 24 23.5 23 22 
Approach (°C) 8.2 8.3 8.5 8.6 14 14.5 15 16 
Total Annualized Cost 
(USD) 
95570 99424 110834 113988 58807 60399 64327 66316 
6.5.1. System reliability 
The overall system reliability for different states as shown in Table VI.6 is 
calculated based on system availability/operability. The system availability/operability as 
reported before in this example case study depends on the pump network with three 
pumps.  
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The reliability of the system is plotted against time over the maintenance horizon of 
one year for each system state as exhibited in Figure VI.7. The reliability of the system 
decreases with time. Furthermore, it is evident from the plot that the system reliability has 
a steeper decrease for system state 7 as compared to system state 1.  
Figure VI.7: System reliability for different states 
6.5.2. Maintenance action analysis 
Data-driven maintenance model 
It is necessary to examine some diagnostics to assess whether the Markov chain has 
converged to its stationary distribution. The trace and density and autocorrelation plots are 
illustrated in Figures VI.8 and VI.9 respectively. It is evident that there is convergence as 
the trace plots are wiggly and the autocorrelation plots decay rapidly. Heidelberg-Welch 
convergence diagnostic test was implemented in the coda package 375 and the results were 
checked before using the posterior density sample for inference. All variables passed the 
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Heidelberg-Welch convergence test and the margin of error was found to be less than 0.1 
for all cases. This result reinforces the conclusions made from the trace and autocorrelation 
plots.  
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Figure VI.8: Trace and density plots for coefficients for pump 1: a – Equipment life; b,c – Frequency; d,e – Downtime 
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Figure VI.9: Autocorrelation plots for pump 1: a – Equipment life; b – Frequency; c – Downtime 
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The posterior probability density functions for equipment life, frequency, and 
downtime for all three pumps are represented in Figure VI.10. 
Figure VI.10: Posterior probability density functions for P1, P2, and P3 
6.5.3. Maintenance action selection 
In order to select the maintenance action alternative, the results of the three factors 
from the data-driven maintenance model as summarized in Table VI.7 are utilized. These 
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quantified results are used with the algorithm described in Appendix D to select the 
maintenance action alternative. 
Table VI.7: Results of maintenance action analysis 
Maintenance Action 
Frequency  










2.14 310 1.341 P3 
Corrective maintenance 1.05 140 3.896 P2 
Predictive maintenance 
(PdM) 
0.562 730 4.293 P1 
6.5.4. Reliability and expected process revenue 
Figure VI.11, is a plot of overall expected revenue of the system against system 
reliability. It is presented for four different safety scenarios and four maintenance cost 
classification types M1, M2, M3, and M4 as per Appendix F. From the graph, it is 
observed that with an increase in reliability, expected revenue increases. Furthermore, the 
expected revenue at a given system reliability is least for safety scenario 1 that is most 
severe in consequences and hence has higher losses and maximum for safety scenario 4, 
which is comparatively less severe in consequences and therefore has lower losses. 
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Figure VI.11: System reliability vs expected revenue 
The graph in Figure VI.12 portrays the change in expected revenue of the system 
with changing system reliability for four different safety scenarios and maintenance cost 
classification type M2. As visible in the graph, expected revenue has a rising trend with an 
increase in system reliability for all four safety scenarios. Additionally, the expected 
revenue (with SIC) for all safety scenarios follow a similar rising trend, which is linear 
except that for safety scenario 1. For safety scenario 1, expected revenue increases 
logarithmically with increasing system reliability. It is further vital to note that with the 
incorporation of the safety impact costs the expected revenue does not follow the classic 
exponential trend with increase in system reliability, which is generally the case. However, 
expected revenue without safety impact cost displays an exponential trend. 
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Figure VI.12: Trend of expected revenue with and without safety impact cost 
Figure VI.13: A pareto chart showing system reliability and expected revenue 
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Figure VI.13 illustrates a Pareto chart for system reliability vs expected revenue. 
On the X-axis, is the system reliability, primary Y-axis has expected revenue and 
secondary Y-axis shows the cumulative percentage. It can be concluded that 80% of the 
revenue is generated when system reliability is greater than 0.65. This type of information 
can be useful to develop effective maintenance policies. 
Reliability and safety impact cost 
Figure VI.14 depicts a bar graph that represents the change in the safety impact cost 
of the system with varying system reliability for seven different system states, four 
different safety scenarios, and maintenance cost classification type M2. One notable 
conclusion that is drawn from here is that, safety impact cost has a declining trend with an 
increase in system reliability for all states. Additionally, all system states follow a similar 
decreasing trend except that for system state 3. Furthermore, the minimum safety impact 
cost obtained is 2,40,450 USD with system reliability of 0.733 for system state 6. 
Likewise, it is noteworthy that 0.733 is not the highest system reliability but corresponds to 
minimum safety impact cost. 
Reliability and resilience survivability index 
Figure VI.15 highlights system reliability vs the resilience survivability index (RSI) 
of the system for seven different system states, four different safety scenarios, and 
maintenance cost classification type M2. Some observations that can be made from the 
graph are - resilience survivability index displays an increasing trend with respect to the 
system reliability for all states, the RSI is maximum for safety scenario 4 for all system 
states and minimum for safety scenario 1. This is aligned with the results of safety impact 
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cost with system reliability; the RSI is maximum for system state 4 with a value of 9.3 and 
is least for system state 5 with a value of 0.04. 
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Figure VI.14: System reliability vs safety impact cost 
Figure VI.15: System reliability vs RSI 
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6.6. Summary 
In this work, a novel method of survivability assessment using Process Resilience 
Analysis Framework (PRAF) was presented. The work demonstrates the development of 
an integrated model incorporating safety impact costs to identify optimal maintenance 
policy and process operating characteristics for safer and reliable operations.  The key 
elements of this approach are (i) a process model that captures the details such as 
availability/operability of system equipment; (ii) a maintenance model that decides the 
maintenance action type based on data-driven analysis including frequency, downtime, and 
variability in equipment life; (iii) a safety model that takes into account the impact 
scenarios and respective losses through a system safety threshold; (iv) a cost and an 
expected revenue objective function, which examines the trade-off between safety, 
maintenance, and energy costs. The major contribution of this work is the definition of 
novel metric System Survivability Index, SSI that is incorporated as the system safety 
threshold to analyze the safety impact costs. Most of the conventional modeling considers 
reliability and efficiency of equipment as constant in process modeling. This in reality is 
not true as equipment failure, unplanned shutdown, unplanned downtime, less equipment 
efficiency can result in safety impacts and production losses. In current work, varying 
reliability or efficiency of the equipment is used. This approach also demonstrates the 
consideration of both technical and social factors (human and organization related such as 
percentage of maintenance backlogs, percentage of required maintenance procedures 
reviewed or revised as scheduled, percentage of process safety required training sessions 
completed) during the analysis. Finally, this work introduces Resilience Survivability 
Index (RSI) metric to assess the system capacity to respond to process upset situations. 
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Furthermore, the approach demonstrates the utilization of the existing data recorded in 
plants and gain valuable insights about the overall system performance.  
An example of cooling tower operations, which is a MINLP formulation to obtain 
system effectiveness using minimum total annualized cost and maximum expected revenue 
as the objective function, explains the application of this method.  The process system 
consists of counter flow induced draft cooling tower, and two downstream units – batch 
reactor and distillation column. The equipment considered in this system are - fan on top of 
the cooling tower and pump network of three pumps. The results from the example case 
study explicitly show the trade-off between the process revenue, safety impact, and 
maintenance costs. Different scenarios were investigated and it was found that the highest 
reliability of the process system does not ensure maximum expected revenue or minimum 
safety impact cost or maximum resilience survivability index. This symbolizes the 
complexities and connectivity within the process system. Furthermore, this type of 
integrated analysis based on the data on process operations and equipment health provides 
valuable insights about the process system performance. Additionally, the expected 
revenue does not follow the exponential trend with increasing system reliability, which is 
usually the case in the conventional methods. The results indicate that the developed 
application of PRAF can effectively identify the maintenance action to implement to the 
process system and can incorporate safety impact costs successfully in an integrated 
manner. Hence, the methodology and analysis presented in this work can be adopted to 
make effective resource allocation and risk mitigation decisions and can be customized to 
different process or energy systems and industrial sectors.
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CHAPTER VII 
PROCESS SYSTEM RESILIENCE, BUSINESS CONTINUITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
In general, process safety and risk management challenges have increased because 
of competition, scale increase, pressure on energy use, reduced staff, etc., in the process 
industry, along with a heavier focus of public perception on hazards and risks globally. 
This shift has necessitated exploring tools for an efficient transition from the narrower risk 
management aims to a risk management with the broader goals of business continuity and 
sustainability. In this context, the application of the resilience engineering perspective, not 
only in humans and organizations but also in a real technical sense, is being explored as an 
approach for considering the dynamics of socio-technical aspects based on systems theory. 
As established in the previous chapters, the resilience methodology emphasizes the defense 
against non-linear dynamics, new types of threats, uncertainty, and recovery from upset or 
catastrophic situations. The chapter establishes and presents the relationship between risk 
management and resilience capabilities. As an example, the 2012 Chevron Richmond 
Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire incident is reviewed, and the established relationship 
between resilience and sustainability is applied. Based on the review of this case, the 
conclusion is drawn that using the PRAF, which is a quantitative and integrated approach, 
ensures a more effective risk management in the process industry. Hence, it strengthens the 
resilience capabilities of a process system to foster business continuity and sustainability. 
Resilience is known as the elastic property of a solid material to regain its original 





facilities and the enterprise as a whole to sustain their functions with a minimum of long-
term damage when subjected to shocks due to unexpected or unknown threats of a different 
kind. Threats can be both of internal and external nature. The difference between a risk and 
a resilience analysis has been well described39, stressing that risk is analyzed in view of a 
known hazard threat defined by a scenario, while resilience is analyzed in view of any 
threat. Some examples of these external threats are typically the 2017 Houston flooding 
due to hurricane Harvey causing the organic peroxide explosion and fires at the Arkema 
plant, and the earthquake and the following very high tsunami leading to the 2011 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor core melts. The two cases have in common the same 
failed thinking: the power supply will not cease because there are diesel generators as a 
back-up. As the diesel generators are not placed at a sufficient elevation or as in the 
Fukushima plant even in an underground room, floodwater will put these generators out-
of-action. Even, if flooding was imagined as a possibility, the chance had been estimated 
too remote for taking measures. In the case of the Arkema plant, the damage did not 
threaten yet the continuity of the company, but in quite some cases an unforeseen or 
ignored scenario may put the continuity at stake, or at least the damage done is much larger 
than it would have been if resilience measures would have been taken. 
This chapter will sketch the various aspects that come into play when an 
organization given its resources wants to be as resilient as possible to safeguard continuity 
of its business.  
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7.1. Business Continuity 
7.1.1. Definition of Business Continuity 
ISO 22301 and ISO 22313 define Business Continuity as ‘the capability of the 
organization to continue delivery of products or services at acceptable predefined levels 
following a disruptive incident’. 
7.1.2. Business Continuity Metrics 
Following are some Business Continuity metrics relevant to manufacturing systems 
that are reported in the literature301, 376, 377, 378, 379: 
 Business resumption response time: the time taken before your organization
can continue with business after an incident or failure scenario;
 Recovery time: the time taken for an organization to fully recover its
original state after an incident or failure scenario;
 Recovery Point Objective (RPO): the maximum amount of data loss an
organization can sustain during an event;
 Return Time Objective (RTO): the “target time for the resumption of
product, service or activity delivery after an incident;”
 Maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPoD) Duration after which an
organization’s viability will be irrevocably threatened because of the
adverse impacts that would arise as a result of not providing a
product/service or performing an activity.
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7.2. Sustainability 
7.2.1. Definition of Sustainable Process System 
Inspired by the definition of Sustainability by the United Nations Commission on 
Environment and Development (otherwise known as the Brundtland Commission) in 1987, 
a sustainable process system can be defined as follows: A process system that generated 
value to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. This objective is achieved by maintaining and 
continuously improving the environmental, safety, and social performance of the system.  
7.2.2. Sustainability Metrics 
Sustainability metrics can be categorized based on the three dimensions of 
Environment, Economy, and Social acceptability that are relevant to process systems380, as 
follows: 
 Eco-efficiency: a combination of impact of economic and environmental
aspects, e.g., set flaring.
 Socio-economic: a combination of societal/off-site impact (safety injuries or
fatalities) and financial impact (statutory fines).
 Socio-environmental: a combination of effects of natural resources
degradation, environmental releases, the safety of people, greenhouse gas
emissions, air emissions, etc.
7.3. Case study: Chevron Refinery Fire 
The Chevron Refinery Fire incident happened on August 6, 2012 in Richmond, 
California due to a catastrophic pipe rupture in the crude unit. The sulfidation corrosion led 
to the pipe rupture releasing flammable, high temperature light gas oil that ignited 
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subsequently. This incident led to minor injuries to six employees, community impact with 
15,000 local residents seeking medical attention, the shutdown of the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit (BART) metro, and around 13 million USD (including citations, statutory fines, 
medical reimbursements)381. 
7.3.1. Analysis 
To establish a relationship between resilience, business continuity, and 
sustainability, relevant metrics for all three with respect to Chevron incident are analyzed. 
Business continuity 
Based on the information available, two metrics for business continuity – business 
resumption response time, and recovery time are considered for this case study. Table 
VII.1 369, 370 provides the two important business continuity metrics for this case study.
Table VII.1: Business continuity metrics 
Business Continuity Metrics Days 
Business resumption response time 257 
Recovery time 1916 
From Table VII.1, following can be concluded: 
 The business resumption response time for the process unit is close to nine
months or three quarters of a year.
 The recovery time for the whole organization is around five years.
Sustainability 
In order to assess the sustainability of the process system under study, metrics or 
indicators relevant to the scope of the study are used to evaluate the performance. As 
mentioned earlier, three types of interrelated metrics are important and these can be 
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broadly assessed by social, environmental, and economic performance. Table VII.2 
summarizes the key sustainability performance indicators for Chevron as a whole for years 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
Figures VII.1 and VII.2 illustrate the total revenue and profit of Chevron for few 
years. It is important to note that these numbers represent the cumulative performance of 
whole Chevron and not just the Richmond Refinery site. Following are some interesting 
conclusions from Table VII.2: 
 The social performance within sustainability is assessed based on
the health and safety performance. It is observed that the year 2012
(incident year) had the worst performance followed by 2013 while
comparing the performance for five years. The only exception is for
days away from work rate where the worst performance is in the
year 2013.
 For the environmental performance, the years 2012 and 2013 have
the worst performances in the last five years. Metrics or indicators
such as costs of environmental, health and safety fines paid and
settlement is worst for the year 2013 (the year following the
incident).
 The financial performance depends on a variety of factors other than
the incident itself such as oil price. It follows a declining trend for
financial performance since 2011.
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Table VII.2: Sustainability metrics 
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Health and Safety Performance 
Total Recordable Incident Rate (incidents per 200,000 work-hours) 
Workforce 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.24 
Employees 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.2 
Contractors 0.16 0.2 0.21 0.23 0.25 
Lost-Time Incident Frequency (Days Away From Work incidents and fatalities per million 
work-hours) 
Workforce 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.15 
Employees 0.08 0.1 0.06 0.14 0.13 
Contractors 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.12 0.15 
Days Away From Work Rate (incidents per 200,000 work-hours) 
Workforce 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.02 0.027 
Employees 0.015 0.02 0.011 0.026 0.024 
Contractors 0.016 0.018 0.023 0.018 0.027 
Work-related fatal incident rate 
Work-related incidents per 100 
million work-hours 
0.81 0.51 0.49 1.02 1.11 
Number of process safety Tier 1 
events  
22 29 19 38 76 
Environmental Performance 
GHG emission (operated basis) 
Average flare gas volume rate, direct, 
operated basis (million standard 
cubic feet per day) 
644 615 563 692 821 
Air Emissions 
Total volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs) emitted (thousand metric 
tons) 
154 144 134 147 159 
Total sulfur oxides (SOx) emitted 
(thousand metric tons) 
66 84 112 141 123 
Total nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted 
(thousand metric tons) 
151 148 138 147 146 
Fines and settlements 
Number of EHS fines paid and 
settlements entered into, equity basis 
102 135 292 284 339 
Cost of EHS fines paid and 
settlements entered into, equity basis 
(millions of dollars) 
6.7 3.9 57.1 119.2 91.1 
Key Financials $ Millions 
Revenue 107567 131,118 203,784 220356 233899 
Profit -497 4,587 19,241 21423 26179 
Assets 260078 266103 267236 253753 232982 
Total Shareholder Equity 145556 152,716 155,028 149113 136524 
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Figure VII.1: Total annual revenue of Chevron 
Figure VII.2: Total annual profit of Chevron 
Process resilience 
Process resilience of the system under study is evaluated for three different phases 
of resilience – avoidance, survival, and recovery. The overall Resilience Performance 
Index (RPI) is assessed and summarized in Table VII.3. In the current case study of the 
Chevron refinery fire incident, resilience score is assigned based on the findings from the 
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investigation report. This score is used to calculate the actual resilience metrics (Rmactual) 
and best performance or full score is used to calculate the expected resilience metrics 
(Rmexpected). An RPI value of greater than one (>1) is considered being good, 0.5<RPI<1 is 
average, and <0.5 is poor performance. The RPI is calculated based on the plant data from 
resilience metrics using the following set of equations. 




Rmactual =  
Resilience score (actual performance)∗Weight
max (Resilience score (actual performance)∗Weight)
(7.2) 
Rmexpected =  
Resilience score (full)∗Weight
max (Resilience score (full)∗Weight)
(7.3) 
Some conclusions that can be drawn from Table VII.3 are as follows: 
 The RPI for all the relevant metrics is below 0.5, which is an indicator of
poor performance.
 The lowest value of RPI is 0.11, and it is interesting to note that this is for
social metrics such as process hazard evaluations completion, past-due
process safety actions, on-time safety critical equipment (SCE) inspections
completion, and maintenance backlogs. This provides an indication of
strong significance of social metrics in the risk and resilience assessment
during the operational part of a plant’s life cycle. And that is also when the
Safety-II attitude is most relevant.
 The highest value of RPI is 0.37 for the metric mock drills for emergency
situations.
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 For the three phases, the process system had best possible ways to control
the upset situation in the survival phase, followed by avoidance, and lastly 
recovery. 
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safeguard evaluation, and damage 
mechanism hazard review not 
performed. 
0.11 
Past-due process safety 
actions 
0.93 
No formal method to 
communicate and implement 
Energy Technology Company 





through the MoC 
procedure 
0.75 
No MoC performed to evaluate 
the risk of new T-Min. 
0.34 




Recommendation to inspect 4-
Sidecut line not implemented. 
0.11 
Management response to 
the inspection findings of 
(SCE) deficiency 
1 0.34 
Maintenance backlogs 0.81 




Successful tests for 
emergency systems and 
procedures 
1 
No guiding emergency leak 
response protocol. 
0.25 
Mock drills for 
emergency situations 
0.94 0.37 
* RPI stands for Resilience Performance Index (ratio of actual to expected value of
resilience metrics) 
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Furthermore, from the combined analysis of Tables VII.1, VII.2, and VII.3 it is 
evident that resilience and sustainability are closely related. Also, all three metrics clearly 
depict the fact that resilience, sustainability, and business continuity aspects are related in 
some way or the other. 
Figure VII.3: Trendline result for Business Continuity and Resilience relationship 
The analysis results based on the incident case study are summarized in Figures 
VII.3 and VII.4. As illustrated in the qualitative analysis in Figure VII.3, with the increase
in resources in the recoverability phase, both resilience and business continuity of the 
process system increase. This increase is because time is the critical parameter for both 
resilience and business continuity in the recovery phase. With more resources, the response 
time and hence overall recovery time can be reduced. This would lead to increase in both 
process system resilience and business continuity.  Therefore, with regard to the 
recoverability resources, it is clear that there exists a positive proportional relationship 
between business continuity and resilience. Figure VII.4 illustrates the relationship 
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between process system resilience and sustainability for three resilience phases based on 
results from Tables VII.2 and VII.3 and also considering the number of resources 
available. In the avoidance phase, a moderately sustainable process system would require 
fewer resources. However, the system would have been more robust and as well as resilient 
with more resources. For the survival phase, the system gains both robustness and 
sustainable characteristics to a medium level only, even at the deployment of more 
resources. This is due to limited time and resources available, the process system will 
unlikely reach its full potential. Clearly, for the recovery phase, with low resources, both 
the sustainability and resilience of the system is low and would be high with more 
resources.  
Figure VII.4: Trendline results for Sustainability and Resilience Relationship 
It is difficult to establish a correlation between sustainability and business 
continuity and it needs further research with more data. Similarly, at this stage of research, 
at least a semi-quantitative correlation between resilience, sustainability and business 
continuity is difficult to state and it requires more data and a further detailed analysis of 
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various trade-offs based on risk acceptance and desired resilience levels of process system 
or management. This may be considered as future work, which will incorporate explicit 
cost values and detailed simulation and multi-objective optimization methods to 
incorporate conflicting goals and their mutual impacts. 
7.4. Summary 
Building resilience capability of a process plant is initiated by being concerned 
about continuity of the business in the longer term, and it consists of a way of thinking. 
The framework for this was laid down. As a result of a system approach pushing for 
resiliency, a comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of an organization is needed that 
will be quite effort intensive. Because threats may be unknown and unexpected, a full risk 
assessment in the plant design stage will certainly not be sufficient. Although thorough 
hazard identification will be of great help then and in later stages, the four aspects of 
process system resilience – early detection, error-tolerant design, plasticity, and 
recoverability - require other aspects to also be considered. This will certainly be the case 
in the operational stage where the effectiveness of the organization, teamwork, hence the 
human interaction both within the organization and with the plant equipment are key, and 
when the idea of resilience engineering in the human sense with the Safety-II approach 
should be deployed. Effective management needs indicators to steer an organization in the 
right direction. Practical, effective and efficient realization of the ideas of resilience will 
need therefore further development of software tools, and data analytics. 
In the case study presented, the effect of neglecting to keep sufficient resources for 
unexpected disturbances, and the correlations of resilience capacity of a process system 
with regard to business continuity and sustainability were shown.
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CHAPTER VIII  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The objective of this research has been to establish a systematic framework for 
early detection of unsafe domains of operation, assessment of aggregate risks and 
prioritization of safety barriers during process upset situations and reduction in response 
time resulting in a reduced frequency of loss of containment events 37, reduced 
consequences and enhanced recovery.  The implementation of models within PRAF would 
also result in better flexibility and control, operability, and maintainability of process 
operations. 
8.1. Conclusions 
Chapter I provided the motivation and challenges behind the research in the area of 
advanced risk and resilience assessment. The limitations of existing methods, reasons for 
complex systems failure, comparative regulatory regime analysis, and potential 
improvement opportunities have been reviewed and presented. 
A significant amount of work has been previously conducted in area of resilience 
by research community. Chapter II presents a literature review of the previous 
developments on which the Process Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF) concepts and 
model formulations presented are based. The review covers the previous work carried out 
in system resilience and resilience engineering, risk and resilience assessment of process 
systems, and modeling aspects of process system resilience. 
The foundations of the proposed framework PRAF have been formally introduced 
in Chapter III. In particular, concepts of process system resilience, unified taxonomy, and 
four aspects of process system resilience: early detection, error-tolerant design, 
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recoverability, and plasticity, have been presented. The details on resilience metrics and 
PRAF survey and response analysis is also provided in this chapter. In addition, matrix-
based quantification method for social aspects is represented and demonstrated using an 
example of reactor charging procedure. 
In Chapter IV, a novel resilience-based qualitative method for hazard analysis 
called Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard Analysis (RIPSHA) has been 
proposed. The key aspects of the RIPSHA approach such as bi-layered method, covering 
four modes of operations, along with templates for RIPSHA worksheets has been 
provided.  
 A thorough predictability assessment analysis procedure has been formally 
proposed in Chapter V, for the identification of the process upset situations or events 
affecting the flexibility and control of the process system under study. A new method using 
MCMC algorithms, sensitivity analysis and optimization has been introduced that utilizes 
plant data. 
In Chapter VI, a novel method of survivability assessment using PRAF has been 
presented. The proposed methodology aimed to determine the optimal maintenance policy 
for optimal and safer plant operations. The implementation of the survival model is 
demonstrated on a cooling tower operation example problem (MINLP formulation), where 
optimal operation and maintenance (preventive, corrective, and predictive) strategies are 
determined based on trade-off analysis of process revenue, safety impact, and maintenance 
costs. 
Finally, the concepts of business continuity, sustainability, process system 
resilience and their relationships have been explored and presented in Chapter VII. A case 
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study on Chevron Richmond refinery incident is applied to find out the relationships based 
on the metrics for the three aspects.  
In summary, the main contributions of this work have been: 
 A standard process system resilience framework called PRAF - ‘Process
Resilience Analysis Framework’ with a unified taxonomy has been
established. This framework is an integrated, dynamic, systems-based,
quantifiable framework for enhanced risk and resilience management
through improved flexibility, operability, maintainability, and
controllability.
 24 process system resilience metrics including both technical and social
aspects have been developed. These resilience metrics in principle allow for
system optimization to develop effective risk management strategies in
design and operations of such systems.
 A PRAF survey has been conducted and survey response has been analyzed
to answer the three research questions related to incorporation of the
resilience metrics in the risk and/or resilience assessment – what are the
most important metrics for each of the three phases of PRAF – avoidance,
survival, and recovery?, are there any differences in viewpoints of various
groups of survey respondents?, what are the weights or level of importance
for each of the metrics?
 A new resilience-based and integrated systems approach for hazard analysis
called RIPSHA – ‘Resilience-based Integrated Process Systems Hazard
Analysis’ has been developed and methodology demonstrated using a LNG
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and tank explosion case study examples. A significant feature of RIPSHA 
methodology is that it covers two layers – management system (process 
safety culture and resilient leadership; operational discipline, and process 
safety systems) and plant system (process/plant equipment, operator/human 
and procedures) and four different modes of analysis − design, normal 
operations, simultaneous operations, and transient operations to be applied 
throughout the life cycle of a facility. The study results illustrate that the 
resilience-based approach is useful for identification of unknown scenarios 
from human and organizational perspectives. 
 A predictability assessment methodology to predict process upset situations
and hence have better flexibility and control of process system by virtue of
a Monte Carlo Markov Chain formulation, Global Sensitivity Analysis,
robust simulation, and optimization backed by process resilience concepts
has been developed and demonstrated using a batch reactor example.
 The established predictability assessment approach would enable the risk
assessors to make risk decisions based on information of their process plant
and hence manage and quantify uncertainties and better allocate the
resources towards improvement areas.
 A novel method of survivability assessment using PRAF was presented.
The work demonstrates the development of an integrated model
incorporating safety impact costs to identify optimal maintenance policy
and process operating characteristics for safer and reliable operations. A
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novel metric called SSI – ‘System Survivability Index,’ was incorporated as 
the system safety threshold to analyze the safety impact costs.  
 The implementation of the developed models can (i) integrate the social
factors analysis and quantify them using a single approach, (ii) move from
traditional point values for occurrence of loss of containment events (used
in QRAs) to a range similar to the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
methods, and (iii) manage the uncertainties in the limited historical database
on frequency or failure rates by using resilience metrics and thus
incorporating the process plant performance data of the plant under study.
This subsequently may increase safety, reliability, efficiency, and
profitability of the process system.
 Concepts of business continuity, sustainability, process system resilience
and their relationship was summarized. A case study using the metrics in
each of these areas and study results on the effect of resources for
unexpected disturbances, and the correlations of resilience capacity of a
process system with regard to business continuity and sustainability were
shown.
8.2. Recommendations for future directions 
Within the PRAF research, the following aspects could be looked into for further 
development: 
 Recoverability Assessment: the concepts for uncertainty quantification and
social aspects analysis can be furthered for the recoverability analysis.
Some major elements of this assessment are 1) a process model that
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captures the details such as process variations, 2) a barriers assessment 
model that enhances the assessment of mitigation barriers by quantifying 
the uncertainty in the probability of failure on demand values, 3) a decision-
making model to evaluate the behavior of personnel during emergency 
situation, for example, in selection of the evacuation route, and 4) an 
optimization model based on the objective of maximum flow and minimum 
cost.  
 Process resilience index (PRI): the current work proposes the methods for
estimation of the resilience sub-indices for the prediction, survival, and the
recovery phases. These are resilience prediction index (RPI), resilience
survival index (RSI), and resilience recovery index (RRI). This work and
concepts could be extended to evaluate the PRI for a single process system.
 Process system resilience metrics: the results of the metrics study indicate
potential improvement for further research such as extending the survey to
determine the most appropriate phase of the metric, find the relative level of
significance of three phases, and establish correlations between metrics and
performance by using actual data.
 Maintenance model: the maintenance model, presented in Chapter VI, is
based on steady-state considerations; here extensions to include time-
dependent maintenance activities could be an essential step for a more
realistic representation of dynamic process operations. Additionally,
objective such as of maintenance scheduling and planning would be another
interesting aspect to incorporate in the current model.
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 PRAF application in design phase: the models developed within PRAF can
be extended to formulate multi-objective optimization problems for
different applications such as process intensification during the design stage
analysis. Various objectives and constraints can be set and a trade-off
analysis can be carried out for such studies.
 Environmental considerations: the same models can be developed further in
order to explicitly include environmental losses or constraints in addition to
process, product quality and safety constraints in the optimization
formulation.
 Computing platform: the analysis in the current research has been carried
out in different platforms – gPROMS, MATLAB, programming language
R, and GAMS. In future, opportunities may be explored to carry out
complete analysis in a single platform and deliver it as a PRAF-based
software tool.
 Benchmarking studies: predictive and survival assessment models in the
current research have been limited to single process unit case studies,
however, this work could be extended to multiple process system units and
can also be used to benchmark and compare the resilience capacities and
performance of any two process systems.
 Extension to supply chain network analysis: the various concepts and
methods developed within PRAF have been currently applied to
manufacturing design and operations. In future, the systems thinking, top
requirements of the system for effectiveness, business continuity and
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statistical techniques, sensitivity analysis, prediction tools, and optimization 
methods can be furthered in areas of supply chain network analysis. 
 Application: the methodology and analysis presented in this research can be
adopted to make effective resource allocation and risk mitigation decisions
and can be customized to different process or energy systems and industrial
sectors such as pharmaceutical plants, LNG industry, and oil and gas units.
Additionally, the PRAF methodology can be applied to compare process
technologies during the conceptual stages of design.
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APPENDIX A  
SOBOL SENSITIVITY INDICES 
Sobol’s GSA Indices320 
The basis of the Sobol’ global indices is an ANOVA-like decomposition of the 
total variability of the model into summands of increasing dimensionality. This 
decomposition takes place within the boundaries of the n-dimensional unit cube, where n is 
the number of input factors. Let us define the output variable as 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝑋), where X is the 
vector of input factors. It is possible to decompose 𝑓(𝑋) into summands of increasing 
dimensionality, 
𝑓(𝑋1, … … , 𝑋𝑛) =  𝑓0 + ∑ 𝑓𝑖(𝑋𝑖) +  ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑗) + ⋯ + 𝑓1,2,…..,𝑛(𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛)1≤𝑖≤𝑗≤𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1   (A.1) 
The decomposition presented in eqn. (A.1) is termed ANOVA if 𝑓0 is constant and 
the integral of every summand over any of the variables it contains is equal to zero. 
∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =  𝑓0          (A.2) 
and 
∫ 𝑓𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑛(𝑋𝑖1,…….,𝑋𝑖𝑛)𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 0,        1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑠
1
0
     (A.3) 
It can be easily proven that eqns. (A.2) and (A.3) uniquely define all the terms in 
eqn. (A.1). In order to define the one-dimensional terms, eqn. (A.1) is integrated over all 
variables except 𝑥𝑖. 
∫ 𝑓(𝑥) ∏ 𝑑𝑥𝑘 = 𝑓0 + 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖)𝑘≠𝑖        (A.4) 
This can be extended to include all higher order terms as well. Assuming 𝑓(𝑥) to 
be square integrable implies that all the 𝑓𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑠 are square integrable as well. Squaring 





∫ 𝑓2(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑓0
2 = ∑ ∑ ∫ 𝑓𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑠




𝑠=1     (A.5) 
If x were a random point uniformly distributed within the unit hypercube 𝐼𝑛, then 
𝑓(𝑥) and 𝑓𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑠(𝑥𝑖1,…,𝑥𝑖𝑠) would become random variables with variances D and 
𝐷𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑠, respectively. Hence, the following constants from eqn. (A.5) are named 
variances:  
𝐷 = ∫ 𝑓2𝑑𝑥 −  𝑓0
2  𝐷𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑠 = ∫ 𝑓𝑖1,…….,𝑖𝑠
2𝑑𝑥𝑖1 … . . 𝑑𝑥𝑖𝑠   (A.6) 
A measure of the main effect of each factor on the model output can be now 




         (A.7) 





𝑠=1 = 1        (A.8) 
Apart from sensitivity indices for individual input factors, the Sobol method allows 
indices to be evaluated for subsets of factors. Therefore, after an initial screening of the 
model parameters, those indicated as less important can be grouped into subsets, thus 
gaining in computational time. Input factors can also be grouped and studied according to 
their physical or biological nature382.   
Let us now consider a subset of m input factors, where 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, namely 
𝑦 = (𝑥𝑘1,…,𝑥𝑘𝑚). Let z denote the set of 𝑛 − 𝑚 remaining input factors. The variance 
corresponding to the subset y can be defined as 




𝑠=1         𝐾 = (𝑘1, … , 𝑘𝑚)    (A.9)  
Equation (A.9) can be rewritten for the variance of the second subgroup, 𝐷𝑦. The 






𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐷 − 𝐷𝑦         (A.10) 
It is now possible to define the two global sensitivity indices for the subset of input 
factors y. The 𝑆𝑦 term represents the main effect of the subset on the output variance, 
whereas the term 𝑆𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  corresponds to the TSI. The latter includes both the individual 





         and      𝑆𝑦




       (A.11) 
From eqns. (A.10) and (A.11) one can easily derive that 𝑆𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 1 − 𝑆𝑦 and that 
0 ≤ 𝑆𝑦 ≤ 𝑆𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ≤ 1. Two extreme cases exist for the values of 𝑆𝑦 and 𝑆𝑦
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙. Either they 
are both 0, in which case they do not have any effect on the model output, or they are both 
equal to 1, in which case the model output variance is a direct result of the variance of this 





APPENDIX B  
STATISTICAL METHODS 
Bayes’ theorem  
For two events A and B Bayes’ theorem states that P(A | B) = P(B | A) P(A)/P(B). 
Consider a statistical model Pθ used to describe the data X1, . . ., Xn. The parameter θ ∈ Θ is 
an index for the family of models {Pθ: θ ∈ Θ}. Let pθ be the joint distribution of X1, . . ., Xn, 
usually termed as the likelihood. Suppose there is a prior distribution π (·) on Θ. Then by the 
application of Bayes’ theorem the posterior distribution of θ | X1, . . . , Xn is given by,  
p(θ | X1, . . . , Xn) = 
pθ(X1,...,X𝑛) π(θ) 
m(X1,...,X𝑛)
       (B.1)
 where m(·) is the marginal distribution of X1, . . ., Xn under the prior π(·).  
Conjugate priors  
Inferential summaries in a Bayesian framework are usually averages taken over the 
posterior distribution. For example, the posterior mean θB = ∫ θp(θ | X) or the predictive 
distribution for a new observation Xnew = ∫ p(xnew | θ)p(θ | X) where we write X to 
denote the observed data. Thus it is desirable to have an explicit form of the posterior p(θ | 
X), so that integrals of the above form may be computed without having to use numerical 
approximation. Conjugate priors are priors π over θ so that the posterior p(θ | X) belongs to 
the same family of probability distributions.  
Gibbs sampling  
Suppose we want to sample from p(θ1, θ2), a joint distribution on (θ1, θ2). Often, the 
joint distribution will be mathematically intractable making it impossible to draw samples. 





to sample from this complicated distribution when the conditional distributions p(θ1 | θ2) 
and p(θ2 | θ1) are easy to sample from. The Markov chain steps are:  
1. Draw θ1 ∼ p(θ1 | θ2).  
2. Draw θ2 ∼ p(θ2 | θ1).  
Standard Markov chain algebra can then be used to prove that such a draw (θ1, θ2) 
is indeed coming from the desired distribution p(θ1, θ2). The algorithm is easily extended 
to settings where there are more than two variables. Suppose we want to draw samples 
from p(θ1, . . . , θk). We display below a generic t
th step to sample from this joint 
distribution. Let (𝜃1
(𝑡−1)
, . . . , 𝜃𝑘
(𝑡−1)
) be the draw at the (t − 1)th iteration. 
Input: (𝜃1
(𝑡−1)




     Draw (𝜃𝑗
(𝑡)
∼ p(θ𝑗  | 𝜃1
(𝑡)


















APPENDIX C  
EULERS METHOD 
Euler's method is a basic numerical method for solving differential equations. The 
approximate solution is derived by approximating the derivative in the differential equation 
by the slope of a secant line.  
Let’s denote the time at the nth time-step by tn and the solution at the n
th step by yn, 
i.e., 
𝑦𝑛 ≡ 𝑦(𝑡 = 𝑡𝑛) 
The step size h (assumed to be constant) is then given by, 
ℎ = 𝑡𝑛 − 𝑡𝑛−1 
Given the (𝑡𝑛, 𝑦𝑛), the (explicit) forward Euler method computes 𝑦𝑛+1 as, 
𝑦𝑛+1 = 𝑦𝑛 + ℎ𝑓(𝑦𝑛, 𝑡𝑛) 
The forward Euler method is based on a truncated Taylor series expansion. 






APPENDIX D  
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY 
System reliability 
The reliability of a system in series (Rss) with n components can be mathematically written 
as, 
𝑅𝑠𝑠 =  ∏ 𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1          (D.1)  
where Ri represents the reliability of component i. 
The reliability of a system in parallel (Rsp) with n components can be mathematically written 
as, 
𝑅𝑠𝑝 = 1 −  ∏ (1 −  𝑅𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )        (D.2)  
where Rj represents the reliability of component j. 





          (D.3) 
The reliability of the system under study is mathematically written as, 
𝑅𝑠 =  ∏ 𝑅𝑖
2
𝑖=1           (D.4) 
R1 : reliability of fan (Rfan) 
R2 : reliability of pump network (Rpn) 
𝑅𝑝𝑛 = 1 −  ∏ (1 −  𝑅𝑝𝑗
3
𝑗=1 )        (D.5)  
Rp1, Rp2, Rp3 : reliability of pump  
α: scale parameter 






Generic algorithm: maintenance action selection 
Function: Action decision (Ground truth, input parameter sequence) 
Assign arrays ‘M’ and ‘I’ to store the values of truth and parameters input.  
Map the values high and low as ‘1’ and ‘0’. 
Binarize the truth and input values. 
Run the for loop to check if values of input array match with the truth. Initialize another 
array ‘Count’ and increase it if there is a match.  
Repeat the above step to find if the highest match score. 
The one with the highest matched score is the alternative to be selected. 
If there are multiple highest matched scores, ask the user to input the cost of each action. 
Choose the final action with minimum cost. 
Return the final maintenance action selected. 
System states: structural classification  
System state, s Equipment state (w1s, w2s, w3s) Availability/Operability , ϕ (ws) 
1 1,1,1 Available/Operable 
2 0,1,1 Available/Operable 
3 1,0,1 Available/Operable 
4 1,1,0 Available/Operable 
5 0,0,1 Available/Operable 
6 0,1,0 Available/Operable 
7 1,0,0 Available/Operable 






APPENDIX E  
COOLING TOWER PROCESS MODEL 
The following equations383 refer to the cooling tower example presented in Section 
6.4 and schematically depicted in Figure VI.4. 
Equations: 
Heat load: 
Q =  cpwmw(TWin − TWout)       (E.1) 
Power consumption:         (E.2) 
P =  
mavout∆Pt
ρoutηf
           
Water consumption: 
mwev =  ma(wout − win)        (E.3) 
mbw =  
mmw
ncycles
−  mwd        (E.4) 
mwd = 0.002mw         (E.5) 
mmw =  mwev + mbw +  mwd        (E.6) 
mmw =  
ncyclesmwev
ncycles −1
          (E.7) 
Physical Properties: 
hain =  −6.38887667 + 0.86581791 TWBin + 15.7153617e











          
hsaout =  hain +
cpwmw
ma
(TWin − TWout)      (E.10) 
wout =  
0.62509 PVout
Ptot−1.05 PVout





ln(PV) = ∑ cnT
n + 6.5459673 ln(T)3n=−1       (E.12) 






] [1 + w]       (E.13) 
 
Feasibility constraints: 
TWout −  TWBin ≥ 2.8        (E.14) 
TWout  ≤ TMPO − ∆Tmin        (E.15) 
TWin  ≤ TMPI −  ∆Tmin        (E.16) 
TWin ≤ 50℃          (E.17) 
TWin >  TWout         (E.18) 
TAout >  TAin         (E.19) 
0.5 ≤  
mw
ma
 ≤ 2.5         (E.20) 
2.9 ≤  
mw
Afr
 ≤ 5.96         (E.21) 
1.2 ≤  
ma
Afr
 ≤ 4.25         (E.22) 
mw  > 0          (E.23) 





APPENDIX F  
VALUES OF CONSTANTS AND COST NUMBERS 
Cost values used in the model 
Safety impact (USD, per unit hours of operation) 
Tier 1 
S1 E1  A1 L1 
50 45 47.5 32.5 
Tier 2 
S2 E2  A2 L2 
25 20 27.5 17.5 






CCM = CPdM 
(M3) 




25 25 150 300 
Corrective 
maintenance 
70 1000 500 400 
Predictive 
maintenance 
55 100 500 800 
Inspection cost 10 








CCM = CPdM 
(M3) 




37.5 37.5 225 450 
Corrective 
maintenance 
105 1500 750 600 
Predictive 
maintenance 
82.5 150 750 1200 
Inspection cost 15 
Process operations 
Cp: cost in USD per kg cooling water flowrate   0.0000763 
Ec: cost in USD per kWh 0.085 
Cp1:cost in USD per kg product flowrate 
(batch reactor) 
1.5 
Cp2 :cost in USD per kg product flowrate 
(overhead vapor condensation) 
2 
 Crm1 :making cost in USD per kg product 
flowrate (batch reactor) 
0.5 
Crm2 :making cost in USD per kg product 







List of various constants  
Scalar Description Value 
H number of hours of operations in a year  2000 
pc1 pump 1 design capacity 33 
pc2 pump 2 design capacity 42 
pc3 pump 3 design capacity 50 
ηp1 pump 1 efficiency 0.63 
ηp2 pump 2 efficiency 0.56 
ηp3 pump 3 efficiency 0.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
